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Abstract 
 
You and I lead different lives. While we share a society and a world, our existence is 
separate from one another. You and I matter individually, by ourselves. My 
dissertation is about this simple thought. I argue that this simple insight, the 
separateness of persons, tells us something fundamental about morality. My 
dissertation seeks to answer how the separateness of persons matters. I develop a 
precise view of the demands of the separateness of persons. The separateness of 
persons imposes both a requirement on the justification of first-order moral 
principles as well as a requirement on the content of first-order moral principles. In 
specifying these demands, I argue that respecting the separateness of persons 
requires taking into consideration each person’s point of view separately. This 
requires taking into account the moral relations in which individuals stand to one 
another. I make use of this relational understanding of the separateness of persons to 
advance various debates in moral and political philosophy. I argue for a framework 
to assess to which extent the veil of ignorance can be reconciled with the separateness 
of persons. I also argue for a new view on the ethics of risk which is a form of 
contractualism that discounts risks only by their objective risk. Furthermore, I argue 
for a new solution to the problem of aggregation that is skeptical of aggregation and 
can set plausible limits to aggregation. Lastly, I provide a new relational agent-based 
justification for deontological constraints. In addition to answering how the 
separateness of persons matters, I defend the separateness of persons against 
challenges. Most importantly, I argue that the importance of the separateness of 
persons is not undermined even if we believe that our personal identity, i.e. whether 
we persist as the same person, is unimportant. 
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Introduction 
 
 Suppose you have one child that suffers from a painful disability. There is a 
treatment available that will remove the disability, but the treatment is arduous for 
your child. The treatment requires you to move to the city. Your child will lose their 
current friends and have no longer the joy of nature that provided relief from the 
disability. But after the treatment is over your child will flourish more without the 
disability. Are you permitted to move to the city to gain access to the treatment? The 
answer it seems depends on whether the long-term benefits outweigh the short-term 
losses. If on balance they do, it is permissible for you to proceed. If on balance they 
do not, it is impermissible for you to proceed. Now suppose you have two children, 
one of which suffers from a painful disability. The treatment requires you to move to 
the city. But now the burdens are on your able-bodied child instead of your disabled 
child. Are you permitted to move to the city to access the treatment? Here it seems 
that the answer is more difficult. Plausibly, you are allowed to move to the city even 
if on balance the burdens to your able-bodied child somewhat outweigh the benefits 
to your disabled child.1 Why is this? Why is the answer in the first case not available 
in the second case? 
 The reason is that the second case is a trade-off between the interests of two 
persons whereas the trade-off in the first case is a trade-off between different interests 
of one person. The second trade-off is inter-personal, the first trade-off is intra-personal. 
But why can we not simply proceed the same way for inter-personal trade-offs as we 
do for intra-personal trade-offs? To treat both trade-offs the same way would violate 
the separateness of persons. 
You and I lead different lives. While we share a society and a world, our 
existences are separate from one another. You and I matter individually, by ourselves. 
This is the core idea, the simple thought, behind the separateness of persons. In this 
 
1 The contrast is inspired by a case of Thomas Nagel’s. Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 123-24. A similar one-child case, albeit 
under conditions of risk, is presented and contrasted with Nagel’s two-child case by Michael 
Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve, “Why It Matters That Some Are Worse Off Than Others: An 
Argument against the Priority View,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 37 (2009): 171-99, at p. 188. 
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dissertation, I argue that this simple insight tells us something fundamental about 
morality. 
 
I. Different Trade-Offs 
 
The idea that different kinds of trade-offs require different solutions is not a 
new one. The earliest version of this criticism that I have been able to locate is due to 
Richard Price. It occurs in Price’s book A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals in 
1758. Price examines the view that the sole standard for justice is general utility or 
public happiness. In effect, the view that he examines is a utilitarian theory of justice. 
Price does not attribute this view to any specific author and his criticism predates the 
beginning of classical utilitarianism with Bentham’s An Introduction to the Principles of 
Morals and Legislation in 1789. In a footnote, Price mentions, however, an affinity 
between the view he examines and the work of Frances Hutcheson.2  
Price begins by pointing out how under the view in question people may be 
put into misery if this is what overall happiness demands. He then asks that from the 
standpoint of such a utilitarian principle: 
“What makes the difference between communicating happiness to a 
single being in such a manner, as that it shall be only the excess of his 
enjoyments above his sufferings; and communicating happiness to a 
system of beings in such a manner that a great number of them shall be 
totally miserable, but a greater number happy? Would there be nothing in 
such a procedure that was not right and just … Such consequences are 
plainly shocking to our natural sentiments; but I know not how to avoid 
them on the principles I am examining.”3 
 
2 Richard Price, A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948), 
p. 161fn. Hutcheson is a precursor to classical utilitarianism whose moral thought shows great 
resemblance to utilitarianism. He both gives an analysis of rights in terms of their tendency to 
promote the universal good and provides a criterion for evaluating actions that resembles 
Bentham’s greatest happiness principle. See Julia Driver, “The History of Utilitarianism,” in 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Winter 2014 Edition, ed. Edward N. Zalta (URL: 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/utilitarianism-history/>) 
3 Price, A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals, p. 160. Emphasis in the original. 
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Price observes that a utilitarian principle must ignore the difference between 
balancing the happiness and suffering of a single being and balancing the happiness 
and suffering of a system of beings. In effect, Price describes here that a utilitarian 
principle can draw no distinction between inter-personal and intra-personal trade-
offs. To treat these two trade-offs alike is shocking to Price and an objection to any 
principle that entails it. 
Price approaches the distinction between different kinds of trade-offs by way 
of a criticism of a view that fails to distinguish between them. R.B. Perry, who is 
another early philosopher that insisted on difference between inter-personal and 
intra-personal trade-offs, approached the subject from a different angle. In a section 
of his book General Theory of Value (1926) titled “The Independence of Persons” Perry 
approaches the difference between trade-offs as a problem of integrating different 
interests.4 Perry argues that there is a difference between personal integration 
(resolving intra-personal trade-offs) and social integration (resolving inter-personal 
trade-offs). He conceives of interests as representing distinct ends. In the case of 
resolving conflicts of ambivalence between our own interests, we can resolve them 
by subsuming our different interests under one end. We should treat our various 
individual interests as means to one overarching end. This he called the “principle of 
subordination”. This principle, however, is inapplicable in the case of social 
integration. If I, as a decision-maker, treat someone else’s interests only as means to 
my own ends, then I treat this person as a mere means. Different persons, however, 
have their separate ends. Perry attributes the mistake of overlooking this difference 
to a tendency to personify society and treat it as a singular subject. Unlike Price, Perry 
does not, however, mention any specific moral theory as guilty of overlooking the 
difference between individual, intra-personal trade-offs and social, inter-personal 
trade-offs. 
More recently, David Gauthier has raised the criticism that a theory that 
assimilates the two kinds of trade-offs overlooks the separateness of persons. 
Gauthier’s criticism makes explicit appeal to the idea of the separateness of persons 
 
4 Ralph Barton Perry, General Theory of Value (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 
1926), pp. 674-77. 
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which was merely implicit in the arguments of Price and Perry. Gauthier’s argument 
in his Practical Reasoning (1963) is therefore among the first clear invocations of the 
separateness of persons in moral argument.5 Gauthier remarks that whenever 
prudence is concerned, one is not interested in the satisfaction of one’s desires by 
themselves, but rather in one’s own greater satisfaction of one’s desires. The 
separateness of these desires does not matter. Things are different, however, in the 
case where conflicting desires of different persons come into play. Here we need to 
pay special attention to the individual desires and not only to the sum-total of all 
desires. Doing otherwise, Gauthier proceeds to argue, would mean that one considers 
the different desires of different persons to be part of one system of desires. But no 
such super-person exists. It is individuals that have desires. 
 
II. First-Person Standpoint: Anti-Aggregation 
 
But why exactly should we treat the two kinds of trade-offs differently? 
Gauthier seems to suggest that to do otherwise would be to treat humanity as one 
super-person. Yet it is patently obvious to adherents of utilitarianism that humanity 
is not one super-person. The arguments for utilitarianism do not typically assume 
humanity to be a super-person.6 Perry’s reason was that different persons are 
different ends in themselves. We can accept Perry’s reason while still maintaining 
that we need some theory that tells us how to trade-off goods that accrue to different 
final ends. What rules out that this theory is the same as the theory for intra-personal 
trade-offs?7 Price rejected the equivalence of the two kinds of trade-offs because it 
implies unacceptable conclusions. But counterintuitive implications of utilitarianism 
are already well-known. The inability of distinguishing between different trade-offs 
was supposed to be an additional and theoretical argument. 
 
5 David Gauthier, Practical Reasoning (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. 123-27. As we shall 
see later, John Rawls develops his version of the separateness of persons at the same time as 
Gauthier. 
6 See also Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 331. 
7 This is in effect the point of Richard Yetter Chappell’s utilitarian response to the separateness 
of persons objection. Richard Yetter Chappell, “Value Receptacles,” Noûs 49 (2015): 322-32. 
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One answer to the question why the difference between the trade-offs matters 
lies in a link we can draw to a line of opposition to aggregative reasoning. What seems 
to make the initial decision of moving to the city or staying in the suburbs difficult in 
the two children case is that it seems wrong to simply aggregate all benefits and 
burdens in this case. This link between the separateness of persons and opposition to 
aggregation also has an important historical pedigree. 
A discussion by the lay theologian C.S. Lewis in The Problem of Pain (1940) 
exemplifies nicely this thought.8 Lewis’s argument, however, has also given grounds 
for a reaction skeptical of the importance of the separateness of persons. As a 
theologian Lewis was interested in responding to the problem of evil. He gives the 
following argument to establish that the existence of evil and suffering is less 
widespread than one might think. Imagine a person who has a toothache of a given 
intensity. Now imagine a second person with a toothache of the same intensity. A 
natural thought would be that the pain in the world has doubled. But Lewis resists 
this thought. There is no one who suffers a toothache twice as intense. Suffering does 
not add up in this way. From this he concludes that “[when] we have reached the 
maximum that a single person can suffer, we have … reached all the suffering there 
ever can be in the universe”.9 Lewis’s thought is that we cannot simply aggregate 
harms in a simple manner because there is no agent who will be the subject of this 
harm. This indicates a clear difference to cases of intra-personal aggregation where 
all harms and benefit fall on one person. While Lewis gives a reason for 
distinguishing between intra-personal and inter-personal aggregation, the argument 
has attracted opposition.10 Lewis’s further claim that all the suffering in the universe 
is exhausted by the worst that a single person can suffer overreaches. It takes the 
thought that only individuals matter to an extreme. This invites the suspicion that the 
separateness of persons leads to implausible moral demands which are entirely 
focused on the fates of single individuals. 
 
8 C.S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain (Québec: Samizdat University Press, 2016), pp. 72-73. 
9 Lewis, The Problem of Pain, p. 73. 
10 See e.g. Derek Parfit, “Innumerate Ethics,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 7 (1978): 285-301, at 
pp. 294-96. 
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A more moderate version of the idea that aggregating individual goods 
differs in the contexts of different trade-offs comes from John Findlay in his book 
Values and Intentions (1961).11 Findlay notes an asymmetry between the aggregation 
of satisfactions within a person’s life and across different person’s lives. In particular, 
Findlay rejects a simple aggregative model for satisfactions within one’s life. He 
draws a distinction between totals of satisfaction and a total satisfaction. These two 
can diverge. A holistic experience of an extended period of time is different from an 
additive total of the satisfactions at each point in time. A vacation with a bad ending 
may be spoiled because of it, while a vacation with a bad start may be remembered 
as a nice experience. These holistic experiences of total satisfaction should count in 
thinking about the value of our life. Such a model is, however, plainly not available 
for aggregating preferences across people’s lives. There are only totals of satisfactions 
and no holistic experience of total satisfaction. There is no individual point of view 
from which this whole experience is made. This is due to “the profound gulfs 
constitutive of the space of persons”.12 Because of the separateness of different lives, 
there is no overall experience that we can give. This does not exclude the possibility 
of an overall assessment of the satisfactions of different people. Rather, the idea is 
that combining various benefits and burdens must proceed very differently in the 
case of individuals than in the case of collectives. 
The more radical opposition to aggregation has become identified with the 
separateness of persons. The two modern references are Robert Nozick and John 
Taurek. In his Should the Numbers Count? (1977) Taurek argues against the view that 
we have a duty to save a greater number of people from equal harm rather than a 
lesser number.13 Taurek’s skeptical argument against aggregation resembles Lewis’s 
at some stages. For example, Taurek invokes the idea that it is a mistake to think that 
small pains experienced by many people could be as bad as pains of greater intensity 
or duration suffered by a single person.14 For Taurek this is because there is no 
perspective for whom the many small pains are worse than a pain of the single 
 
11 John Findlay, Values and Intentions (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1961), pp. 234-36. 
12 Findlay, Values and Intentions, p. 236. 
13 John M. Taurek, “Should the Numbers Count?,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 6 (1977): 293-316. 
14 Taurek, “Should the Numbers Count?,” pp. 307-10. 
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person. Taurek’s claim about the badness of suffering is a claim about preferring one 
state of affairs to another. Saying that something is worse than something else is, for 
Taurek, tantamount to preferring that one state of affairs comes about rather than 
another.15 This is different from Lewis’s claim that once a single person reaches 
maximum suffering, this exhausts all the suffering there possibly could be in the 
world. Lewis’s claim is about the amount of suffering in the world. Taurek’s 
argument focuses on what the rejection of aggregative reasoning means for the 
morality of saving from harm. Robert Nozick focuses in Anarchy, State, and Utopia 
(1974) on the question whether it can be permissible to impose harm on one person 
in order to bring about a greater social good. In a manner reminiscent of Lewis and 
Taurek, Nozick rejects that we can do so, because “there is no social entity with a good 
that undergoes some sacrifice for its own good”. He continues: 
“There are only individual people, different individual people, with their 
own individual lives. Using one of these people to benefit others, uses 
him and benefits others. Nothing more. … To use a person in this way 
does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a 
separate person, that his is the only life he has. He does not get some 
overbalancing good from his sacrifice, and no one is entitled to force this 
upon him.”16 
For both Taurek and Nozick to aggregate overlooks the fact that different 
individuals have different points of view or first-personal standpoints. This 
distinguishes individuals from inanimate objects, for example. Taurek writes that to 
simply add up all benefits and burdens would mean we value persons the way we 
value objects.17 However, persons are not the only beings with first-personal 
standpoints. Conscious or sentient animals have a point of view. There are things that 
can be better or worse for them, they can be harmed, experience pain and pleasure.18 
 
15 Taurek, “Should the Numbers Count?,” pp. 304-5. See also Weyma Lübbe, “Taurek’s No 
Worse Claim,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 36 (2008): 68-85. 
16 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 32-33. Emphasis 
in the original. 
17 Taurek, “Should the Numbers Count?,” pp. 306-8. 
18 Peter Godfrey Smith, for example, identifies “subjective experiences” or a “point of view” 
with the ability to feel experiences. If an animal can feel pain, then there is subjectivity and a 
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All of these are morally significant. But persons have capacities above and beyond 
this. Nozick writes that persons can have a conception of a good life. They can have 
plans of life, projects and strive towards a good life. They can have an idea of how 
they want to be, what sort of identity they want to adopt. Their lives can have 
meaning.19 This argument stresses that the separateness of persons says that 
individuals have separate lives to lead. It is individuals who are leading their lives 
and who have the opportunity to make something meaningful or valuable out of their 
lives. This opportunity means that we need to give greater importance to person’s 
first-personal standpoints and cannot simply overlook them by aggregating across 
them. 
Taurek’s arguments seems to set strict limits to aggregation in the context of 
the morality of saving from harm. Nozick’s argument seems to set strict limits to our 
ability to harm others. Critics of the separateness of persons have argued that the 
limits they set are too strict and that this gives us reason to doubt the importance of 
the separateness of persons. The complaint that individuals should not be sacrificed 
for the benefit of others is unreasonably general, according to these critics. Such an 
interpretation would result in an implausible Paretian morality which never requires 
anyone to even accept small sacrifices for the benefit of others. If morality can 
sometimes require us to balance the losses of some with the gains of others, then it 
appears that the appeal of the separateness of persons is mistaken here.20 Proponents 
of the separateness of persons need a way to avoid such a Paretian morality without 
hollowing out the importance of the separateness of persons. A similar argument can 
be made about the rejection that the relative numbers matter in deciding whom to 
save. A morality that never allowed the relative numbers to count in deciding whom 
 
point of view. Peter Godfrey-Smith, Other Minds (London: William Collins, 2017), ch. 4; and 
Peter Godfrey-Smith, “Evolving Across the Explanatory Gap,” Philosophy, Theory, and Practice 
in Biology 11 (2019): 1-24. 
19 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, pp. 48-51. 
20 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 336-39; Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 271-77; David O. Brink, “The Separateness of Persons, Distributive 
Norms, and Moral Theory,” in Value, Welfare, and Morality, ed. R.G. Frey and Christopher 
Morris (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 252-289, at pp. 253-59; and Larry 
Temkin, Rethinking the Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 101-8; and Iwao 
Hirose, Moral Aggregation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 67-73. 
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to save seems overly restrictive according to these critics. Like the imagined Paretian 
morality, it fails to allow trade-offs that morality demands and gives an implausibly 
strong emphasis to single individuals.21 To counter this argument, proponents of the 
separateness of persons would need to show why the separateness of persons is not 
overly restrictive in this sense. In Chapters 3 (Contractualism, Complaints, and Risk), 4 
(Skepticism about Aggregation and Uncertain Rescues) and 5 (Aggregation, Balancing, and 
Respect for the Separateness of Persons) I take up this challenge and develop a view that 
is guided by the separateness of persons while being neither Paretian nor holding 
that relative numbers are never morally relevant.  
 
III. Second-Person Standpoint:  
The Separateness and Relatedness of Persons 
 
Thus far I argued that one of the reasons why overlooking the difference 
between inter-personal and intra-personal trade-offs is problematic is because this 
confuses what is permissible in aggregating benefits and burdens in one life with the 
permissibility of aggregation across lives. This is problematic because it conflates the 
different first-personal standpoints of individuals. Now, I want to suggest a second, 
equally important, reason why a moral theory needs to be sensitive to the difference 
between inter-personal and intra-personal trade-offs. This reason is related to the 
importance of person’s second-personal authority and the importance of moral 
relations between persons. 
The separateness of persons objection is often traced back to John Rawls’s A 
Theory of Justice (1971). My previous discussion has already shown that the idea of the 
separateness of persons did not exclusively originate with Rawls’s presentation of the 
objection. What is equally noteworthy is that the separateness of persons objection 
has antecedents in Rawls’s own work. In Justice as Fairness (1958) Rawls compares 
 
21 Brink, “The Separateness of Persons, Distributive Norms, and Moral Theory,” pp. 259-82; 
and Alastair Norcross, “Two Dogmas of Deontology: Aggregation, Rights, and the 
Separateness of Persons,” Social Philosophy & Policy 26 (2009): 76-95, at pp. 80-88. 
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utilitarianism to his own view of justice as fairness.22 His argument is not the familiar 
objection that utilitarianism can lead to counterintuitive verdicts or that it fails to 
account for the value of equal distributions. Rawls is willing to concede that what 
utilitarianism recommends might be extensionally equivalent to his own principles 
of justice. If all utility functions are identical, there is diminishing marginal utility, 
and costless redistribution, then utilitarianism would advocate for perfect equality of 
goods. Utilitarianism can, thereby, account for common sense principles of justice. 
Rawls rather objects that utilitarianism gives the wrong reason for accepting these 
principles of justice. The principles of justice would be accepted only as a response to 
the question of what the most efficient design of institutions is.23 
More interestingly Rawls objects that benefits to individuals matter only 
insofar as they contribute to the individual’s welfare. Their importance is irrespective 
of any moral relations between individuals or any moral claims that they might be 
able to raise. Whether or not they are part of cooperative enterprises, for example, is 
immaterial. Rawls then criticizes the form of individualism that utilitarianism 
espouses. He writes: 
“[Utilitarianism] regards persons as so many separate directions in which 
benefits and burdens may be assigned; and the value of the satisfaction 
and dissatisfaction of desire is not thought to depend in any way on the 
moral relations in which individuals stand, or on the kinds of claims 
which they are willing … to press on each other.”24 
At first sight this criticism does not appear to be related to Rawls’s criticisms 
that utilitarianism violates the separateness of persons. Rawls criticizes utilitarianism 
for admitting too much separation between individuals. This charge appears to be the 
precise opposite of the objection that utilitarianism overlooks the separation between 
individuals. Rawls’s criticism in Justice as Fairness is that utilitarianism understands 
persons in an atomistic and unrelated manner. It fails to give importance to the 
 
22 John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness,” Philosophical Review 67 (1958): 164-94, at pp. 184-87. 
23 G.A. Cohen has developed a somewhat similar criticism of Rawls’s theory of justice as being 
concerned with “rules of regulation” for society as opposed to principles of justice in a fact-
independent sense. See G.A. Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard 
University Press, 2008), pt. 2. 
24 Rawls, “Justice as Fairness,” p. 187. 
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relations between individuals. In spite of the criticism that utilitarianism admits too 
much separation between persons, Rawls himself says that his separateness of 
persons objection takes its root from these considerations.25 How is this possible? 
Considering the development of this idea in Rawls’s thought helps us here. 
Rawls develops his criticism that questions of justice are transformed into 
questions of efficient administration in Constitutional Liberty and the Concept of Justice 
(1963).26  Rawls again compares utilitarianism (or social utility) with a view that takes 
justice as fundamental. The contrast here is that justice, in contrast to social utility, 
“takes the plurality of persons as fundamental”. Social utility aims at maximizing one 
thing. Questions about social utility are therefore questions akin to efficient 
administration, namely questions of rational choice for a single chooser. Just as in the 
case of a single individual, losses to some part are immediately outweighed by gains 
to another. Justice forbids this kind of reasoning. The flaw of utilitarianism is to justify 
the violation of one person’s claims by appeal to a compensating advantage that 
someone else has received. Rawls thereby singles out the importance of the 
competing claims of different individuals as one of the morally important relations 
which utilitarianism overlooks. To rectify the flaw of utilitarianism, Rawls proposes 
that we must find principles which can obtain the unanimous agreement of 
individuals. This agreement can be achieved from a position of equal liberty within 
moral constraints, i.e. Rawls’s original position. 
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls then gives the separateness of persons objection 
its famous form.27 By extending the principle of rational choice for one person to 
social trade-offs, Rawls argues, utilitarianism fails to take seriously the separateness 
of persons. Again, Rawls picks up the criticism that utilitarianism overlooks the 
importance of moral relations. His proposal of “justice as fairness” is built around the 
recognition that it matters whether individuals are engaged in mutually 
advantageous cooperation or not. Rawls also gives another hint what the importance 
 
25 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 21fn10. 
26 John Rawls, “Constitutional Liberty and the Concept of Justice,” in John Rawls: Collected 
Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 73-95, at 
pp. 94-95. 
27 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. edn., pp. 20-27.  
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of moral relations can mean. Moral relations matter, for example, in the way in which 
well-being arises. Well-being that is derived from discriminating against others 
should not be counted.28 The importance of moral relations indicates that the moral 
importance of well-being is not irrespective of how it is created and how it bears on 
the relations between persons. In short, Rawls’s argument here is a rejection of 
welfarism. 
Rawls also gives a clearer answer to the question of why moral relations 
matter. The relations between persons matter insofar as they determine the 
appropriate principle of choice. Rawls writes that the right principle of regulation 
depends on what is regulated.29 Principles of individual rationality are devised for 
single individuals. His principles of justice are devised for a plurality of individuals 
who all pursue their separate ends and who, moreover, are all part of a system of 
mutually advantageous cooperation. This makes clearer how Rawls’s initial 
complaint that utilitarianism admits of too much separateness is connected to Rawls’s 
later complaint that utilitarianism overlooks the separateness of persons. Principles 
of justice regulate the interactions of persons who are at the same time separate from 
and related to one another. If we use the same principle for inter-personal trade-offs 
that we use for intra-personal trade-offs, then we will overlook both aspects. We 
erode the distinction between persons and we also adopt an atomistic picture of 
human interaction. In its classical form, utilitarianism ignores the bonds between 
these atoms and justice is simply a function of the sum total of mass of these separate 
atoms. Utilitarianism, a theory which is insensitive to the difference between the 
different kinds of trade-offs, therefore, fails doubly. 
The idea that overlooking the difference between different kinds of trade-offs 
primarily overlooks the importance of moral relations between individuals is also 
present in Thomas Nagel’s discussion of the separateness of persons in The Possibility 
of Altruism (1970).30 Nagel contrasts two different kinds of conflicts of reasons. One 
 
28 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. edn., p. 27. 
29 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. edn., p. 25.  
30 Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 
133-42. Nagel acknowledges that his thinking of the separateness of persons has taken root 
from Rawls’s comments in Constitutional Liberty and the Concept of Justice. See Nagel, The 
Possibility of Altruism, p.134fn1. 
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conflict is between reasons which derive their force from the interests of a single 
person, an intra-personal conflict. The other conflict is between reasons which derive 
their force from the interests of multiple persons, an inter-personal conflict. Nagel 
argues that we need different principles for the different kinds of conflicts. 
Proceeding in the same manner in both cases would overlook the significance of the 
distinction between persons. This is because treating interests of different persons as 
if they belonged to one person “distorts the nature of the competing claims”.31 It is 
the distortion of moral claims that individuals can press against one another that 
explains why inter-personal trade-offs differ crucially from intra-personal trade-offs. 
Moral claims matter because persons have the ability to understand, evaluate 
and respond to reasons. Persons differ thereby from other conscious animals. They 
can take into consideration and act on reasons that other persons give them. One can 
act towards animals in ways that are justifiable or unjustifiable. But only towards 
persons can one act in ways that are justifiable or unjustifiable to these persons. This 
indicates a difference in the way animals and persons can be thought to be members 
of a moral community. Animals can be passive members insofar as moral norms can 
be about them; persons can be active, self-legislating members. Because persons can 
understand and respond to reasons, we can stand in a special relation with persons 
of acting in ways that are justifiable to them. This means that persons not only have 
a first-person standpoint, but also a second-person standpoint, i.e. the ability and the 
moral standing to direct claims towards others. Because they have such moral 
standing, ignoring their claims would disrespect them and their special moral 
status.32 
In addition to emphasizing the importance of claims, Nagel also criticizes 
Rawls’s positive proposal regarding how to respect the separateness of persons. He 
objects that Rawls’s choice behind the veil of ignorance may allow individuals to 
simply balance different lives against one another as if they were merely possible lives 
 
31 Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism, p. 138. 
32 Similar thoughts are discussed by Scanlon and Darwall. See Scanlon, What We Owe to Each 
Other (Cambridge, MA.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 103-7, ch. 
4; and Stephen Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University 
Press, 2006), esp. chs. 1-2, 6, 12. Scanlon calls this relation “mutual recognition” (p. 162). 
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of a single agent. Yet bad lives are not mere possibilities, they are actual lives of actual 
and distinct persons.33 In Chapter 2 (Separate Persons Behind the Veil), I take up this 
criticism of Rawls’s veil of ignorance and explore further what this argument means 
for veil of ignorance arguments in general. Nagel, however, not only criticizes 
Rawls’s proposal but also develops his own positive proposal. Rather than conflating 
different moral claims, Nagel argues that we should accept that our moral concern is 
stratified between different loci.34 Morality includes, for Nagel, a form of impartial 
concern towards each person. This is achieved by placing oneself into the shoes of 
everyone else. This allows us to see the moral perspective of others. Our concern for 
others will remain fundamentally fragmented, however. It is one-by-one. For this 
reason, Nagel proposes that we should strive for a form of unanimity. Our actions 
should be justifiable and acceptable to everyone. This would respect the nature of 
competing claims. To determine whether actions are justifiable, Nagel considers the 
idea that we should choose the action which is least unacceptable to the person to 
whom it is most unacceptable.35 Nagel’s form of the separateness of persons objection 
thereby already contains the seeds for a positive proposal of a broadly contractualist 
morality. I elaborate on Nagel’s proposal for how to respect each person’s claims 
separately in Chapter 5 (Aggregation, Balancing, and Respect for the Claims of 
Individuals). 
 
 
 
 
33 Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism, p. 140. 
34 In The Possibility of Altruism (at pp. 141-42), Nagel considers a solution in which the chooser 
expects to lead all lives as separate lives. In effect, Nagel imagines here a decision-maker who 
needs to decide trade-offs of various post-fission selves to whom the decision-maker is equally 
concerned. In the main text I focus on Nagel’s later proposal that he develops in Mortal 
Questions, ch. 8; and Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1991): chs. 4-7 
35 Nagel doubts whether this is a complete solution to the problem. See Nagel, Mortal 
Questions, pp. 122-25 and Nagel, Equality and Partiality, chs. 4, 7. Nagel also refers to a similar 
idea present in Scanlon’s contractualism, see T.M. Scanlon, “Contractualism and 
utilitarianism,” in Utilitarianism and beyond, ed. Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 102-28; and Scanlon, What We Owe to Each 
Other. 
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IV. Two Versions of the Separateness of Persons Objection 
 
 Thus far, I have discussed reasons why the difference between intra-personal 
and inter-personal trade-offs matters. Consider now the following remarks that 
Rawls makes about individual rationality: 
“[Each] man in realizing his own interests is certainly free to balance his 
own losses against his own gains. We may impose a sacrifice on ourselves 
now for the sake of a greater advantage later. A person quite properly 
acts … to achieve his own greatest good, to advance his rational ends as 
far as possible.”36 
 Then Rawls asks in the next sentence: “[Why] should not a society act on 
precisely the same principle applied to the group”. He strengthens this case by 
introducing the impartial spectator. The impartial spectator imagines herself to be in 
everyone’s position and then chooses principles of justice. Any advantages in one 
position are cancelled out, for the impartial spectator, by disadvantages in another 
position. This means in Rawls’s words: 
“This view of social cooperation is the consequence of extending to 
society the principle of choice for one man, and then, to make this 
extension work, conflating all persons into one through the imaginative 
acts of the impartial sympathetic spectator. Utilitarianism does not take 
seriously the distinction between persons.”37 
One source of Rawls’s objection is, therefore, that utilitarianism pretends that 
all persons belong to one system of desires. This is particularly evident in the case of 
the Rawls’s version of the impartial spectator. The device of the impartial spectator 
fuses all persons into one person. It can achieve impartiality only by treating all 
person’s lives as one life the spectator will lead.38 A second form of objection is also 
implicit in the last quote. Principles of individual choice are appropriate for choices 
for single persons, but they are inappropriate for situations of mutually 
 
36 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. edn., p. 21. 
37 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. edn., p. 24. 
38 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. edn., p. 161-66. 
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advantageous social cooperation. The right principle of regulation depends on what 
is supposed to be regulated. 
 The two parts of the objection represent two different versions of the 
separateness of persons objection. The different versions of the objection in turn 
indicate two different requirements for moral theories. The first part is concerned 
with the failure of utilitarian philosophers to respect the separateness of persons in 
the arguments they advance. Utilitarianism fails insofar as the justification given for 
it does not respect the separateness of persons. I will call this the justificatory 
requirement. The second part is independent from the specific reasons given for the 
act utilitarian principle. By stating that the utilitarian principle is not suitable in its 
application to problems of social regulation, social cooperation, and justice, Rawls 
indicts act utilitarianism as a criterion of rightness. This part is concerned with 
utilitarianism’s failure to respect the separateness of persons in the deontic verdicts 
it gives. I will call this the substantive requirement. 
 The difference between the two requirements is the following. The 
justificatory requirement is less sweeping in its implications. The idea is that moral 
reasons or arguments can violate the separateness of persons. Strictly speaking this 
criticism does not say that all forms of act utilitarianism violate the separateness of 
persons, but rather that the reasons given for act utilitarianism can violate the 
separateness of persons. If there is an alternative justification compliant with the 
separateness of persons, then act utilitarianism may turn out to be the correct 
position. By contrast, the substantive requirement on the other side rules out act 
utilitarianism regardless the reasons given for it. To make the contrast clear, under a 
substantive version the separateness of persons functions as a constraint on first order 
moral principles, under a justificatory version the separateness of persons functions 
as a constraint on moral arguments on behalf of these principles.39 
 
39 A complication arises when we consider rule utilitarianism (or other two-level moral 
theories). For example, in On What Matters Parfit provides a consequentialist theory which 
may avoid violating either constraint that the separateness of persons imposes. Parfit’s rule 
consequentialism is justified by appeal to the contractualist idea that it is a principle everyone 
can accept, seemingly respecting the justificatory requirement. His rule consequentialism 
approximates a form of common sense morality that includes, for example, legitimate 
partiality as the best way to maximize the good in the long-run, seemingly respecting the 
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To see how the two requirements differ in practice, consider the use of the 
separateness of persons in Henry Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics (1874). Sidgwick 
considers the argument that accepting rational egoism, the theory that one should 
aim to maximize one’s own good, should lead one to accept utilitarianism, the theory 
that one should aim to maximize the universal good. The egoist accepts that we 
should sacrifice one’s present happiness for one’s future happiness. Why should this 
not lead one to sacrifice one’s own happiness for someone else’s happiness? Sidgwick 
rejects this reasoning. He argues that the distinction between persons is “taken as 
fundamental in determining the ultimate end of rational action for an individual”.40 
We cannot simply reason from rational egoism to utilitarianism. The separateness of 
persons forbids this. Sidgwick is nonetheless a utilitarian. While he believes in the 
importance of the separateness of persons, he does not believe that it undermines 
utilitarianism. After the quoted passage, Sidgwick proceeds to argue that the 
justification for utilitarianism does not rely on an extension of rational choice 
according to rational egoism to choices between persons. This indicates that Sidgwick 
understands the separateness of persons only as a justificatory demand and not as a 
substantive demand.41 
 
substantive requirement in its deontic verdicts. See Derek Parfit, On What Matters, vol. 1 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), chs. 16-17. I discuss how to interpret gray areas like 
these with respect to the justificatory requirement in Chapter 2 (Separate Persons Behind the 
Veil). I leave open how to understand the substantive requirement in cases like these. 
40 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 418-
19, 498. Quote at p. 498. 
41 What complicates this interpretation of Sidgwick is that he, himself, provides an argument 
for utilitarianism that seems to fail the justificatory demand. Sidgwick argues by analogy in 
favor of utilitarianism. He first establishes that there is no reason to discount good for being 
merely in the future. He then provides an argument that just as the individual good is 
composed of different goods at different points in time, the “universal good” is composed of 
the different goods of different individuals. Sidgwick concludes: “I obtain the self-evident 
principle that the good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view 
(if I may say so) of the Universe, than the good of any other”. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 
pp. 380-82, quote at p. 382. The context makes clear that Sidgwick’s principle of the “universal 
good” is his utilitarian theory of morality. The passage provides us with a dilemma. On one 
reading, Sidgwick’s use of the analogy is merely an analogy that helps understanding the 
utilitarian principle. The analogy is, however, not part of the argument for utilitarianism given 
that utilitarianism is, for Sidgwick, self-evident and needs no argument. On the other reading, 
Sidgwick uses the analogy in his argument, in which case he violates the justificatory demand 
of the separateness of persons. That Sidgwick’s argument may violate something like the 
separateness of persons has been observed even before Gauthier’s and Rawls’s objections. See 
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Sidgwick would need a reason for why the separateness of persons is only a 
demand on moral justification and not on first-order moral principles or theories. 
David Brink suggests a possible reason.42 Brink suggests that the separateness of 
persons is a substantive requirement only for theories of rationality and not also for 
theories of morality. According to Brink, the core of the separateness of persons is a 
principle about uncompensated sacrifice. The separateness of persons tells us that no 
sacrifice can be imposed on an agent without compensation for it. A theory of 
rationality that is time-neutral fulfills this. All sacrifices to an individual at certain 
points in time in her life are compensated by benefits to that same individual at other 
points in her lifetime. Yet Brink thinks that while this principle is plausible as a 
principle of rationality, it is implausible as a principle of morality. The reason for this 
is the skeptical reason we encountered earlier that requiring compensation to an 
individual for every sacrifice to her would lead to a Paretian morality with no duties 
to aid others.43 As I indicated above, I do not believe that the best interpretation of the 
separateness of persons is one that sets such stringent limits on aggregation such that 
it is ruled out by any sound moral theory. My chapter 5 on aggregation (Aggregation, 
Balancing, and Respect for the Claims of Individuals) lays out the role the separateness of 
persons can play in thinking about inter-personal aggregation without having 
extreme and unjustifiable implications. 
 
V. The Justificatory Requirement 
 
 Remember that the justificatory requirement of the separateness of persons is 
the requirement that arguments for a first-order moral principles must respect the 
separateness of persons. How can a justification fail to respect the separateness of 
 
A.R. Lacey, “Sidgwick’s Ethical Maxims,” Philosophy 34 (1959): 217-28, at p. 219; and Geoffrey 
Russell Grice, The Grounds of Moral Judgement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 
pp. 195-97. 
42 David O. Brink, “Sidgwick and the Rationale for Rational Egoism,” in Essays on Henry 
Sidgwick, ed. Bart Schultz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 199-240, at pp. 
207-15. 
43 Brink, “The Separateness of Persons, Distributive Norms, and Moral Theory”. 
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persons? I will first highlight three different ways that are each modelled on the 
choice between alternative principles of justice. 
 The first way is to choose by imagining each person to be part of the chooser 
at once. This is the crudest way to violate the separateness of persons. Here each 
person is imagined to be only part of one system of desires and ends. The interests, 
desires, moral claims and so on of each person are integrated into one system by 
assuming that they all form part of this system. This argument considers a society as 
one social entity, or humanity as one super-person. This paradigm case of violating 
the separateness of persons is seldom expressly defended. J.J.C. Smart comes close to 
embracing it once. Given that it is rational for us to go to the dentist in order to avoid 
the pain of a toothache, he asks why should we then not impose pains akin to a dentist 
visit on others to avoid pains akin to a toothache.44 The question at least suggests a 
model of decision-making where all pains are balanced out as if they belonged to one 
life. 
 Smart’s argument could, however, also be interpreted in a second way. This 
second way is to imagine to be in each person’s position in turn. The clearest 
exposition of this can be found with C.I. Lewis, who argues that the correct way to 
assess value is to imagine to be in each person’s position in seriatim.45 We can justify 
utilitarianism then by the following argument. Imagining to be in each position 
allows us to compare and cancel out positive and negative experiences that we had 
at different points in time. The overall evaluation of the process of imagining oneself 
to be in each position will therefore be the net sum of positive minus negative 
experiences. One natural way to understand the suggestion of sympathetic 
imagination is that it aggregates all lives into one long life. 
 The third way is to imagine each person’s life as a possibility of one’s own 
future life or as a possibility of one’s own actual life. In the latter case, the decision-
maker would be temporarily ignorant of their distinctive features and would have to 
 
44 J.J.C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics (London and New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1961), p. 26. 
45 Clarence Irving Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (La Salle: The Open Court 
Publishing Company, 1946), pp. 546-47. A similar statement is made in R.M. Hare, Freedom 
and Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 123. 
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choose a distribution of benefits and burdens not knowing which life she is leading. 
While the second argument supported total utilitarianism, this argument rather 
seems to support average utilitarianism. The idea is that we should choose to 
maximize our own expected utility if we could choose between different social 
arrangements. In the absence of knowledge of our position in society we would 
assume equal probabilities for each position. Our choice will then coincide with the 
highest average utility level in line with what average utilitarianism dictates.46 I will 
discuss both whether this use of the veil of ignorance argument is coherent and 
whether it really supports average utilitarianism in Chapter 2 (Separate Persons Behind 
the Veil). Even if it was coherent, this method overlooks the separateness of persons 
by turning actual lives into merely possible lives of a single person. And it makes a 
significant moral difference whether a bad life is a possibility that gets written off if 
it does not materialize, or whether someone has to live a bad life no matter what.47 
 
VI. The Substantive Requirement 
 
 Just as there is not only one way in which the justificatory requirement of the 
separateness of persons can be breached, there is not only one substantive 
requirement of the separateness of persons. I group the requirements under four 
headings. 
 First, a theory can be charged with overlooking the separateness of persons in a 
narrow sense. Any theory that is fully aggregative overlooks the importance of 
respecting the standpoints of individuals one-by-one. Simple aggregation across 
individuals cannot reflect the importance of different standpoints. For example, a 
principle that would license the imposition of significant burdens on single 
 
46 A version of this argument might support total utilitarianism. We need the following 
additional assumptions: (1) The choice can be made over variable population sizes so that the 
chooser is not guaranteed to exist, (2) Comparativism between life and death is true. In 
calculating the expected utility for this gamble, we need to assign a welfare level of zero to 
those possibilities where we do not exist. But average utilitarianism defined as the principle 
that selects the highest average welfare of those who exist disregards those who do not exist 
even under the assumption of comparativism. 
47 See Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism, pp. 138-39. 
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individuals for minor benefits to very many other individuals, cannot plausibly be 
said to respect the standpoints of individuals one-by-one. This means that the 
requirement to respect all standpoints one-by-one, itself an idea about moral 
justification, gives rise to a requirement about the substantive content of moral 
principles. This is because no interpretation of the justificatory demand could license 
a principle that allowed such aggregation. 
A second example of this violation of the separateness of persons is treating 
many small harms occurring to different individuals as equivalent to the same harms 
occurring all to one person. It would be wrong to think that a short, minor pain 
experienced by 50 people is the same as pain of 50 times the intensity or duration. 
The reason for this is that there is no pain of such higher intensity or duration for 
anyone. There is no standpoint from which the imposition of the pain is as bad. This 
aspect of the separateness of persons in a narrow sense applies also to some non-
persons. Conscious animals which are not persons can have a point of view. In the 
most basic understanding a point of view just means having subjective experiences 
such that there is something that it is like to be this entity.48 This means that the 
separateness of such animals matters to some extent. For example, imagine we could 
kill one cow in order to marginally increase the comfort of many cows in the herd. It 
does not seem plausible to me that we are permitted to kill the single cow to produce 
trivial dispersed benefits to many cows.49 But not all aspects of the separateness of 
persons also carry over to the separateness of cows. 
 One example of this involves a different objection to utilitarianism. Not only 
its aggregative structure, but also its welfarist commitment is in violation of the 
separateness of persons. By basing one’s judgment of different states of affairs solely 
on their respective distribution of welfare, utilitarianism overlooks relevant non-
welfare factors. The most important one that I have mentioned already are the moral 
claims individuals can raise. To recognize the importance of different standpoints 
and to recognize their second-personal authority means that we have to take 
 
48 See Godfrey-Smith, Other Minds, ch. 4. The idea of understanding consciousness as “what 
it’s like to be” goes back to Nagel, Mortal Questions, ch. 12. 
49 See also John Halstead, “The Numbers Always Count,” Ethics 126 (2016): 789-802, at pp. 
795-96. 
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seriously moral claims on our actions. A moral claim expresses second-personal 
authority in a direct way. For example, for utilitarianism it does not matter how well 
off individuals could have been, something that is relevant in determining the 
strength of their claim on others. Similarly, for utilitarianism it does not matter 
whether there are special moral relations between individuals. It does not ultimately 
matter whether individuals are trustees of someone’s interest, promisors or 
promisees, friends or family members, are responsible for someone’s plight, 
beneficiaries of sadistic pleasure of the misfortune of others, and so on. Only the 
vector of welfare levels ultimately matters.50 However, accepting the authority of the 
second-person standpoint means that moral relations are important. Here, again, the 
demand to respect moral claims in the justification of principles gives rise to a 
condition about the substantive content of these principle. No welfarist theory can do 
justice to the fact that separate persons occupy separate standpoints from which 
moral claims can be raised. This is because a moral theory which focuses only on 
information about welfare levels is necessarily insensitive to the presence or absence 
of moral relations. 
 The second way in which the separateness of persons can be violated is by 
overlooking the unity of the individual. This can be regarded as the flipside of the 
separateness of persons in a narrow sense. While the separateness of persons sets 
limits to the kinds of permissible trade-offs, the unity of the individual demands that 
trade-offs are allowed and sometimes required within a person’s life. 
While the separateness of persons is built on the idea that there is not one 
social entity but rather various individuals with their own different first-personal 
standpoints, the unity of the individual is based on the negative of this idea. In the 
case of an individual, there is only one entity and no competition between the claims 
 
50 I follow here Sen’s seminal definition of welfarism according to which welfarism is an 
informational constraint on moral judgment in which only. He writes that “[if] all the 
personal-utility information about two states of affairs that can be known is known, then they 
can be judged without any other information about these states”. Amartya Sen, 
“Utilitarianism and Welfarism,” Journal of Philosophy 76 (1979): 463-89, quote at p. 461. My 
formulation rules out even a wider understanding of welfarism according to which well-being 
is the only fundamental value. If we believe that benefits from sadistic pleasure ought not 
count, then this is accounted for by bringing in values besides welfare. 
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of different individuals. This means that prudential justifications can become 
available in the case of intra-personal trade-offs. In situations of pure trusteeship in 
which our actions have no effects on third parties, we are confronted only with the 
claim of that individual. The individual would have no reason to object to a 
prudential justification. Such a justification looks after that person’s interests. 
Furthermore, by being sensitive to the values of the individual it also does not impede 
an individual’s ability to govern their own life. 
 The third way in which moral theories can be charged with overlooking the 
separateness of persons is a combination of the two previous points. This is the 
difference between the unity of the individual and the separateness of persons. The 
separateness of persons requires us to set limits to permissible trade-offs, the unity of 
the individual requires us to be lenient when it comes to permissible trade-offs. Taken 
together this means that a moral theory should be sensitive to the difference between 
inter-personal and intra-personal trade-offs. This is the most famous illustration of 
the separateness of persons objection and also the one I began my introduction with. 
 A fourth and final component of the separateness of persons is the separateness 
of agents. The previous three components were all related to what we can and cannot 
do to people. They regarded persons as passive recipients of harms and benefits. But 
as persons we are also agents who act in the world, as opposed, for example, to 
merely patients, beneficiaries, or victims. The separateness of agents is concerned 
with the separateness of different agential perspectives. 
 Some theories, notably utilitarianism, embrace what can be called the doctrine 
of negative responsibility.51 This doctrine holds that we are equally responsible for 
what we fail to do (or fail to prevent others from doing) as we are for what we do. 
Embracing the doctrine of negative responsibility means that we fail to distinguish 
between what an agent does and what an agent lets others do. It does not distinguish 
 
51 See Bernard Williams, “A Critique of Utilitarianism,” in Utilitarianism: For and Against, ed. 
J.J.C. Smart and Bernard Williams (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 77-150, at pp. 
93-100. 
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which contributions belong to particular agents in the causal web. This overlooks the 
separateness of agents.52 
 The separateness of agents is best explained through an appeal to the 
importance of the second-personal standpoint. From the second-personal 
standpoints, individuals can hold us to account for our actions. The separateness of 
agents is linked to the other side of this accountability relation. It is linked to the 
perspective of an agent who has to answer the demands of others on her conduct. 
Such an agent must be able to answer this call for justification. She must be able to 
respond that what she in particular did was justified. The demands of second-person 
authority are relational; they hold between specific persons. The doctrine of negative 
responsibility does not, however, distinguish in this manner between agents. Agents 
cannot point out what they have done. 
 The separateness of agents can also be relevant to the ability and 
responsibility to live well. One’s responsibility to live well and give meaning to one’s 
life is executed by one’s actions and omissions. Our actions determine what projects 
we pursue and how we want to live our lives. The doctrine of negative responsibility 
asks us to make no distinction in our moral reasoning between our own actions and 
projects and those of others. Yet such a distinction is necessary for these projects to 
play the important meaning-giving role for our own life in particular.53 Negative 
responsibility thereby does not take seriously the separateness of persons. It fails to 
respect the demand that each person has their separate live to lead, and their own 
separate projects that are central to their life. 
 
VII. The Separateness of Persons, Attitudes, and Rightness 
 
 In my discussion, I have assumed that respecting the separateness of persons 
is an important requirement for the deontic judgments of a moral theory. In other 
 
52 Bernard Williams, “Persons, Character and Morality,” in The Identities of Persons, ed. Amélie 
Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), pp. 197-216, at pp. 200-1; 
and F.M. Kamm, “Moral Status and Personal Identity: Clones, Embryos, and Future 
Generations,” Social Philosophy & Policy 22 (2005): 283-307, at pp. 290-91. 
53 See also Williams, “A Critique of Utilitarianism,” pp. 108-18. 
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words, respecting the separateness of persons is a matter of what actions are or are 
not morally permissible. One challenge to the separateness of persons is that this 
misunderstands the appeal of the separateness of persons. Richard Yetter Chappell 
gives such an argument.54 His argument departs from the idea that violating the 
separateness of persons is wrong because it treats individuals as mere value 
receptacles. Compare this with the following statement by James MacKaye, a 
utilitarian of the early 20th century, elaborating on the utilitarian idea of justice: 
“In a manner very similar to that whereby the engineer in the foregoing 
example determines the factors upon which depends the maximum 
production of steam, Justice must seek to determine the factors upon 
which depends the maximum production of happiness. … [Just] as a 
boiler is required to utilize the potential energy of coal in the production 
of steam, so sentient beings are required to convert the potentiality of 
happiness resident in a given land area into actual happiness.”55 
He continues his elaboration of the production of happiness: 
“Each human being is, in the first place, in his own person, the immediate 
sentient agent, the happiness-producing mechanism, in whose sensorium 
the finished product of all successful human effort – happiness – is finally 
turned out.”56 
In MacKaye’s statements persons are producers of happiness and happiness is a 
product which manifests itself in a person. While MacKaye embraces this idea, Tom 
Regan takes this to be decisive objection against utilitarianism. He elaborates on his 
objection by using a metaphor of two cups.57 Two cups are filled with a sweet liquid, 
call it value. We can move the liquid from one cup to the other. All that matters is the 
liquid. The cups themselves are only receptacles or containers of value. They are 
entirely interchangeable or fungible. The cups do not matter. Nothing bad happens 
 
54 Chappell, “Value Receptacles”. 
55 James MacKaye, The Economy of Happiness (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1906), pp. 
190-91. 
56 MacKaye, The Economy of Happiness, p. 196. 
57 Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 
205-6; and “The Case for Animal Rights,” in In Defense of Animals, ed. Peter Singer (New York: 
Basil Blackwell, 1985), pp. 13-26, at pp. 19-20. 
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if one breaks and is replaced by another cup. But persons are unlike Regan’s cups. 
They are not mere value receptacles. They matter in themselves. 
 Chappell then argues that one can accept this idea that the standpoints of 
individuals matter while also endorsing a moral theory that is extensionally 
equivalent to classical utilitarianism. He construes the value receptacles objection as 
an objection that utilitarianism treats individuals as fungible. Money bills, for 
example, are completely fungible. We can simply replace one money bill with another 
without losing anything of value. Persons, however, cannot be treated as fungible in 
the same way. This is because, Chappell argues, persons have final value. They are 
ends in themselves and do not only contribute instrumentally to the good in the way 
that money bills do.58 This difference should be reflected in our moral attitudes. In a 
trade-off between two money bills we should be indifferent between which one of 
the two continues to exist. In a trade-off between two persons we should be torn 
between which one of the two continues to exist. The attitude of conflict and regret 
expresses the idea that separate persons are separate ends and fulfills the demand of 
the separateness of persons, according to Chappell. 
 Chappell’s argument applies not only to persons, but also to any entity that 
has final value. Sites of natural beauty might have final value; great artworks have 
final value. Their final value indicates that these entities are not entirely replaceable. 
The entities are not merely constituents of some overall good but are separate sources 
of value. We can bring this out, like Chappell, in terms of the attitudes that we should 
take towards entities with final value. It might be fine to sacrifice one painting by 
Monet in order to save five equally great paintings by Magritte. Nonetheless, it would 
be appropriate to feel conflict in this case. There are strong grounds for regret in 
sacrificing the Monet.59  
 
58 This need not be due to that entity’s intrinsic properties. It may also be due to that entities 
extrinsic or relational properties. For example, sites of natural beauty may have final value 
and count in themselves only because they are God’s creation. For the distinction between 
intrinsic value and final value see Christine M. Korsgaard, “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” 
Philosophical Review 92 (1983): 169-195. 
59 The feeling of conflict when trading off entities with final value can also enlighten a 
conservative attitude that G.A. Cohen has argued in favor of (G.A. Cohen, “Rescuing 
Conservatism: A Defense of Existing Value,” in Finding Oneself in the Other, ed. Michael 
Otsuka (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2013), pp. 143-74). 
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If this were all that the separateness of persons was saying, then there should 
be no difference between the separateness of persons and the separateness of 
artworks. However, persons are importantly different from artworks in a way that 
explains why the separateness of persons is of greater importance. Persons have a 
rich first-personal perspective and a second-person authority to raise claims on 
others. This means that the concern for persons involves not only a recognition of 
separate sites of final value, but a concern for the moral relationship in which agent 
and patients stand. No such comparable concern matters for the relationship between 
an agent and Michelangelo’s Pietà. Taurek phrases this nicely when he writes that in 
the case of the loss of an arm of the Pietà, we are concerned with the loss of something. 
However, in the case where a person loses an arm, we are concerned with the loss to 
someone.60 Our concern is not that something of value disappeared or that value was 
diminished, but rather that there has been a loss to a person with whom we 
empathize and with whom we stand in a particular relationship. This concern makes 
it possible that we can owe it to persons to act in certain ways. The separateness of 
persons is distinct from the separateness of artworks insofar as it is centrally about 
deontic verdicts and not fitting attitudes. Owing behavior to a being implies a 
directed duty. The duty is not owed to persons as a whole, but to particular and 
separate persons. This should be reflected in its deontic verdicts. 
 
VIII. The Dissertation 
 
 Thus far I argued that the separateness of persons imposes two distinct 
requirements on moral philosophy. One is a requirement regarding the justification 
of moral theories, the other is a requirement for the first-order content of moral 
theories. In the previous section I defended the view that the first-order content – i.e. 
the verdicts of moral permissibility – matter rather than the moral attitudes which 
the moral theory demands. Before I turn to the content of what the separateness of 
persons in my view demands, I address one further objection to the idea that the 
 
60 Taurek, “Should the Numbers Count?,” pp. 306-8. 
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separateness of persons is morally relevant. The challenge is that the separateness of 
persons relies on mistaken views about personal identity. Derek Parfit has argued for 
a revisionist view of personal identity according to which our personal identity – i.e. 
whether we persist as the same person – is not what matters. Instead, what should 
matter to us in thinking about prudential or anticipatory concern is Relation R, a 
relation of psychological connections with a future self.61 In Chapter 1 (Why It Does 
Not Matter What Matters) I take on this challenge. I argue that even if we grant Parfit’s 
views on the metaphysics of personal identity and on “what matters” for prudential 
and anticipatory concern, it does not follow that the separateness of persons is 
unimportant. 
 In the remainder of my dissertation, I further develop my view of what a 
moral theory that respects the separateness of persons requires. I have already 
expanded on both requirements and argued that the separateness of persons is 
morally important because of the importance of each person’s first-person and 
second-person standpoint. 
 I begin with a discussion of the link between the justificatory requirement of 
the separateness of persons and the veil of ignorance as a thought experiment. In 
Chapter 2 (Separate Persons Behind the Veil), I argue that prominent examples of the 
veil of ignorance, John Harsanyi’s and John Rawls’s, fail the justificatory requirement. 
I argue, however, that Ronald Dworkin’s veil of ignorance meets this requirement 
and highlight what is different about his veil. In Chapter 2 I also address a question 
of the substantive requirement of the separateness of persons in the context of 
distributive justice. I argue that there are two ways in which principles chosen behind 
a veil can respect the separateness of persons. One way is Rawls’s which restricts the 
principles to the basic structure of society. The other way is Dworkin’s where 
individual choices behind the veil only influence an entire hypothetical insurance 
market. Trade-offs are, in Dworkin’s theory, determined by an interplay of various 
individual decisions and not by these decisions themselves. My discussion here 
focuses on the difference between the unity of the individual and the separateness of 
persons. 
 
61 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pt. 3. 
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As I explained earlier, one component of the unity of the individual and the 
separateness of persons is the separateness of persons in a narrow sense. The 
separateness of persons in a narrow sense comes out most clearly in discussions of 
aggregation. As I have argued, there is an important connection to interpersonal 
moral theories which place emphasis on the importance of moral relations. Three 
chapters are devoted to this question. 
I start with a challenge for contractualist moral theories. Contractualism, as 
proposed by T.M. Scanlon, is perhaps the best developed interpersonal moral theory 
on offer. The challenge I address is how contractualism should address cases in which 
risks of harm and benefit rather than certain harms and benefits are at stake. In 
Chapter 3 (Contractualism, Complaints, and Risk), I argue against both traditional ex 
ante contractualism and ex post contractualism. Neither view distinguishes between 
different kinds of risk. I argue that distinguishing between objective and epistemic 
risk opens up the possibility for a third view that I call objective ex ante 
contractualism. This view, I argue, provides us with the best model of justifiability to 
each and provides us with a plausible model for addressing impositions of risk. 
I supplement my argument in Chapter 4 (Skepticism about Aggregation and 
Uncertain Rescues) by considering alternative versions of ex post contractualism 
which I do not consider in the previous chapter. None of the versions I consider in 
this chapter are superior in avoiding implausible forms of inter-personal aggregation 
to the interpretation of ex post contractualism that I argue against in Chapter 3. My 
discussion in Chapter 4 thereby bridges my discussion of risk and uncertainty with 
my discussion of aggregation in the following chapter. 
Chapter 5 (Aggregation, Balancing, and Respect for the Claims of Individuals) is 
devoted to questions of aggregation. I discuss the problem of how to reconcile anti-
aggregationist moral theories with intuitive verdicts that are more permissive about 
aggregation. In particular, I provide a theory that I call Hybrid Balance Relevant 
Claims. My view is like others a middle ground between a theory that is fully 
aggregative and theories that rule out all forms of aggregation. I accept that 
sometimes a great number of weaker, yet relevant claims can outweigh single 
stronger claims. I develop my theory by drawing a contrast between two different 
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kinds of intermediate positions, one with greater affinity to aggregation and my own 
theory with lesser affinity to aggregation. 
In Chapter 6 (Constraints, You, and Your Victims), I turn to the importance of 
the separateness of agents. The chapter discusses the morality of harming and in 
particular the paradox of deontology – i.e. the seeming paradox that although all 
rights violations matter equally, we should not violate a single right to prevent a large 
number of comparable rights violations. I argue for a new relational agent-based 
justification for deontological constraints. The justification is based on the special 
relation between the agent and her victims. This justification relates to the 
separateness of agents. It is the relational feature of you harming someone in 
particular that matters. I argue that my relational agent-based justification can 
explain why we are not permitted to minimize our own rights violations. I also point 
out how my relational justification can avoid the charge of being unduly self-
concerned. 
My dissertation thereby engages in a wide range of topics. I discuss personal 
identity, distributive justice, egalitarianism, contractualism, inter-personal 
aggregation, the morality of saving from harm, the morality of harming, and 
individual rights. My discussion is not exhaustive of the topics that the separateness 
of persons has been taken to be important for. For example, I do not discuss either 
libertarianism or liberalism in any depth.62 What should we say about this diversity 
in topics allegedly related to the separateness of persons? A pessimistic conclusion is 
that the separateness of persons is an elusive concept. When properly analyzed the 
different references to the separateness of persons turn out to be different arguments 
which bear no relation to one another. There is no real moral content to the 
separateness of persons.63 My dissertation as a whole argues for an optimistic 
 
62 For this see Martha C. Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1999), pp. 61-67; Anthony Simon Laden, “Taking the Distinction between Persons Seriously,” 
Journal of Moral Philosophy 1 (2004): 277-92; Matt Zwolinski, “The Separateness of Persons and 
Liberal Theory,” Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (2008): 147-65; and Jason Tyndal, “The Separatness 
of Persons: A Moral Basis for a Public Justification Requirement,” Journal of Value Inquiry 51 
(2017): 491-505.  
63 See e.g. Shlomi Segall, “Sufficientarianism and the Separateness of Persons,” Philosophical 
Quarterly 69 (2019): 142-55. 
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conclusion. The demands of the separateness of persons are neither empty nor 
implausibly stringent. Instead, the separateness of persons is a unifying feature of my 
discussion of various separate areas of morality. The unity of my dissertation goes 
along with the separateness of its chapters. 
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Chapter 1. 
Why It Does Not Matter What Matters: 
Relation R, Personal Identity, and Moral Theory 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Derek Parfit famously argued that personal identity is not what matters for 
prudential concern about the future. Instead, he argues what matters is Relation R, a 
combination of psychological connectedness and continuity with any cause. This 
revisionary conclusion, Parfit argued, has profound implications for moral theory. It 
should lead us, among other things, to deny the importance of the separateness of 
persons to morality. Instead, we should adopt impersonal consequentialism. In this 
chapter, I argue that Parfit is mistaken about this last step. His revisionary arguments 
about personal identity and rationality have no implications for moral theory. The 
importance the separateness of persons has for morality does not turn on whether 
personal identity rather than Relation R is what matters for prudential concern.1 
 
1 For Parfit’s views see Derek Parfit, “Personal Identity,” Philosophical Review 80 (1971): 3-27; 
“On ‘The Importance of Self-Identity’,” Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): 683-90; “Later selves 
and moral principles,” in Philosophy and Personal Relations, ed. Alan Montefiore (London: 
Routledge, 1973), pp. 137-69; “Lewis, Parry, and What Matters,” in Rorty, The Identities of 
Persons, pp. 91-108; Reasons and Persons, pt. 3; and “The Unimportance of Identity,” in Identity, 
ed. Henry Harris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 13-45. For views similar to 
Parfit’s see John Perry, “The Importance of Being Identical,” in Rorty, The Identities of Persons, 
pp. 67-90; Sydney Shoemaker, “Personal Identity: A materialist’s account,” in Personal Identity, 
ed. Sydney Shoemaker and Richard Swinburne (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), pp. 67-132; 
and Jennifer Whiting, “Friends and Future Selves,” Philosophical Review 95 (1986): 547-80. For 
a variety of arguments that personal identity is what matters see David Lewis, “Survival and 
Identity,” in Rorty, The Identities of Persons, pp. 17-40; Vinit Haksar, Equality, Liberty, and 
Perfectionism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 106-13; Vinit Haksar, Indivisible 
selves and moral practice (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1991), pp. 158-215; Susan 
Wolf, “Self-Interest and Interest in Selves,” Ethics 96 (1986): 704-20; Robert Merrihew Adams, 
“Should Ethics be More Impersonal? A Critical Note of Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons,” 
Philosophical Review 98 (1989): 438-84; Christine M. Korsgaard, “Personal Identity and the 
Unity of Agency: A Kantian Response to Parfit,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 18 (1989): 101-32; 
Mark Johnston, “Reasons and Reductionism,” Philosophical Review 101 (1992): 589-618; Mark 
Johnston, “Human Concerns without Superlative Selves,” in Reading Parfit, ed. Jonathan 
Dancy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), pp. 149-79; Marya Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), ch. 4; and Tim Christie, “Natural Separateness: Why 
Parfit’s Reductionist Account of Persons Fails to Support Consequentialism,” Journal of Moral 
Philosophy 6 (2009): 178-95. Otsuka argues that personal identity is a sufficient condition for 
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 When spelling out the moral implications of his view on personal identity and 
what matters, Parfit mentions a variety of examples. The examples range from 
revising our views on paternalism and autonomy, abortion, promises and 
commitments, retribution and desert, and the importance of equality to the 
separateness of persons objection to utilitarianism. My discussion will be focused on 
the importance of the separateness of persons objection. As I explained in the 
introduction to this dissertation, the separateness of persons objection occupies a 
central place in non-consequentialist moral thinking. Utilitarianism ignores the 
separateness of persons, the argument holds, because it aggregates all benefits and 
burdens across different persons. Sometimes, however, we are allowed to aggregate 
different benefits and burdens. In particular, we are allowed to aggregate when these 
benefits and burdens fall within one life. This is explained by the unity of the 
individual. Together the separateness of persons and the unity of the individual 
demand that we should treat inter-personal trade-offs differently from intra-personal 
trade-offs. Utilitarianism cannot do this. 
Parfit’s revisionary arguments concerning morality can be reconstructed as 
attacking both components of the separateness of persons objection to utilitarianism. 
One argument holds that Parfit’s views on personal identity and what matters 
undermine the unity of the individual. I examine and reject this argument in Section 
II. Another argument holds that Parfit’s views on personal identity and what matters 
undermine the separateness of persons. I examine and reject this argument in Section 
III. A last argument holds that his views render the unity of the individual and the 
separateness of persons less relevant. I examine and reject this argument in Section 
IV. 
 Throughout this paper my strategy is to accept Parfit’s arguments concerning 
personal identity and rationality, and to reject the link he draws from metaphysics 
and rationality to morality. My strategy thereby differs from what Mark Johnston has 
 
prudential concern (Michael Otsuka, “Personal Identity, Substantial Change, and the 
Significance of Becoming,” Erkenntnis 83 (2018): 1229-43). Unger and McMahan propose views 
which qualify Relation R with a physical realizer. This makes their views in practice close to 
personal identity. See Peter Unger, Identity, Consciousness and Value (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1990), chs. 4-5, 7; and Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), pp. 66-82. 
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called “minimalism”. Johnston remarks that many of our practices, like those of 
morality and rationality, lend themselves to certain metaphysical views. Minimalism 
then holds that the justification of these practices is independent from the truth of the 
metaphysical position. Metaphysical positions, like those about personal identity, are 
epiphenomenal to practices like rationality and morality.2 Unlike Johnston, I believe 
that the truth of metaphysical positions can have an impact on normative practices 
like morality. Indeed, I accept, at least for the sake of argument, that Parfit is correct 
about his link between metaphysics and rationality. I only deny that Parfit’s 
revisionary argument for morality stands. 
 
II. First Argument: Less United Individuals 
 
 So why should Parfit’s conclusion about the metaphysics of personal identity 
have any impact on morality? The first suggestion is that Parfit’s claim that what 
matters is Relation R rather than personal identity demonstrates that the unity of the 
individual is unimportant. When discussing the diminished importance of the 
separateness of persons, Parfit writes: “If the unity of a life is less deep, it is more 
plausible to claim that this unity is not what justifies maximization”.3 In rational 
decision-making we are allowed to pursue what will bring about the highest sum-
total of well-being. If Parfit is right in holding that the unity of the individual is less 
important, then this cannot be justified by appealing to the unity of the individual. 
Maximizing the sum-total of well-being would then seem to be justified differently 
and apply also in inter-personal trade-off, in line with what utilitarianism demands. 
 One way to explain Parfit’s claim that the unity of the individual is 
undermined, is by appealing to what we may call the relevant units of moral and 
prudential concern. Some nationalists claim that nations have moral importance over 
and above individuals. Nations matter for their own sake. A nation is, under such a 
view, a unit of moral and prudential concern. For “moral individualists”, the unit of 
 
2 Johnston, “Reasons and Reductionism”; and Johnston, “Human Concerns without 
Superlative Selves”. Similar arguments are made by Wolf, “Self-Interest and Interest in 
Selves”; Adams, “Should Ethics be More Impersonal?”; and Christie, “Natural Separateness”. 
3 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 334-35. 
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moral concern is a person’s entire life. But other proposals are possible. We could 
focus on parts of lives (I shall call these “person stages”), or we could focus on time-
slice persons, instances in an individual’s life without much temporal extension.4 
Parfit at some point writes that following his view we should “regard the rough 
subdivisions within lives as, in certain ways, like the divisions between lives”.5 
Elsewhere he speaks of the “partial disintegration” of persons.6 This seems to suggest 
that Parfit regards parts of lives, in particular those with high degrees of 
psychological connectedness, as the basic units of moral and prudential concern. The 
idea is that the psychological connections that contain what matters come in degrees. 
Some of these connections wither away over time. We are more strongly connected 
to our past and future person stages close in time. While this is a statement about the 
unit of prudential concern, Parfit’s statements indicate that he thinks that the unit of 
moral concern coincides with the unit of prudential concern. Indeed, his statement 
about treating rough subdivisions within lives like divisions between lives is made 
in the context of moral principles. 
Moral theories should therefore take person stages, rather than full lives as 
their objects of principal concern. For example, questions of distributive justice would 
then arise between person stages rather than between persons. This means that 
principles of distributive justice would need to be given a greater scope. They would 
also extend to trade-offs within a person’s life, namely to those between one person 
stage and its future successive person stage.7 But since principles of distributive 
justice would then apply to such a variety of cases, we might think that we have less 
reason to care about distributive justice. Our intuition that distribution matters is less 
strong for intra-personal, inter-stage trade-offs. Yet it is unclear why this is the 
conclusion we should draw from the widening of the scope of principles of justice. 
 
4 For similar distinctions see David O. Brink, “Rational Egoism and the Separateness of 
Persons,” in Dancy, Reading Parfit, pp. 96-134, at pp. 110-16; and David W. Shoemaker, “Selves 
and Moral Units,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1999): 391-419, at pp. 391-92. Shoemaker, 
following Parfit, calls these persons in parts of their lives ‘selves’, Brink calls them ‘person 
segments’. 
5 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 333-34. 
6 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 335-36. 
7 Cf. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 332-34. 
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Instead of revising our intuition about the importance of distributions, we could 
revise our intuition about intra-personal, inter-stage trade-offs. Perhaps we trust this 
intuition less since it might derive from traditional views about personal identity that 
Parfit rejects. If we take this answer to the problem, then we would revise our view 
on individual rationality. We would no longer be justified to pursue the maximum 
benefit when facing trade-offs that only affect our life. Principles of distributive 
justice would be extended to all trade-offs involving different person stages.8 
This looks like a stand-off between two different ways to adjust our intuitions. 
However, the defender of Parfit’s view has another argument in hand. Talking about 
person stages is only a useful heuristic. Person stages are united by greater 
psychological connections and what matters are these connections (Relation R). 
Introducing person stages can help us to avoid talking about Relation R directly, but 
it is an imperfect heuristic. The boundaries between different stages are fuzzy and 
different stages overlap. Once we see this, it is less plausible to just apply our moral 
principles to different units. To substitute one unit of moral concern for another 
overlooks the fuzziness around the borders of these moral units. There does not exist 
a unity of a person stage that is comparable to the unity a defender of the unity of the 
individual has in mind. We can then rightly ask why we should attach such great 
importance to the difference between different units when the units are only useful 
heuristics to refer to persons in different stages of their lives. 
But why should we follow Parfit in believing that Relation R leads us to accept 
person stages as the unit of moral concern? Why should we believe that entire lives 
are not strongly integrated? Broadly speaking there are two possible arguments, 
contra Parfit, that lives are strongly integrated. One argument is that something other 
than Relation R unifies persons. Consider, for example, Kantian replies to Parfit’s 
claims.9 These replies can admit that persons are neither metaphysically united nor 
united via Relation R. Instead, there is something else that unites persons. The 
 
8 Cf. Nagel, Mortal Questions, pp. 124-25fn16; and Dennis McKerlie, “Egalitarianism and the 
Difference Between Interpersonal and Intrapersonal Judgments,” in Egalitarianism, ed. Nils 
Holtug and Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), pp. 157-73, at pp. 
163-67. 
9 Korsgaard, “Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency”; and Simon Blackburn, “Has Kant 
Refuted Parfit?,” in Dancy, Reading Parfit, pp. 180-201. 
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Kantian response to Parfit highlights that persons are united by the practical 
perspective and the necessity to act as agents. In a similar vein, David Brink argues 
that agency is best ascribed to persons rather than person stages. Considering person 
stages to be agents would lead to an undue proliferation of various, overlapping 
agents.10 The second argument, on the contrary, does not introduce any further 
considerations over and above Relation R that could explain why individuals are 
unified. Instead, this argument rejects the claim that Parfit’s arguments have 
established that Relation R fades out over time. In line with my general strategy of 
granting Parfit his claims about metaphysics and rationality, I pursue an argument 
of the second sort. 
Relation R is the relation of psychological connectedness and/or continuity 
with any cause. Psychological connectedness refers to the degree to which the same 
psychological features are present in two different persons at different times. The 
psychological connectedness between me, now and me, two seconds ago, is very 
high. The psychological connectedness between me, now and me, two years ago is 
lower. I have forgotten some experiences, do not share all of my beliefs, adjusted my 
plans of life, and so on. Psychological continuity requires a series of overlapping 
bonds of strong psychological connectedness. Continuity does not require, however, 
that connectedness is given between earlier and later stages in the series. As such, 
psychological continuity, unlike psychological connectedness, is a transitive relation. 
The idea that Relation R weakens over time requires an interpretation of 
Relation R in which Relation R comes in degrees. Only then will person stages show 
a significantly greater extent of R-relatedness than entire lives. I already mentioned 
that psychological connectedness is a matter of degree. But is psychological 
continuity as well? Parfit contrasts connectedness as a relation that comes in degrees 
with continuity indicating that he does not believe that continuity is a relation that 
comes in degrees.11 Nevertheless, Brink offers a construal of continuity in which 
continuity is a matter of degree. According to Brink, two persons are more strongly 
continuous with one another if the individual connections in the chain of 
 
10 Brink, “Rational Egoism and the Separateness of Persons,” pp. 110-16, 121-23. 
11 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 206. 
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psychological connectedness that constitutes continuity are stronger.12 An immediate 
problem for such a view is that continuity is transitive. Parfit defines continuity as a 
transitive relation in order for continuity to be a possible criterion of personal 
identity. Since personal identity is transitive, continuity must be as well.13 Continuity 
is thus defined as transitive precisely to express a form of connection that the non-
transitive relation of connectedness does not express. The problem for Brink’s view 
is now that transitivity is defined only as a property of binary relations and not 
defined for relations that come in degrees. 
We can make sense of the suggestion that continuity comes in degrees in 
another way. We can imagine a family of continuity relations which each specify a 
different threshold of connectedness that is needed to ensure continuity. A person 
stage is then more continuous with a past or future person stage if a higher threshold 
of connectedness is met. For example, continuitySTRONG requires that all overlapping 
chains consist of strong connectedness, continuityVERY-STRONG requires chains of very 
strong connectedness, continuityEXTREMELY-STRONG requires extremely strong 
connectedness. Two person stages might then be more continuous if 
continuityEXTREMELY-STRONG rather than continuitySTRONG holds between them. 
This construal of continuity is a threshold view. According to this view, the 
weakest link determines the strength of the degree of continuity of the entire chain. 
The degree of continuity for an entire life is therefore determined exclusively by the 
amount of connectedness in the moment where the greatest change occurred. This 
does not cohere well with the reason for which continuity was introduced. Continuity 
is distinguished from connectedness to explain the psychological connection between 
persons over a long period of time. Continuity can explain how an old person is 
psychologically connected to her childhood person stage. But then it does not appear 
that it should matter very much how these changes occurred. 
Take the example of St Paul who according to the biblical story fell on the road 
to Damascus, heard the voice of Jesus, and decided to stop his persecution of 
 
12 Brink, “Rational Egoism and the Separateness of Persons,” p. 132fn31; and David O. Brink, 
“Self-Love and Altruism,” Social Philosophy & Policy 14 (1997): 122-57, at pp. 138, 141-43. 
13 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 206-7. 
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Christians and convert. St Paul’s story is one of a single sharp change. Contrast this 
with a person who lives an erratic life and changes her life’s narrative multiple times. 
Finally, towards the end of her life she, like St Paul, arrives at a point that is very 
different from her early person stages. As long as none of the individual changes in 
her life were as drastic as St Paul’s conversion, she would, following the current 
proposal, be more continuous than St Paul. While it may make sense to think that St 
Paul’s life has not been fully continuous, it makes little sense to think that the erratic 
life has been more continuous than St Paul’s. St Paul’s life has a clear narrative that is 
only disrupted by a single incident. No clear narrative exists for the person with the 
erratic life. Given that continuity is supposed to account for long-term relations, it 
seems hardly plausible that degrees of continuity should be so sensitive to single 
points in time. The reason why continuity is distinguished from connectedness as a 
separate relation is better accounted for by understanding continuity as an on-off 
relation. 
The argument for person stages as the unit of moral concern therefore cannot 
rely on an analysis of psychological continuity. But I have admitted that 
psychological connectedness comes in degrees. If we attach primary importance to 
psychological connectedness, then we can argue that person stages are the relevant 
unit of moral concern. If, on the other hand, we attach little significance to 
psychological connectedness, then we have no grounds for believing Parfit’s 
argument that person stages are the relevant unit of moral and prudential concern. 
In such a case my previous argument has shown that psychological continuity would 
ensure that we regard entire lives as the proper unit of moral concern. 
While for most parts of his argument, Parfit does not distinguish between the 
two components of Relation R, we can now see that the difference is important. So 
what is Parfit’s argument that psychological connectedness is an important part of 
what matters? His argument here is very brief. He analyses three components of 
psychological connectedness/continuity to see whether we care about being 
connected instead of merely continuous.14 The first component is memory. If only 
continuity mattered, then “[i]t should not matter to me that I shall soon have lost all 
 
14 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 301. 
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of my memories of my past life.” But this is implausible. Indeed, we care heavily 
about retaining our memories. Also in terms of desires and intentions Parfit claims 
that we want more than continuity. Our lives should have an overall unity and 
should not be episodic with continued fluctuations. Thirdly, Parfit claims that there 
are parts of our character that we do not want to change. Here again, he claims, 
connectedness matters. 
 To assess Parfit’s argument, it will be helpful to make the case a bit more 
concrete. We can take a case where psychological continuity is given but 
psychological connectedness is low. Alzheimer’s is such a case.15 A person before the 
development of Alzheimer’s is psychologically continuous with the person having 
developed Alzheimer’s. But their psychological connectedness is limited. The person 
has forgotten many of the memories she once had. It is also likely that many of the 
intentions or long-term plans that the person had will have changed or she simply 
will have forgotten them. Maybe there will be further changes due to Alzheimer’s 
that reduce psychological connectedness. If the person used to be very engaged with 
intellectual activities, her character will inevitably change when the illness leads to a 
decline of her reasoning skills. As noted earlier, Parfit has argued that in these cases 
we do seem to care about our connectedness with these persons. I agree with this to 
some extent. But I think Parfit relies here on an ambiguity in the locution “what 
matters”.16 It matters to us that or whether these changes happen. The thought of 
Alzheimer’s is truly frightening to many, including me, and we would strongly want 
to avoid it. 
Yet Parfit needs another claim to support his argument. He needs to say that 
connectedness matters once or when these changes happen. In other words, he needs 
 
15 We can leave aside complications of late stage Alzheimer’s where all psychological 
connections to one’s previous life are cut and so there is no continuity either. Some authors, 
notably Jeff McMahan, have held that we have grounds to be rationally concerned with a 
future Alzheimer’s-Self who is not even psychologically continuous with us (cf. McMahan, 
The Ethics of Killing, p. 65). Here I do not need this stronger claim but only the weaker claim 
that we have reason to be rationally concerned with a future Alzheimer’s-Self that is 
continuous with us. Those like McMahan who believe in the stronger claim will also support 
the weaker claim. 
16 A similar observation about the ambiguity of “what matters” is made by Peter Unger. Unger 
uses the terms “desirability use” and “prudential use” for the contrast (cf. Unger, Identity, 
Consciousness and Value, pp. 92-97). 
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the claim that connectedness constitutes the basis for rational self-concern. But here 
it does not seem plausible to me that we would lose the special bond with the 
resulting person once we develop Alzheimer’s. If someone told us that the person 
with whom we will be continuously connected will be tortured in the future, we 
would rightfully be horrified. It would concern and involve us deeply. If we hear that 
a stranger that is qualitatively similar to us will be tortured, we may have sympathy 
but will not be as involved as in the previous case. Now how should we react if we 
hear that a person with whom we will be continuously connected but who will 
develop Alzheimer’s will be tortured? Parfit’s claim that connectedness matters 
should make us be less worried or concerned about this news. We should treat it 
more like the news of the stranger. Yet I cannot see why we should not react with the 
same horror and concern to the news as in the case of our continuous self who will 
not develop Alzheimer’s. 
 Let me illustrate my distinction further with an analogy. Parents often want 
children to turn out a specific way. At the very least they would like their children to 
be successful and happy. This matters tremendously to them. But parental love does 
not relinquish when children do not meet this standard. It does not matter to parents 
that their child is not successful once this is the way things are. They do not lose the 
special bond of concern with their children if these happen to be unsuccessful and 
depressed. Similar things hold in the self-regarding Alzheimer’s case. Of course we 
would prefer a future without Alzheimer’s. But this does not mean that we give less 
importance to our bond with our psychologically continuous Alzheimer’s-self. 
 A second reason to think that psychological connectedness is not what 
primarily matters is the following. Psychological connectedness will be very high 
when there is a great overlap in our psychology between past and future selves. But 
we certainly do not want our life to be static. Even if we are content with ourselves 
and cannot identify specific parts of ourselves to be changed, we still would want to 
develop and grow as persons. Parfit to some extent agrees with this general 
observation, but he remarks that we want our life to have a certain overall unity. The 
life should not be episodic.17 But here similar arguments like the ones I raised before 
 
17 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 301. 
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apply. I can concede that we do not want that our life will be episodic. Such a life 
would not have the requisite unity or narrative that we strive for. We might even 
think that such a life could not be a good life. In short, we do not want that this 
happens. But does this also mean we shall lose all special bond or interest in the 
person who is at the end of our episodic journey through time? I doubt that. Our 
intuitions about the unity of life are intuitions about what makes a life good, but we 
will still be concerned with our path through life even if our life is deficient in some 
sense. 
We can make the remarks about change more precise. Some decisions are very 
likely going to result in psychological changes in the personality of the person making 
the decision. Take the decision of a young adult from a working-class background 
whether or not to go to university. If she goes, the would-be student will experience 
a new social setting very different from the one she is used to. She will be exposed to 
ideas and avenues radically different from those she would have encountered 
otherwise. This is confirmed by reports of a culture shock for students from working-
class backgrounds in higher education. She can foresee that the university experience 
will change her. It is foreseeable for the decision-maker that one option will lead to 
significant psychological changes. The new experience can turn out to be 
transformative for that person.18 Psychological connectedness will hold only to a 
reduced degree between the decision-maker and her future self. This change will only 
happen, however, if one of the two options is chosen. Assuming that psychological 
connectedness is the primary part of what matters, this influences the rational 
assessment of these decisions. The decision to engage in the transformative 
experience will be less appealing. Any potential gains of higher education will have 
to be discounted by the fact that we should have less prudential concern for the 
resulting person. The expected benefits of going to university would need to be very 
substantial to counteract the lessened concern. This does not strike me as a plausible 
model for thinking about these kinds of decisions.19 
 
18 For a detailed treatment of personally transformative experiences see L.A. Paul, 
Transformative Experiences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
19 For a similar observation see Wolf, “Self-Interest and Interest in Selves,” pp. 712-13. 
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 The argument becomes even more pressing in the special case when we 
regard the change positively as an improvement.20 We do want to change some of our 
psychological features and would not regard their disappearance as a loss in any way. 
However, successful improvement of our psychological features would render us less 
psychologically connected with our past self. If psychological connectedness 
expresses what matters, then we should have less prudential or anticipatory concern 
for our successive improved self. In a way this even undermines the rationality of 
efforts made in order to improve one’s character. These efforts are borne out of a 
concern for an eventually resulting person that will be psychologically less connected 
with the person having made the sacrifices. If we should have less rational concern 
for this resulting person, these efforts may not be worthwhile after all. 
 There is one feature about the improvement argument that might seem 
problematic. David Shoemaker objects that, contrary to what I have been assuming, 
cases of improvements do contain a significant degree of connectedness. Most 
importantly, there is a shared intention of wanting to improve one’s character and 
life. This intention connects these parts of one’s life strongly together. The strong 
connection is evidenced by the fact that we can identify with our past self in a way 
that we cannot with an even more remote self, like our past self before we made the 
decision to change our life.21 
 Shoemaker’s point is apt for deliberate decisions to improve one’s character. 
But not all improvements need to involve an intention. Earlier, I described decisions 
which can have a transformative impact on the decision-maker. It seems possible that 
there are decisions where the decision-maker can foresee that the decision will have 
a positive transformative impact yet does not choose the option because they intend 
the improvement. Take the example of parenting. Let us assume that a person 
 
20 This possibility is also discussed by Brink, “Rational Egoism and the Separateness of 
Persons,” pp. 119-21. Christine Korsgaard touches on this issue when she discusses changes 
that are deliberately brought about by the agent, something she calls “authorial 
connectedness”. Korsgaard, “Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency,” pp. 120-23. 
21 Shoemaker, “Selves and Moral Units,” pp. 406-9. For a more extensive discussion of 
Shoemaker’s point on identification see David W. Shoemaker, “Theoretical Persons and 
Practical Agents,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 25 (1996): 318-32; at 328-31. He extends on a point 
made earlier by Parfit (“On ‘The Importance of Self-Identity’”). Parfit did not include 
identification in his discussion of personal identity in Reasons and Persons. 
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foresees that being a parent will induce positive character changes, for example by 
becoming a more responsible person. But the decision to become a parent may have 
been made on grounds entirely independent of these changes. In this case, the 
improvement of the future parent’s character is not intended and therefore there is 
no intention that connects the self of the future parent with the later improved self. 
Here, too, the fact that the future parent will be less connected to her later self should 
not make undergoing the improving experience any less rational. 
 What is present, however, is a second-order desire by the future parent to be 
a more responsible person. This second-order desire is fulfilled in the case of first-
order psychological change while it is frustrated in the case of first-order 
psychological stagnation. While the second-order connection does hold over time in 
cases of improvement, many other first-order psychological connections will be 
weakened. Psychological connectedness can accept cases of improvement only if 
there is a reason why we should privilege second-order psychological connections 
over first-order psychological connections. 
 One suggestion here is related to the idea of self-identification. The idea is that 
there is a sense of alienation towards those first-order desires that we rather not have 
while there is a sense of self-identification towards those first-order desires that we 
wish to retain. Alienation and self-identification do provide us with good reasons for 
regarding some desires as more properly our own than others. Parfit, when he 
discusses self-identification, draws a contrast between self-identification and non-
identification. Non-identification is marked by an attitude of indifference towards a 
past self. Indifference in turn is marked by the absence of feelings of pride, shame, 
regret and the like.22 This analysis of self-identification does not privilege desires that 
we approve of over those we disapprove of. Shame and regret for having certain 
desires can just as well provide for self-identification. I think Parfit is right in this 
construal of self-identification. We talk about people owning up to one’s mistakes. A 
person repentant of a former self that did wrong is not regarding this former self as 
alien to herself. On the contrary, it would be difficult to understand the intensity of 
feelings of remorse and guilt if the person would not identify the former self as 
 
22 Parfit, “On ‘The Importance of Self-Identity’”. 
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genuinely herself. Of course, sometimes there is a feeling of alienation from our first-
order desires. But alienation is not the same as disapproval, the two can diverge. Since 
this is the case, the importance of self-identification cannot give us a reason why 
second-order desires are more important psychological connections than first-order 
desires. This in turn means that improvements do not necessarily ensure 
psychological connectedness. The reply to the improvement argument fails. It seems 
then that Parfit’s case for psychological connectedness as a central part of the relation 
of what matters does not stand. 
 This concludes my discussion of connectedness and continuity. We should 
interpret Relation R as giving primary weight to psychological continuity as opposed 
to connectedness. We can retain Parfit’s central claim that personal identity is not 
what matters. What matters instead is Relation R. Psychological continuity can, 
unlike personal identity, be one to many, as illustrated by fission cases where one 
brain is divided and inserted into two different brainless bodies. Both resulting 
persons will then be psychologically continuous with the original person whose brain 
was divided.23 But, as it turns out, in our world this difference is not relevant. We do 
not divide or branch in our real world. For us, personal identity perfectly coincides 
with psychological continuity. Unlike psychological connectedness this does not 
come in degree but is an on-off relation. The appropriate unit of moral and prudential 
concern therefore remains an entire life. The unity of the individual is safeguarded 
by the unity of psychological continuity. 
 
III. Second Argument: Less Separate Persons 
 
 The arguments canvassed so far have sought to undermine the unity of the 
individual. But instead of focusing on the unity of the individual, we could focus on 
the separateness of persons. Consider the following famous passage in which Parfit 
describes his own attitude after coming to believe the reductionist view. 
 
23 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 254-60. 
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“There is still a difference between my life and the lives of other people. 
But the difference is less. Other people are closer. I am less concerned about 
the rest of my own life, and more concerned about the lives of others”.24 
One way to interpret this passage is that Parfit is suggesting that we can have similar 
relations to other contemporaneous persons as we have to our future selves. This 
includes Relation R which contains what matters. If the way we are related to our 
future selves is similar to the way we are related to other distinct people, then this 
reduces the extent to which we are distinct from other persons. Jennifer Whiting and 
David Brink have suggested, in a similar vein, that our relation to our future person 
stages is like the relation to close friends or family.25 If this is so, then we would no 
longer be justified in putting such great weight on the separateness of persons as a 
bar to inter-personal aggregation. 
There are many different ways individuals can be psychologically related to 
us. These correspond to the different important features of our mental lives. Sharing 
memories, intentions, beliefs, or dispositions are ways to be psychologically related. 
To be one of the psychological relations included in Relation R, the relation has to 
have a causal component. It is not sufficient that two persons are very much alike in 
terms of their psychological characteristics. The causal component in Relation R is 
important to distinguish numerical identity from qualitative identity. Sometimes 
older people say things like “you remind me of myself when I was young”. This is a 
statement about qualitative identity. The older person sees many of the features of 
her own psychology when she was young in the other person. But this psychological 
resemblance is clearly not sufficient to establish numerical identity. 
With regard to causal psychological connections, we should draw a 
distinction between those connections that are first-personal and those connections 
which are not first-personal. By first-personal I do not mean that the connections have 
to be had by the same person. Rather, I understand a first-personal connection as a 
non-deviant causal connection between first-personal mental states. 
 
24 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 281. My emphasis. 
25 Whiting, “Friends and Future Selves”; and Brink, “Self-Love and Altruism,” pp. 136-43. 
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The contrast here is between mental states that are “from the inside” against 
mental states “from the outside”. It means that connections are presented in the first-
personal mode of presentation.26 The connections must be part of a self-centred 
scheme of one particular point of view. The distinction is best explained with regard 
to memory. I might have the memory of hearing Parfit speak. The memory is 
detached from the person Parfit, just as in a dream we sometimes see ourselves from 
a third-person perspective. This memory is markedly distinct from a memory in 
which I seem to recall having Parfit’s body and voice and am speaking at All Souls 
College. This second memory is had “from the inside”. The memory is one in which 
I occupy Parfit’s self-centred perspective of the world. It is not just that I am 
imagining how All Souls looked and Parfit’s voice sounded. Rather, it is, in 
Williams’s words, participation imagery from the perspective that Parfit occupied.27 
A second example is the link between an intention and a subsequently carried out 
action. Intentions entail a first-person perspective; they are intentions that the agent 
performs an action. Intentions are “inside” of a particular self-centered scheme.28 
Memories or intentions of this sort need not presuppose personal identity. 
Parfit introduces a revision of the concept of memory, originally proposed by Sydney 
Shoemaker, that he calls quasi-memories.29 In quasi-memories the subject seems to 
remember an experience from the first-personal point of view, someone had this 
experience, and there is a non-deviant causal connection between the experience and 
the memory. Similarly, for someone to have a quasi-intention, one has to have an 
intention, a subsequent action has to be performed, and the intention must cause the 
action in the right way. 
To see the importance of causation in the case of memory, consider a case in 
which a person who has been in an accident forgets about her experience. At a later 
point in time a skilled hypnotist implants imagery of an accident into the minds of 
 
26 Cf. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 220-22. 
27 Bernard Williams, Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 
43-44; see also J. David Velleman, “Self to Self,” Philosophical Review 105 (1996): 39-76, at pp. 
48-50. 
28 Cf. Velleman, “Self to Self,” p. 70. 
29 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 220-22; and Sydney Shoemaker, “Persons and Their Pasts,” 
American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (1970): 269-85. 
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her audience. By sheer coincidence the hypnotist’s imagery of the accident 
corresponds perfectly to the imagery of the actual accident. Such a case is clearly not 
one of remembering or quasi-remembering the accident.30 The causal connection is 
even clearer to see in the case of intentions. What is special about intentions is that 
intentions can lead directly to actions without agential interference. Intentions are 
causes of actions.31 
With these clarifications in mind, the question arises whether psychological 
continuity and therefore strong psychological connectedness, requires first-personal 
connections. The first thing to note is that the examples that Parfit gives as elements 
of Relation R tend to be first-personal connections. For example, when introducing 
the relations of psychological connectedness and continuity Parfit introduces them 
after a discussion of quasi-memories and quasi-intentions.32 This gives an indication 
that Relation R appears to be a plausible criterion for what matters in large part 
because it contains first-personal connections. 
While this is indicative, there are other arguments which strengthen the case 
for the centrality of first-personal connections. Consider the relation between you, 
now, and a future person who happens, by fortuitous coincidence, to have the same 
character, habits and other psychological features as you. In short, the person is 
qualitatively very similar to you. This relation is not Relation R and does not contain 
what matters. There are two elements missing in this case. One is the absence of a 
causal link between your psychology and the future person’s psychology. The other 
element is the absence of first-personal connections. Which one of these two elements 
explains more satisfactorily why qualitative similarity is insufficient for Relation R? 
 
30 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 207. The example is due to C.B. Martin and Max Deutscher, 
“Remembering,” Philosophical Review 75 (1966): 161-96, at pp. 174-75. 
31 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 261. In both cases we need further conditions that rule out 
deviant causal chains. For the case of intentions see Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and 
Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 74-82; John R. Searle, Intentionality 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 83-98; and Alfred R. Mele, Springs of 
Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). For the case of memory see Martin and 
Deutscher, “Remembering,” pp. 178-91; and Alan Sidelle, “Parfit on ‘the Normal/a 
Reliable/any Cause of Relation R,” Mind 120 (2011): 735-60, at pp. 744-48. 
32 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 204-5. 
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It is hard to see why causation by itself should make such a big difference. 
There is no obvious reason why causally sustained psychological connections should 
be particularly important. There is nothing intrinsic to causation that suitably 
connects with our concerns of what matters. It is difficult to see how the mere fact 
that some connections are causally sustained could explain what distinguishes 
fortuitous psychological connections by accident from ordinary cases of personal 
identity. 
Why causation is important is even more puzzling given that Parfit thinks 
that any causal link would be sufficient to satisfy psychological connectedness.33 If 
what matters is the effect and not how it was caused, why does it matter that is was 
caused in the first place? One possibility is that something associated with the causal 
requirement explains why the relation has to be a causal one. In this case then, it 
would be this extra factor rather than the causal link as such which explains why the 
relation between the two persons contains what matters. Ernest Sosa and Jeff 
McMahan provide arguments of this kind.34 Sosa argues that what explains why 
causal connections are important is that one important causal connection is non-
branching survival. Survival for Sosa refers to being the unique closest continuer of a 
person. McMahan argues that causal connections are important if they have a 
physical realiser: the continued existence of enough of one’s brain. I agree with the 
spirit of these arguments that something associated with causation explains the 
causal requirement. However, unlike Sosa and McMahan, I seek to provide an 
answer that is consistent with Parfit’s own view on what matters. 
When I introduced quasi-memories and quasi-intentions as examples of first-
personal connections, I highlighted that both are defined as causal notions. Quasi-
memories and quasi-intentions must both stand in the right kind of causal relation to 
previous experiences or subsequent actions. Without any causal relations then, there 
cannot be quasi-memories or quasi-intentions.35 Crucially, in contrast to the generic 
 
33 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 282-87. 
34 Ernest Sosa, “Surviving Matters,” Noûs 24 (1990): 297-322, at pp. 309-13; and McMahan, The 
Ethics of Killing, pp. 60-66. 
35 Alan Sidelle makes a related point about Parfit’s discussion of whether what matters is 
Relation R with any cause, a reliable cause, or its normal cause. Sidelle argues that Parfit’s 
discussion is best understood as rejecting the view that there are any further causal 
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causal link, it is easy to see why first-personal connections add something significant 
to mere qualitative similarity. First-personal connections express what distinguishes 
one’s psychology from the psychological make-up of others. We can call this a 
person’s distinguishing psychology. Distinguishing psychology is opposed to both 
generic psychology and core psychology. Generic psychology refers to the parts of one’s 
psychology that are instantiations of generic psychological features which one shares 
with others, like character traits or habits. Core psychology refers to the psychological 
capacities that persons have.36 
By conveying one’s distinguishing psychology, first-personal connections 
contain what sets oneself apart from others. They express a non-generic sense of ‘you’ 
and demark what is special about you. This links well with what matters. The relation 
of what matters captures a special bond that we have to persons precisely because of 
what sets them apart; what makes them different and special. Our distinguishing 
psychology is thereby closely connected to a sense of self. It provides for the 
possibility of self-identification. As I discussed earlier, when we self-identify, we 
acknowledge events or persons in time to be of special importance to us. In the 
example of mere qualitative similarity, it is this basis for self-identification that is 
missing. The absence of first-personal connections is the more plausible explanation 
why the relation with a qualitatively similar person fails to contain what matters. 
There is another reason in favour of the view that the absence of first-personal 
connections satisfactorily explains why the relation of mere qualitative similarity 
does not contain what matters. When introducing first-personal connections, I 
highlighted that first-personal connections are connections that are “from the inside” 
and which provide us with a self-centred perspective on the world. This self-centred 
perspective is closely related to what matters. It provides us with a perspective from 
which our projects and ambitions are carried out. The continuation of this perspective 
provides us with the basis for our special concern with our projects and ambitions. 
 
requirements over and above those inherent in the causal psychological connections that 
constitute Relation R. See Sidelle, “Parfit on ‘the Normal/a Reliable/any Cause of Relation R”. 
36 The distinction refines the contrast Unger draws between core psychology and distinctive 
psychology (Unger, Identity, Consciousness and Value, pp. 67-71). Unger somewhat 
misleadingly uses the term distinctive psychology for both distinguishing and generic 
psychology. 
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The first-personal perspective also explains why we are rightly involved and 
anticipate experience of future person stages. We can anticipate from the first-person 
perspective.37 
We should conclude that first-personal connections are a central component 
of Relation R. They explain why Relation R requires causal connections between 
psychological features, provide for a sense of self-identification and provide us with 
a self-centred scheme from which we experience the world. Given the centrality of 
first-personal connections for psychological connectedness, we should further 
conclude that strong connectedness requires at least some first-personal connections. 
Strong connectedness is in turn needed for psychological continuity. If, following my 
argument in Section II, psychological continuity is primarily what matters, then non-
trivial R-relatedness requires first-personal connections. 
We might imagine two persons regularly exchanging quasi-memories, quasi-
intentions, and other first-personal connections via telepathy. Similarly, in cases of 
fission the two resulting persons would share many quasi-memories, quasi-
intentions, and other first-personal connections. These two persons would exhibit 
strong psychological connectedness and continuity. But aside from these science 
fiction examples, it is hard to see how in our world quasi-memories, or other first-
personal connections, could be shared between separate persons. I know of no 
mechanism in our world that ensures that first-personal memories or intentions can 
be shared. And I certainly know of no mechanism by which we can share first-
personal memories, intentions and so on, over a prolonged period of time. In our 
world then, strong connectedness, a requirement for continuity, cannot plausibly be 
met between separate individuals. 
 
IV. Third Argument: Less Importance to Persons 
 
In the previous two sections, I examined and rejected arguments that 
respectively sought to undermine the unity of the individual and the separateness of 
persons. We can defend the unity of the individual and the separateness of persons. 
 
37 Cf. Velleman, “Self to Self,” pp. 67-76. 
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I will now examine a third argument. Rather than disputing the unity of the 
individual or the separateness of persons, it disputes that the separateness of persons 
or the unity of the individual have moral importance. Parfit’s reductionist views on 
personal identity should give us reason to attach less significance to persons. Parfit 
argues that a person’s existence can be reduced to facts about mental and physical 
events. Over and above these facts, there does not exist an entity like a Cartesian Ego 
or a soul.38 Because a person’s existence just consists in facts about mental and 
physical events, there is less that is involved in the fact of personal identity. This 
should give us grounds to care less about the fact of personal identity.39 The argument 
relies exclusively on Parfit’s reductionist answer to the question of what a person is 
and does not rely on his more specific claims about what matters for prudential and 
anticipatory concern. We can still believe that reductionism about persons should 
lead us to adopt an impersonal morality, even if we think identity is what matters 
prudentially. This line of argument, while often overlooked, deserves scrutiny. 40 
Let me now turn to the argument. What are the reasons for believing that 
persons matter less under the reductionist view? Parfit describes facts about personal 
identity as being a “deeper truth” under the non-reductionist view. He points out 
that many of us would attach great significance to a separate existence over and above 
our body and related mental and physical events. Since personal identity is less 
important, we should also attach less significance to the separateness of our 
respective existences. This consideration does not seem decisive. Various authors 
 
38 Cf. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 219-28, 236-38, 245-52. 
39 Cf. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 337-38, 340-41; and Parfit, “The Unimportance of 
Identity,” pp. 28-41. 
40 A typical example is David Shoemaker’s discussion in the Stanford Encyclopedia entry on 
Personal Identity and Ethics. In Section 4 Shoemaker discusses the argument that the adoption 
of reductionism and the rejection of a deep metaphysical divide between persons could 
undermine the separateness of persons. But he then writes that the success of such an 
argument will depend on the kind of psychological or moral unit that the view espouses (cf. 
David W. Shoemaker, “Personal Identity and Ethics,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
Winter 2016 Edition, ed. Edward N. Zalta (URL: < 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/identity-ethics/>)). For a good 
explanation of the difference between this line of reasoning and other revisionary arguments 
see Parfit, “Later selves and moral principles,” pp. 147-49. For reasons how this type of 
argument might fill a gap in other revisionary arguments see also John Broome, “Utilitarian 
Metaphysics,” in Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being, ed. Jon Elster and John E. Roemer 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 70-97. 
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have pointed out that their belief in the moral (and prudential) importance of persons 
has not diminished even as they have become convinced of a reductionist picture of 
the person.41 Their reason for assigning importance to persons depends on the 
centrality of persons for our projects and social surroundings. It depends on how 
persons relate to their future and to others. It never depended on there being a 
separate entity who is this person. 
There is a stronger argument for the reductionist critique. If we are 
reductionist about personal identity, then we can express every fact about personal 
identity in another way. We can re-describe these facts as impersonal facts about 
mental and physical events. But if these facts are just equivalent to the more ordinary, 
impersonal facts, then it is unclear why we are justified in ascribing greater 
significance to facts about personal identity than we do to the equivalent impersonal 
facts. Following this argument, it is not so much the absence of a Cartesian Ego that 
makes the difference, but rather the availability of an alternative, impersonal 
description of one’s life. If these two ways of describing one’s life are indeed 
equivalent, then we should be suspicious whether the added significance we attach 
to persons is indeed justified.42 
Mark Johnston provides an objection to this kind of argument. He dubs this 
line of reasoning by Parfit the “argument from below”. The argument from below 
seems to hold that facts about higher level entities are less important as long as they 
do not involve any superlative, non-reducible entities. It would seem that we can only 
reason bottom up, from lower level entities and descriptions, and cannot invoke 
higher level entities in our arguments. The argument from below denies that the 
value of the whole can be greater than the sum of its parts. If the lower level entities 
do not carry value, then the higher level entities cannot either. The composition of 
 
41 Wolf, “Self-Interest and Interest in Selves,” esp. pp. 705-8; Adams, “Should Ethics be More 
Impersonal?,” pp. 454-60; and Johnston, “Human Concerns without Superlative Selves,” p. 
159. 
42 Parfit makes this argument in Reasons and Persons (cf. pp. 340-1), later however Parfit writes 
that it was misleading to claim that a person’s life could be re-described impersonally. 
Nonetheless, he insists that an impersonal conceptual scheme would be neither scientifically 
nor metaphysically worse than our current conceptual scheme (Derek Parfit, “Experiences, 
Subjects, and Conceptual Schemes,” Philosophical Topics 26 (1999): 217-70). 
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these entities cannot “create” value. Johnston provides a reductio against this 
argument. Together with physicalism the argument from below implies that the only 
thing that could matter in our world would be microphysical particles. But evidently 
these are not, by themselves, of any value. Johnston points out how this is not a proof 
of moral nihilism but rather a reductio against Parfit’s argument from below.43 We 
can add that under a dualist view, the argument from below would only count mental 
events or experiences as having importance to us. But very few of us think that the 
only thing that has value to us are mental states. To make Johnston’s point clearer, 
we can give examples where Parfit’s reductionist deconstruction seems implausible. 
We can be reductionist about art and say that the Mona Lisa just consists in a poplar 
panel and various coloured pigments bound together by oil. Presented this way, it is 
hard to see why we should attach any significance to the Mona Lisa at all. 
Parfit replies to Johnston’s criticism with some examples of his own.44 In 
Parfit’s examples the reductionist strategy seems more plausible. One example is 
related to the definition of death. Plausibly we are reductionist about death insofar 
as death just means the cessation of certain functions necessary for our continued 
existence. According to one view it matters how we define and use the word “death”. 
But we may plausibly think that what should matter to us morally speaking is which 
morally important functions cease to exist rather than whether a specific definition is 
met. Being alive is important only insofar as the functions that constitute “being 
alive” are important or valuable.45 We then need a way to distinguish Parfit’s more 
plausible examples, like the definition of death, from other examples, like my own 
about the Mona Lisa. In other words, we need to show that reductionism about death 
and persons is a different sort of reductionism from the one involved in art. 
I have already alluded to one possible answer, the one Parfit wants to defend. 
In the case of defining death (and personal identity Parfit may add), we are dealing 
with merely verbal disputes. In the case of art, on the other hand, this is not the case. 
Parfit writes: 
 
43 Johnston, “Human Concerns without Superlative Selves,” pp. 154-56, 167-68. 
44 Parfit, “The Unimportance of Identity,” pp. 29-31. 
45 A more complete defense of this claim is developed by Eric Olson. Eric Olson, “Why 
Definitions of Death Don’t Matter,” (unpublished manuscript). 
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“When I claim that personal identity just consists in certain other facts, I 
have in mind a closer and partly conceptual relation. … But, if we knew 
the facts about these [psychological] continuities, and understood the 
concept of a person, we would thereby know, or would be able to work 
out, the facts about persons. Hence my claim that, if we know the other 
facts, questions about personal identity should be taken to be questions, 
not about reality, but only about our language”.46 
The most straightforward way to interpret this response is to understand it as 
analytical reductionism. Analytical reductionism would mean that we could reduce 
in principle statements involving persons to statements that do not involve persons 
just in virtue of the meaning of the word “person”. This form of reductionism seems 
plausible in Parfit’s cases that concern the definitions of words. Analytical 
reductionism would, however, also mean that the statement about persons and the 
impersonal statement to which it can be reduced necessarily have the same truth-
value. If the difference is merely about our language and not about reality, then the 
relation of equivalence between a statement about persons and an impersonal 
statement should hold necessarily. But here Parfit provides the best counterexamples 
against himself. Reductionism about persons does not hold necessarily, non-
reductionism may well have been true. If we had evidence of persons remembering 
events from distant times and were these events confirmed, this would support the 
case for an immortal soul that can be reincarnated.47 Reductionism does then not hold 
as an analytical necessity. 
Rather than analytical reductionism, Parfit ought to hold that reductionism 
about persons is ontological reductionism. Here the idea is that we can translate facts 
about a specific entity into facts that do not presuppose this entity. Instead of persons 
we can talk of mental and physical events and their relations. Instead of the Mona 
 
46 Parfit, “The Unimportance of Identity,” p. 33. Elsewhere Parfit writes that under his view 
the existence of persons is only “a fact of grammar” (“Later selves and moral principles,” p. 
158), he also writes that most facts about persons only exist because of the way we talk (Reasons 
and Persons, pp. 223, 226, 341). Parfit also defends more explicitly the view that an impersonal 
conceptual scheme would be no worse than our current conceptual scheme (“Experiences, 
Subjects, and Conceptual Schemes”). 
47 Cf. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 227-28. 
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Lisa we can talk of colour pigments and their spatial relations, and so on. One specific 
form of ontological reductionism is constitutive reductionism. Under constitutive 
reductionism some entities constitute others. A common example for constitutive 
reductionism are clay statues. The statue does not exist independently from the lump 
of clay, but neither is it identical to it. Rather the lump of clay constitutes the statue. 
In cases of constitutive reductionism, we would still say that there is an additional 
entity in the world. The statue does exist in the world and has an existence separate 
but not independent from the lump of clay. The existence of the statue will always be 
parasitic on the existence of the clay. But we can destroy the statue without 
destroying the lump of clay. This gives us a strong sense how the statue is a separate 
entity. Facts that hold about the statue are therefore not merely conceptual facts about 
how to use words, they are facts about a really existing entity. Parfit claims to be a 
realist about importance by which he means that he attaches importance only to those 
facts that are ontologically real. But if Parfit is a realist about importance in this way, 
then he should attach significance to constituted entities. Constituted entities are 
ontologically real after all. Given that he does not attach significance to persons, his 
reductionism is most plausibly not a constitutive one.48  
Instead of constitutive reductionism, Parfit needs to invoke eliminativist 
reductionism. According to eliminativist reductionism, the reduced entity does not 
really exist. It is not part of one’s privileged ontology. Instead, we only have terms of 
convenience that do not refer to any real entity at all. This interpretation gives a 
strong sense that we would be treating language as more important than reality if we 
attached significance to persons. The problem with this reading is that Parfit does not 
give any argument for eliminative reductionism about persons. His reductionist 
 
48 Here things are getting confused since Parfit does expressly claim to be a constitutive 
reductionist about persons (“The Unimportance of Identity,” pp. 16-17; and “Experiences, 
Subjects, and Conceptual Schemes,” p. 218). However, he describes facts about persons as 
merely conceptual facts. It might be that I have overlooked something in my argument and 
that some forms of constitutive reductionism give rise to genuine entities with facts about 
reality (like statues, art works and so on) while other forms of constitutive reductionism give 
rise to merely conceptual facts. Parfit in any case fails to make this argument and I do not 
know of any good argument to this effect. See also David Shoemaker’s post and ensuing 
discussion on the PEA Soup blog for more detail on this discussion. David W. Shoemaker, 
“Parfit’s ‘Argument from Below’ vs. Johnston’s ‘Argument from Above’,” in PEA Soup Blog 
(2006, URL: < https://peasoup.typepad.com/peasoup/2006/04/parfits_argumen.html>). 
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arguments seek to establish that it is possible to give an impersonal description of 
one’s life and that no appeal to a higher entity is needed. But, of course, the ability to 
use a different vocabulary does not establish the need to use it. We can similarly give 
a description of an artwork without mentioning its existence, but this does not mean 
that we should not include the artwork in our ontology. 
We need a different way to distinguish between cases where reductionism 
does disenchant our ordinary concepts and those cases where it does not. One 
possible explanation is that in some cases the relations between constituent entities 
have significance over and above the entities while in other cases they do not. In the 
example of reductionism about art, it is the special way how the colour pigments of 
the Mona Lisa stand to one another that makes the Mona Lisa important over and 
above its individual elements. If we could show that the relations of individual events 
are not significant in the case of persons, then we would have achieved a reductionist 
debunking of our concept of a person. 
John Broome provides such an argument.49 Broome wants to argue that the 
relations between the different stages of a person are axiologically insignificant. There 
would be just as much value in the world regardless of the relation between person 
stages. Broome draws a comparison between a world with one person and a world 
with two persons that correspond to the two halves of the first person’s life. We can 
imagine that the two persons are living two different causally isolated lives that 
correspond to all of the person stages that form part of the first half or the second half 
of the first person’s life respectively. In this situation Broome says that it is unclear 
why the world with one person is any different in terms of value from the world with 
two persons. 
Broome’s argument should equally hold if we decompose the person’s life 
further into different time-slices rather than comparably big units. If we decompose 
a life to this extent however it is difficult to see how the importance of fulfilling 
desires or achieving projects can be captured. Time-slice persons are not extended 
beyond an ephemeral moment. The satisfaction of desires and the accomplishment 
of projects however extends in time. Parfit’s proposal of the success theory of well-
 
49 Broome, “Utilitarian Metaphysics,” pp. 87-90. 
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being makes this particularly clear. A success requires some extension in time and 
does not refer merely to someone being a specific way at a given time.50 On most 
accounts of a person’s well-being, we consider projects or desires to be an important 
component. Since projects and desires require continued existence over at least some 
time, the relation between the individual constitutive parts of a person’s life does 
have axiological significance, contrary to what Broome argues. 
We should conclude that Broome’s argument fails as well. Neither Parfit’s 
claims about “less deep” truths of personal identity, nor Parfit’s appeal to “merely 
conceptual truth”, nor Broome’s argument about the axiological insignificance of the 
relations that unite a life have succeeded. None of the three arguments has 
established sufficient ground to reject the importance of persons based on a 
reductionist metaphysics of persons. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
I have argued that Parfit’s step from the questions of personal identity and of 
what matters for self-interest to the question of what matters for our moral theorizing 
is not warranted. We can grant Parfit’s answer to the question of what matters 
without having to adjust our moral theories. There is no need to engage in the 
complex discussion over whether or not identity does or does not matter, if we simply 
want to defend a person-based form of morality. I have defended the unity of the 
individual and the separateness of persons against Parfit’s challenge. Once we see 
that psychological continuity and not connectedness is the primary part of Relation 
R, his challenge fails. And once we understand that Parfit’s reductionism about 
persons is best understood as a constitutive reductionism, we realize that the unity 
of the individual and separateness of persons have the same significance as they had 
before Parfit’s challenge. 
Parfit’s contributions to the metaphysics of personal identity and its 
implications for rationality and self-interest are truly outstanding. For a while I feared 
that Parfit provided a strong challenge to my moral beliefs as well. The arguments in 
 
50 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 494-99. 
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this chapter have convinced me otherwise. It seems to me that Parfit’s argument for 
a revisionary understanding of morality fails. I can be reassured. It does not matter 
what matters. 
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Chapter 2. 
Separate Persons Behind the Veil 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The separateness of persons and the veil of ignorance are two among many 
arguments or devices that were made prominent by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice. 
Neither of the two originated with Rawls and versions of them existed prior to 
Rawls.1 But Rawls’s formulation and the integration of these ideas in a 
comprehensive theory of justice made them prominent and canonical. 
I want to explore the relation between the separateness of persons and the veil 
of ignorance. In particular, I want to assess whether the separateness of persons gives 
us a reason not to use the veil of ignorance. In doing so, I will draw on the distinction 
that I outlined in the introduction to this dissertation between a justificatory 
requirement and a substantive requirement. I will assess different constructions of 
the veil of ignorance, John Harsanyi’s, Rawls’s own, and Ronald Dworkin’s, in light 
of the requirements of the separateness of persons. The discussion of these examples 
will help me to argue how the veil of ignorance can meet the two requirements that 
the separateness of persons imposes. Yet this requires that the veil both plays a 
different role and is constructed differently from the standard model that Rawls 
made popular. I will first discuss the justificatory requirement (Section II) before 
discussing the substantive requirement (Section III). 
 
 
 
1 I have traced origins of the separateness of persons objection in the Introduction. The veil of 
ignorance is used before by John Harsanyi. (“Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in 
the Theory of Risk-Taking,” Journal of Political Economy 61 (1953): 434-35; and “Cardinal 
Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility,” Journal of Political 
Economy 63 (1955): 309-21.) The first use of the veil of ignorance precedes even Harsanyi’s 
widely known use. William Vickrey briefly referred to the idea that a distribution of income 
should be distributed in accordance with the choice an individual would make not knowing 
his position in society (“Measuring Marginal Utility by Reactions to Risk,” Econometrica 13 
(1945): 319-33, at pp. 328-29.) 
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II. Justification for Separate Persons 
 
A. The Impartial Spectator 
 
I will begin by discussing how the veil of ignorance features in the justification 
of principles of justice. A good starting point for this is the impartial spectator. Rawls 
reconstructs an argument in favor of utilitarianism as a principle of justice that makes 
use of the impartial spectator. He considers this the “most natural way” to argue for 
utilitarianism.2 The argument shares a common core with Rawls’s own 
contractualism insofar as utilitarianism is justified by appeal to a principle of 
justifiability. This contrasts with a teleological justification for utilitarianism which 
simply appeals to the goodness of welfare directly. The standard for justifiability 
proposed is the endorsement by an ideally rational and impartial spectator. This 
method is inspired by David Hume’s and Adam Smith’s use of the “judicious” (in 
Hume’s case) or “impartial” (in Smith’s case) spectator, even though Rawls notes that 
Hume’s own moral philosophy is not utilitarian.3 
The argument for utilitarianism is then the following. The impartial spectator 
imagines herself to be in each person’s position. She is equally sympathetic to 
everyone’s plight. She imagines to be in each person’s position and what it is like to 
be in this position. After imagining herself to be in each person’s position, she 
approves or disapproves of principles of justice. Approval is understood here as a 
kind of pleasure that arises from the reproduction of the experience of each person. 
The spectator would therefore feel the experience of each person with positive 
experiences and negative experiences canceling each other out. In the end the 
impartial spectator would endorse the principle of justice that brings about the largest 
 
2 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. edn., pp. 23-24. 
3 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1888), pp. 574-91; Adam Smith, “The Theory of Moral Sentiments,” in The Essential Adam 
Smith, ed. Robert L. Heilbronner (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 57-147, at pp. 
93-96, 100-9, 118-123. For Rawls’s discussion see Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. edn., pp. 28-
29; and John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard 
University Press, 2000), pp. 84-100. He does not discuss Smith’s moral theory in any depth. 
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net sum total of welfare.4 But this argument does not take notice of the separateness 
of persons. The impartial spectator, by balancing out the different experiences of 
different persons, treats them as if they formed part of one system of experiences or 
desires. The sympathetic imagination of the impartial spectator treats all of these lives 
as stages of a very long life of one spectator. 
The problem is that this interpretation of the method of the impartial spectator 
achieves impartiality only by subsuming the various individual points of view of 
separate individuals under one overarching point of view. Rawls does not want to 
sacrifice impartiality and he is right to insist on it. While partiality has an important 
role in personal morality, its role in matters of justice is dubious. As a principle of 
justice rather than as a moral theory, utilitarianism is relatively more plausible. The 
objection that utilitarianism cannot allow for the personal perspective by ruling out 
partiality does not apply when we restrict utilitarianism to be a principle of 
distributive justice alone. While individuals do not have to treat everyone with equal 
concern and respect, governments have to. Equal concern is, in Ronald Dworkin’s 
famous words, the sovereign virtue of political community.5 While impartiality has 
to be observed in distributive justice, impartiality is not the same as the impersonality 
or the monopersonality of an impartial spectator. 
 
B. John Harsanyi 
 
John Harsanyi provides us with a second example of a veil of ignorance 
argument. Like the impartial spectator, it is aimed to support a version of 
utilitarianism. As in the case of the impartial spectator, Harsanyi makes use of the 
veil of ignorance because he wants to find impartial principles of distributive justice. 
While ordinary judgments about distributive justice are clouded by our particular 
situation, truly impartial judgments will be found in the absence of knowledge of our 
particular situation. Therefore, he imagines the hypothetical choice an impartial 
 
4 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. edn., pp. 161-65. 
5 See the title and the introduction to Sovereign Virtue (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University 
Press, 2000). 
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observer would make not knowing his or her position in society. She would assign 
an equal probability to being in each person’s position and then choose accordingly. 
A crucial difference to the impartial spectator is that Harsanyi does not imagine his 
impartial observer to be guided by a hedonic evaluation of each person’s life. Instead, 
Harsanyi imagines the impartial observer to occupy each person’s position with their 
conception of the good and their preferences. Harsanyi then reasons that if the impartial 
observer follows expected utility theory, then she would systematically choose the 
distribution that maximizes average utility.6 
What does it mean, however, to be in a person’s position with their conception 
of the good? A person’s position includes all social facts that are potentially morally 
relevant and a person’s conception of the good which is deeply tied up with their 
psychology and personality. An apparent interpretation of being in a person’s 
position with their conception of the good is, therefore, to be this person.7 Yet this 
interpretation is puzzling. It is impossible for the impartial observer to be numerically 
identical with another person. 
Perhaps what Harsanyi’s veil of ignorance argument requires is not numerical 
identity but something similar to it. One proposal is what Bernard Williams calls 
participation imagery.8 Williams discusses the case of a person imagining that he is 
Napoleon, for example in a dream. This person would have imagery from Napoleon’s 
first-person point of view. Such imagery is different from visualizing Napoleon at the 
battle of Austerlitz. The imagery is “from the inside”, it occupies Napoleon’s point of 
view. Such imagery is clearly coherent and possible. It occurs when we dream, role-
play or enact dramatic performances. Participation imagery can give us, furthermore, 
a good sense of someone’s hedonic state. The impartial spectator that I discussed 
earlier, for example, can make use of participation imagery in order to replicate the 
 
6 Harsanyi, “Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-Taking”; and 
Harsanyi, “Morality and the theory of rational behavior,” in Sen and Williams, Utilitarianism 
and beyond, pp. 631-38. 
7 See Matthew D. Adler, Well-Being and Fair Distribution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), pp. 198-99; and Hilary Greaves and Harvey Lederman, “Extended Preferences and 
Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2018): 
636-67, at pp. 640-42. 
8 Williams, Problems of the Self, ch. 3. 
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first-personal experience of different persons. Harsanyi’s impartial observer is not 
guided by a hedonic evaluation, however. This means that participation imagery is 
not enough. Having a certain set of experiences and beliefs from a first-personal point 
of view allows us only to rank alternatives within one person’s life. But the impartial 
spectator would not be able to compare alternatives across lives. This way the 
impartial spectator could not choose a principle of justice. If one principle is better for 
A and worse for B and another principle is better for B and worse for A, the impartial 
spectator cannot tell which principle would be better in expectation. 
A second proposal is to make use of the phenomenon of de se beliefs. Take the 
case of mad Heimson who believes he is Hume, yet who fails to believe the 
proposition that “Heimson is Hume”. Heimson believes de se that he is Hume yet 
believes de dicto that “Heimson” is not Hume. A de se belief is a belief that belongs to 
a self-centered scheme of reference, a first-personal point of view. Perhaps this means 
that we can have de se and de dicto preferences as well. Greaves and Lederman argue 
that such de se preferences do not require that subjects are deluded about their 
identity as Heimson is.9 Their argument relies on the idea that an agent can have a 
preference to be cured from an illness even when she knows that she will remain sick. 
Preferences, they argue, can be held over alternatives that do not obtain. However, 
this argument sidesteps the important challenge. While we can have preferences over 
possibilities we know that do not obtain, invoking de se attitudes does nothing to 
alleviate the concern that one cannot have preferences over scenarios one knows to be 
impossible. 
The argument reveals an important possible avenue. Perhaps we should take 
the label “veil of ignorance” more seriously. According to this interpretation, the 
thought experiment requires a straightforward deprivation of knowledge about 
oneself. We can imagine it as a form of transient amnesia. The impartial observer has 
temporarily forgotten who she is. Perhaps she consumes a new neurological drug 
which temporarily blocks the access to her psychological make-up, except for her 
rational reasoning capacities. She can only assign an equal probability to being any 
 
9 Greaves and Lederman, “Extended Preferences and Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-
Being,” pp. 644-50. 
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given individual in society with their social position and conception of the good.10 A 
question for this interpretation is whether it is compatible with all plausible views on 
personal identity. In particular, there is a concern that psychological, or Lockean, 
views on personal identity struggle to accommodate the choice of the impartial 
observer. I discussed Parfit’s version of a Lockean view in the previous chapter. The 
concern is that there is a complete breakdown of psychological connectedness 
between the impartial observer behind the veil of ignorance and the impartial 
observer once the veil of ignorance is lifted. If Parfit is correct that Relation R is what 
matters for prudential concern, then the impartial observer behind the veil of 
ignorance may have no concern for any of the possible persons she may turn out to 
be.11 
I believe that this concern is unfounded. What the thought experiment 
requires is that the impartial observer has short-term, transient amnesia. The observer 
will recover all of her psychological features once the veil is lifted. The objection to 
Harsanyi’s veil stands only if no Lockean view on personal identity can account for 
transient amnesia. However, Lockean views should be able to say something about 
transient amnesia and I believe they can. Cognitive psychologists distinguish 
between three components of our faculties of memories. One is the encoding of new 
memories, a second is the storage of memories, a third is the retrieval of memories. In 
cases of transient amnesia, the storage of memories is unaffected and only the 
retrieval is temporarily blocked. In order to account for the numerical identity of 
individuals pre- and post-amnesia, a Lockean can argue that continuity of storage of 
memories is sufficient. 12 A Lockean need not even argue that continuity of storage is 
always sufficient, but only in cases where the retrieval of information is blocked for 
a short period. A similar revision would seem necessary if Lockeans want to account 
 
10 Alex Voorhoeve, “Matthew D. Adler: Well-being and fair distribution: beyond cost-benefit 
analysis,” Social Choice and Welfare 42 (2014): 245-54, at pp. 247-48. Voorhoeve credits Michael 
Otsuka for the thought experiment. 
11 For the concern see Voorhoeve, “Matthew D. Adler: Well-being and fair distribution,” p. 
248. 
12 See also Andreas L. Mogensen, “The Brave Officer Rides Again,” Erkenntnis 83 (2018): 315-
29, at pp. 318-19; Jamies Baillie, “Recent Work on Personal Identity,” Philosophical Books 4 
(1993): 193-206, at p. 195. 
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for cases where persons are put in a temporary coma and upon reawaking show a 
perfect psychological connection, or even the more mundane case of a person 
sleeping and having no active psychological connections for the duration of the 
sleep.13 
While Harsanyi’s thought experiment so construed is coherent, it clearly 
violates the justificatory version of the separateness of persons. The impartial 
observer is very similar in this regard to the impartial spectator. There are three 
important differences. The impartial observer is rationally self-interested rather than 
sympathetic. Second, the observer is also not perfectly knowledgeable since she lacks 
knowledge of who she is and is assumed to have an equal probability of being each 
person. Third, while the impartial spectator imagines herself to be in each person’s 
position in turn, the impartial observer considers each person’s life to be a possible 
future life of herself. But notwithstanding these differences, Harsanyi’s first 
argument falls foul of the separateness of persons. It merges all individuals together 
by considering them as mere possibilities of one person’s future. 
While the impartial observer form of the argument is prominent, there is 
another interpretation of Harsanyi’s point.14 Harsanyi repeatedly speaks of “ethical 
preferences” when talking about the judgment that a society with higher average 
 
13 Andrew Brennan thinks that we should therefore switch to a more coarse-grained 
understanding of psychological connections in which episodes separated by more than 
moments are connected in time. Andrew Brennan, “Amnesia and Psychological Continuity,” 
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (1985): 195-209, at pp. 196-97. 
14 For the above, impartial observer interpretation see Philippe Mongin, “The Impartial 
Observer Theorem of Social Ethics,” Economics & Philosophy 17 (2001): 147-79; John E. Roemer, 
“Harsanyi’s Impartial Observer is not a Utilitarian,” in Justice, Political Liberalism, and 
Utilitarianism, ed. Marc Fleurbaey, Maurice Salles, and John Weymark (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 129-35; Marc Fleurbaey, “Economics and Economic 
Justice,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Winter 2016 Edition, ed. Edward N. Zalta 
(URL: <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/economic-justice/>), sec. 3; and 
Hilary Greaves, “A Reconsideration of the Harsanyi-Sen-Weymark Debate on Utilitarianism,” 
Utilitas 29 (2017): 175-213, at pp. 179-81. Harsanyi uses the language of the impartial observer 
in later statements of his argument (“Morality and the theory of rational behavior” (in 1977)) 
but not in earlier ones. For the second, ethical preferences interpretation see Harsanyi, 
“Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-Taking”; Harsanyi, 
“Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility,” pp. 314-
16; John C. Harsanyi, “Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of 
John Rawls’s Theory,” American Political Science Review 69 (1975): 594-606, at p. 598; and Lara 
Buchak, “Taking Risks behind the Veil of Ignorance,” Ethics 127 (2017): 610-44, at pp. 633-35. 
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utility is superior to one with lower. Impartiality is an ingredient of ethical 
preferences and the choice behind the veil of ignorance brings out this aspect of 
ethical preferences. Harsanyi gives the following example to illustrate this. A wealthy 
capitalist may prefer capitalism over socialism because she is better off under 
capitalism than under socialism. If, however, the person would prefer capitalism over 
socialism regardless of her social position, then this indicates an ethical stance in 
favor of capitalism.15 The difference to the previous interpretation is that Harsanyi 
makes a claim about the considered ethical judgments of everyone, not about the 
judgment of one impartial observer. It is this second interpretation which can be 
identified with a form of contractualism. The ethical preference interpretation of 
Harsanyi’s veil of ignorance gives a foundational role to agreement between different 
persons. Principles of justice are true because they would be agreed upon behind a 
veil of ignorance which brings out our ethical preferences. The impartial observer 
interpretation does not give importance to agreement. Instead, it is the endorsement 
by an impartial observer which gives validity to principles of justice. 
Harsanyi’s second argument therefore faces the difficulty of explaining why 
the parties behind the veil of ignorance would achieve unanimous agreement. The 
answer is that the veil of ignorance brings to the forefront individuals’ extended 
preferences.16 An extended preference is a meta-preference concerning a pair of social 
conditions and ordinary preferences. For example, preferring x (being a monk, 
having a religious conception of the good) over y (being a surfer, having an Epicurean 
conception of the good) is an extended preference. If everyone’s extended preferences 
are the same, then we can explain why there would be unanimous agreement behind 
the veil of ignorance. There would be only one shared extended preference function 
to be taken into account. 
 
15 Harsanyi, “Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality?,” p. 598. See also 
Harsanyi, “Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-Taking”; 
Harsanyi, Morality and the theory of rational behavior,” pp. 631-32. 
16 For extended preferences see Harsanyi, “Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and 
Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility,” pp. 316-19; and John C. Harsanyi, Rational behavior and 
bargaining equilibrium in games and social situations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1977), pp. 51-60. 
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Harsanyi justifies the assumption of identical extended preferences with the 
following argument.17 If we observe a difference in preferences between two 
individuals, then there will be some cause for this divergence. If we identify the cause 
and make the cause part of the object of preferences, then we eliminate this difference. 
We proceed until all differences in preference are accounted for. In some cases, this 
causal argument is convincing. The fact that one person ranks living as a monk over 
living as a surfer can plausibly be explained by the fact that this person has a religious 
conception of the good. The causal conditions for preferring x (being a monk, having 
a religious conception of the good) over y (being a surfer, having an Epicurean 
conception of the good) are more difficult to account for. Once we incorporate all 
relevant causes for our conceptions of the good, it is difficult to imagine that there is 
much left of a personality or agency. 
This shows that the assumption that there is only one shared extended 
preference function denies the individuality and separateness of persons.18 The 
parties choosing behind the veil of ignorance become indistinguishable. The thought 
experiment reduces individuals to an abstract preference relation without any 
individuality. By claiming that everyone shares the same extended preference 
relation, it furthermore denies the plurality of conceptions of the good. The extended 
preference relation encapsulates a form of second-order preferences. Such second-
order preferences are an important part of one’s conception of the good. They 
determine which parts of our first-order pursuits of the good we reflectively endorse 
and which first-order pursuits of the good we want to rid ourselves of.19 Furthermore, 
second-order preferences determine whether we attach value to living lives 
authentically in accordance with our preferences or whether we belief that a life is 
 
17 Harsanyi, “Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of 
Utility,” pp. 316-19. A clear version of this argument is made by Serge-Christophe Kolm, 
Justice and Equity (Cambridge, MA.: The MIT Press, 1997), pp. 165-67. It is also hinted at by 
Jan Tinbergen, “Welfare Economics and Income Distribution,” American Economic Review 47 
(1957): 490-503, at pp. 500-1. 
18 See John Rawls, “Social unity and primary goods,” in Sen and Williams, Utilitarianism and 
beyond, pp. 173-83. 
19 See e.g. Harry Frankfurt, “The Importance of What We Care About,” Synthese 53 (1982): 257-
72 in which Frankfurt draws a contrast between caring which is intimately connected to our 
idea of a good life and mere liking or wanting. 
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lived well if it has objective goods even if these are not valued. Two individuals may 
share the preference of x (being a monk, having a religious conception of the good) 
over y (being a surfer, having an Epicurean conception of the good), while differing 
about the choice between x* (being a monk, having an Epicurean conception of the 
good) over y (being a surfer, having an Epicurean conception of the good). On one 
second-order conception of the good, a life of religious enlightenment is always better 
than a life of hedonic pursuits. On another second-order conception of the good, 
while religious enlightenment is objectively good, it has to be pursued authentically. 
Harsanyi’s ethical preference argument thereby denies the separateness of 
persons. The impartial observer does so by turning individuals into a possible future 
of a single decision-maker. Ethical preferences do so by stripping individuals of all 
their individuality and distinctiveness. Every person is now overlooking the 
boundaries between persons by considering every person’s life to be a mere 
possibility of one’s future. 
 
C. John Rawls 
 
Rawls’s use of the veil of ignorance is motivated by the desire to respect the 
separateness of persons. The impartial spectator failed to do so. It assumed perfect 
knowledge, perfect sympathy, and perfect imaginative powers. These conditions lead 
to a conception of impartiality that identifies impartiality with impersonality. 
Impersonality in turn means the conflation of all desires into a system of desires 
assessed by the impartial spectator. This conflation in turn violates the separateness 
of persons.20 Rawls wants to develop an alternative to the impartial spectator in the 
social contract tradition. He replaces perfect sympathy with mutual disinterest and 
rational self-interest. This requires a relaxation of the condition of perfect knowledge 
given that Rawls wants to retain impartiality. The parties in the original position 
should not be able to rig principles in their favor. The solution is the veil of ignorance 
which deprives individuals of all knowledge that may allow them to tailor principles 
of justice in their favor. 
 
20 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. edn., pp. 164-66. 
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There are three important differences to Harsanyi’s veil of ignorance and how 
it is employed. First, the two methods are concerned with different objects of choice. 
Harsanyi is looking for a broad moral principle like utilitarianism. Rawls is looking 
for principles of justice that regulate the basic structure of society.21 Second, the 
grounds for choice are different. The parties behind Harsanyi’s veil are choosing 
based on welfare considerations. The parties behind Rawls’s veil are deprived of the 
knowledge of their particular conception of the good. Unlike in Harsanyi’s model 
where the parties choose according to a higher-order conception of the good, in 
Rawls’s model the only goods that can influence their choice will be goods they know 
will be important to them regardless of their conception of the good; i.e. primary 
goods. Third, Harsanyi assumes that every person has an equal probability of being 
in each position. Rawls, on the other side, deprives the parties of the original position 
of any knowledge of probabilities.22 
Rawls’s veil of ignorance ensures that the parties in the original position will 
agree on principles of justice. The veil of ignorance deprives them of all information 
that would allow any differentiation between the parties. Since the parties are also 
equally rational, they will all choose the same. Rawls even writes that “[therefore], 
we can view the choice in the original position from the standpoint of one person 
 
21 This difference becomes apparent in an exchange between Harsanyi and Rawls in which 
Harsanyi seems to assume that Rawls is advocating for maximin as a general distributive 
principle as opposed to a principle for the regulation of the basic structure of society. John 
Rawls, “Some Reasons for the Maximin Criterion,” American Economic Review 64 (1974): 141-
46; and Harsanyi, “Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality?,” pp. 605-6. 
22 The third difference has raised a lot of controversy. Critics have suggested that it violates 
accepted standards of rationality for the parties in the original position not to make the 
equiprobability assumption. (E.g. Kenneth J. Arrow, “Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on 
Rawls’s Theory of Justice,” Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973): 245-63, at pp. 249-52; Harsanyi, “Can 
the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality?,” pp. 598-600.) Rawls’s departure from 
Harsanyi should however be seen in light of his design of the original position. The original 
position is set up in a way that achieves a reflective equilibrium between the theoretical 
construction and our intuitions about justice. Rawls gives therefore many moral arguments 
for the design of the original position. He appeals to the strains of commitment, stability, and 
self-respect. All these moral arguments strengthen the design of the original position in a way 
that excludes the assumption of equal probabilities. In other words, the debate around the 
equal probability assumption should not be narrowed to a debate about rational choice 
theory. See also Samuel Scheffler, “Rawls and Utilitarianism,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Rawls, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 426-59, at pp. 
433-36; and Michael Moehler, “The Rawls-Harsanyi Dispute: A Moral Point of View,” Pacific 
Philosophical Quarterly 99 (2018): 82-99. 
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selected at random”.23 Rawls goes on to explain that this step is needed if we are to 
insist on unanimous agreement in the original position. Without ensuring that all 
parties will choose the same, we would not be able to work out a theory of justice at 
all. The problem in the original position would become hopelessly complicated.24 
These remarks indicate an important commonality with Harsanyi’s veil of 
ignorance. In both cases, the parties are deprived of information to an extent which 
makes it impossible to differentiate between them. For the purposes of choice, we 
could simply use a single person. In Harsanyi’s argument this becomes implicit in the 
impartial observer interpretation. In Rawls’s argument this is implicit. For this single 
person, furthermore, the choice becomes one where the person does not know which 
position in society she will inhabit. In effect, all positions in society are transformed 
into possibilities from the decision-maker’s point of view. Rawls is then guilty of the 
same charge as Harsanyi. His veil of ignorance violates the justificatory version of the 
separateness of persons. All lives are seen as merely possible futures from the point 
of view of the decision-maker.25 
The diagnosis of this mistake is important. Rawls tries to develop a procedure 
by which principles of justice can be evaluated. He is motivated not to repeat the 
mistake of the impartial spectator. His proposal therefore does not imagine that all 
lives are lived by the impartial spectator in seriatim. Unlike Harsanyi’s impartial 
observer interpretation, he furthermore does not imagine one impartial observer who 
is equally likely to be each member of society. For Rawls, as for Harsanyi’s ethical 
preference interpretation, it counts that each member of the society would 
hypothetically consent to the principles of justice. The problem he then faces is how 
to ensure unanimity. In order to solve this problem Rawls requires a veil of ignorance 
which deprives individuals of all information that could create disagreement. But in 
doing so, he also deprives the members of society of their separateness from one 
another. 
 
 
23 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 139. 
Rawls changes the word “choice” to “agreement” in the revised edition (p. 120). 
24 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. edn., pp. 121-23. 
25 See also Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism, pp. 138-40. 
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D. From Rawls to Dworkin: The Nature of the Veil 
 
The main problem of Rawls’s veil of ignorance is that it deprives the parties 
of the original position of all the knowledge that would allow us to differentiate 
between them. Ronald Dworkin avoids this problem with his veil of ignorance. 
Dworkin’s veil of ignorance is integrated in his theory of equality of resources. The 
starting point for equality of resources is the envy test. According to the envy test a 
distribution of impersonal resources is equal if no one would prefer to trade her 
bundle of resources with anyone else’s bundle of resources. Equality of resources is, 
however, not exhausted by the envy test. We could fulfil the envy test by giving 
everyone a certain amount of a resource no one wants. While everyone would be 
equally miserable this would not be a distribution that shows equal concern, or 
indeed any concern, for everyone. Dworkin therefore supplements the envy test with 
an initial auction of resources. He imagines that every member of society has an equal 
opportunity to auction resources and to later trade them. After all trades have taken 
place the distribution fulfills the envy test and reflects the tastes of the members of 
society. 
This general ideal has to be revised, however. Individuals in the real world 
do not start with equal shares and their shares may later decrease through no fault of 
their own. In order to accommodate these instances of bad brute luck, Dworkin 
devises a hypothetical insurance scheme. He asks how people would insure 
themselves against bad brute luck in just circumstances. This is the stage where the 
veil of ignorance comes into play. The question must be what individuals would be 
willing to pay for insurance if they did not know their special risk.26 
In setting up his veil of ignorance Dworkin departs in one crucial aspect from 
Rawls. Dworkin does not include a person’s talents as being among the information 
concealed by the veil of ignorance. Talents, he argues, are too closely connected to a 
person’s personality. Without this basis of a person’s personality we cannot judge the 
 
26 See Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, pp. 65-79. Dworkin develops this system further into a model 
for a tax system that mirrors insurance people would take out against their talents yielding 
fewer resources (Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, pp. 85-109). 
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ambitions an individual may have. Equality of resources aims at respecting people’s 
responsibility for their shares of resources. Different ambitions should therefore be 
reflected in the final shares of resources and information about people’s ambitions 
will be crucial. 
It is unclear, however, if this reason sufficiently motivates the inclusion of 
knowledge of talents. It would seem to be possible to construct a veil of ignorance 
that allows for some knowledge about one’s ambitions without allowing for 
information about talents. In order for a theory to be ambition-sensitive, it must allow 
for knowledge of a person’s ambitions. But it is not required that the person knows 
her own personality. Only the part of her personality connected to her ambitions 
must be known to her. Dworkin’s insistence on allowing knowledge of one’s 
personality makes more sense, however, as a response to respecting the separateness 
of persons. It responds to the problem of Rawls’s veil where individuals become 
indistinguishable behind the veil. For the purpose of the choice behind the veil, their 
separateness does not matter. Dworkin’s veil on the other hand, in allowing for the 
knowledge of one’s personality, does not make this mistake. The knowledge of one’s 
personality gives a robust guarantee to the separateness of persons. It avoids the 
effect that we can see the decision in the hypothetical insurance market simply from 
the point of one representative individual. 
 
E. From Harsanyi and Rawls to Dworkin: The Justificatory Role of the Veil 
 
I have criticized Harsanyi and Rawls for violating the separateness of persons. 
This might be surprising, not only because Rawls himself made the use of the 
separateness of persons objection prominent. It might also be surprising because both 
philosophers are contractualists. Harsanyi’s justification, for example, has been held 
to be compliant with the separateness of persons for this reason. Contractualism, by 
its focus on the justifiability to each, embodies a model of justification which gives an 
equal and separate voice to everyone. Since everyone has a veto, the separateness of 
persons is respected. It appears that contractualism complies with the individualist 
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restriction that insists that each person’s claims will be counted separately and only 
include their interests and claims.27 
The general idea of this resurrection of Harsanyi is correct. A method of 
justification that requires justifiability to each would comply with the separateness of 
persons. But this does not mean that every form of contractualism meets this 
standard. In Harsanyi’s ethical preferences different lives are not recognized as such 
but transformed into possible lives of the decision-maker. The same happens with 
Rawls’s argument. Since the parties behind the veil become indistinguishable, what 
counts is the individual calculation of a single member of society. 
We can understand this failure in terms of two different models of unanimity 
rules that are introduced by Thomas Nagel.28 One way to ensure unanimity is to 
prescribe one course of reasoning for everyone. This is, in effect what Harsanyi and 
Rawls are doing. But there is another model of unanimity rules. In this model 
different persons converge from different starting points by modulating their claims 
and expectations. Such a reconciliation would have to happen without a veil of 
ignorance. Nagel expresses skepticism about convergence within a model of agents 
pursuing rational self-interest.29 Without a veil of ignorance the model would 
struggle to explain why we ought to reconcile our claims with those whom we could 
oppress. If the motivation is purely the pursuit of rational self-interest, then this 
might be the most convenient solution for us. Instead, Nagel points to a solution that 
does not rely on rational self-interest. 
 
27 Hirose, Moral Aggregation, pp. 78-84. Hirose does not endorse this argument. Instead, he 
rather suggests various ways in which one may think the separateness of persons has to be 
respected. His ultimate conclusion is that none of these ways bar interpersonal aggregation. 
For this conclusion, Hirose does not need to endorse any particular separateness of persons 
argument. For the individualist restriction see Derek Parfit, On What Matters, vol. 2 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 193-96 and Michael Otsuka, “Saving Lives, Moral Theory, 
and the Claims of Individuals,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 34 (2006): 109-35, at p. 125. In 
Footnote 27 Otsuka raises an objection to this idea that is similar to the one I raise in the 
following paragraph. 
28 Nagel, Equality and Partiality, pp. 33-40. 
29 He mentions David Gauthier’s approach of using bargaining theory to determine a 
contractualist moral theory. See David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1986). 
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Nagel’s solution points at a form of contractualism that is associated with T.M. 
Scanlon. Scanlon’s contractualism is concerned with what it is reasonable to accept 
(or not reject) as opposed to what it is rational (i.e. in one’s self-interest) to accept.30 
Scanlon’s criticism of Rawls’s form of contractualism gives us a sense how the veil of 
ignorance can still play a role in such a theory.31 Scanlon correctly identifies that 
Rawls’s main motivation behind the veil of ignorance is to ensure impartiality. A 
principle that is impartially acceptable is a principle that can be accepted from every 
possible standpoint. Therefore, it is nothing about a particular position, a particular 
conception of the good, or the like, that makes the principle acceptable. The veil of 
ignorance is quite helpful as such a thought experiment. When we abstract from our 
peculiarities, we can see whether or not the principle is still acceptable to us. If a 
principle meets the test of the veil of ignorance, it is because everyone has reason to 
accept this principle. This argument, however, is very different from Rawls’s 
argument of self-interested choice behind the veil of ignorance. Scanlon’s 
reconstruction of the impartiality argument makes no appeal to self-interest. Instead, 
it focuses on the reasons individuals have for accepting (or not rejecting) principles. 
Arguments in Scanlonian contractualism do not admit to a simple reduction of moral 
questions to prudential questions. 
This criticism goes farther than the point previously considered. It holds not 
only that the veil of ignorance must ensure that the parties behind it are distinct 
individuals. It also criticizes that rational agreement behind the veil cannot justify 
moral principles as impartial. Self-interested choice cannot be a justificatory device 
for moral principles. While Rawls’s form of contractualism falls under this criticism, 
Dworkin’s use of the veil of ignorance does not. For this we have to compare the role 
that the veil of ignorance plays in justifying theories for Rawls and Dworkin. 
According to Rawls, agreement in the original position is what justifies moral 
principles. But for Dworkin, the veil of ignorance does not play any justificatory role. 
The veil of ignorance appears in the presentation of equality of resources. It is a device 
 
30 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, pp. 189-97, also pp. 17-33 where Scanlon gives a 
different, more minimal, account of rationality. 
31 Scanlon, “Contractualism and utilitarianism,” pp. 119-28. 
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that illustrates and specifies how equality of resources works. Dworkin identifies 
problems for a conception of distributive equality. He identifies the challenge that 
handicaps and differences in talents pose. He gives independent arguments why a 
theory of equality should be ambition-sensitive but avoid endowment-sensitivity. 
The veil of ignorance helps specifying what this means in particular circumstances. 
It is more a component of the theory itself than a justificatory device for the theory. 
Equality of resources is justified in other ways. Part of its justification stems 
from the criticism of its competitor, equality of welfare.32 Part of its justification stems 
from the presentation alone, as an attractive conception of equality. Part of its 
justification stems from its ability to incorporate concerns of individual responsibility 
and liberty. In later works Dworkin further develops this holistic justification. 
Equality of resources is the conception of equality which meets two desiderata for a 
theory of distributive justice. It blends a model of how governments show equal 
concern for the fate of their citizens with a model of how government show equal 
respect for the responsibility of each citizen to live well. The requirements of equal 
concern and equal respect are requirements for governments. They embody 
principles of how to treat others, but they receive their force in turn from principles 
of how to live well and treat one’s own life. In order to live well we need to 
acknowledge the importance of living well and we need to insist and make use of our 
responsibility to live our life well. Equality of resources is thus justified holistically 
as the conception of equality that not only integrates political values like equality, 
responsibility, and liberty, but also coheres well with a model of one’s duties to 
oneself.33 
Nonetheless, Dworkin’s equality of resources which addresses the question 
of distributing resources between persons makes the answer to this question 
dependent on the choices in the hypothetical insurance market and of judgments of 
intra-personal prudent choice behind the veil of ignorance. Does this not transform 
 
32 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, ch. 1. 
33 Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge, MA.: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2011), pp. 1-15, 191-218 (for his account of personal dignity and living well), 
pp. 351-63 (for how equality of resources fits in this structure). Already in Sovereign Virtue 
Dworkin’s theory of equality is connected to questions of liberty (ch. 3) and questions of the 
good life (ch. 6). 
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such inter-personal trade-offs to intra-personal trade-offs?34 For any given transfer, 
we can sensibly say that the transfer is permissible or impermissible depending on 
the choice behind the veil of ignorance. Dworkin, for example, holds that it would be 
unfair to make expensive medical insurance compulsory that extensively covers end 
of life care for the last few months of one’s life. Since only few people would heavily 
insure themselves against such risk, a mandatory transfer would be overreaching.35 
This points to an ambiguity in the justificatory version of the separateness of persons 
objection. Should we interpret it narrowly as a constraint on the reasons in favor of a 
moral theory? If so, Dworkin’s argument would not violate the separateness of 
persons. His reasons for accepting the insurance test do not depend on any self-
interested choice. Or should we interpret it widely as a constraint on moral reasons 
in favor of actions, including those which the moral theory provides? If so, Dworkin’s 
argument would violate the separateness of persons. The insurance test makes intra-
personal trade-offs pertinent to the question of inter-personal trade-offs. 
The alleged violation of the separateness of persons is that it turns different 
people’s lives into mere possibilities of a single person’s life. The key criticism of this 
model of justification is voiced by Nagel. Nagel criticizes that it is very different 
whether a bad life is a mere possibility which may not materialize, or whether some 
person has to lead this bad life no matter what.36 The problem is that it is 
inappropriate and impermissible to treat bad outcomes as mere possibilities when 
they will be actually realized. This confuses bad actualities, i.e. real suffering, with 
bad eventualities. Choosing a distribution for society is, therefore, different from 
choosing a risk profile for oneself. In Harsanyi’s model this is very clear. Harsanyi 
tells us to treat all actual outcomes as if they were possible outcomes for one chooser. 
Dworkin’s justification is different, however. He provides an argument for 
what constitutes a fair share of resources in just circumstances. The veil of ignorance 
thought experiment determines that in just circumstances individuals would not 
have insurance for such medical care. So why, we may ask, should anyone complain 
 
34 Marc Fleurbaey, “Equality of Resources Revisited,” Ethics 113 (2002): 82-105, at p. 90. 
35 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, pp. 314-15. 
36 Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism, pp. 138-39. 
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if they are made as well off as they would be in circumstances of justice?37 The deep 
justification for using the insurance test does not rely on the idea that we can write 
off bad eventualities. Even the insurance test itself is disanalogous to Harsanyi’s 
argument. In Harsanyi’s case, the decision is about a distribution of goods across 
individuals. In Dworkin’s case, the decision is about individual entitlements. The 
insurance test does not serve to select entire distributions. 
The example Nagel uses to illustrate his objection further shows the difference 
between the two models. Nagel writes that it could be rational to take a small risk of 
enslavement in exchange for a good chance of opulent luxury.38 Harsanyi’s 
justification has to accept this trade-off. Dworkin’s justification does not. In just 
circumstances everyone would be ensured never to be enslaved. No understanding 
of equal concern and respect for each person’s life would accept enslavement. The 
prospect of enslavement is not just treated as a bad eventuality here. This indicates 
that the justificatory objection should be read more narrowly. The separateness of 
persons is a constraint on the reasons given for a moral theory, not a constraint on the 
questions a moral theory may ask. 
This shows that Scanlon’s criticism does not extend to all versions of rational 
choice behind the veil of ignorance. It applies only where rational choice behind the 
veil is part of the justification rather than where it is a tool in specifying a conception 
of an abstract moral ideal. This leads to an intriguing question about Rawls’s use of 
the veil of ignorance. While Rawls presents agreement in the original position as 
providing an argument for his principles of justice, there is an alternative reading to 
Rawls’s use of the original position. In an article on the original position Dworkin 
interprets the original position not as the foundations of Rawls’s theory of justice but 
rather as a component of it.39 For Dworkin the original position is a midway point in 
the justification of principles of justice. The original position, he argues, is a device 
 
37 The force of this question is increased by Dworkin’s other arguments. For example, his 
criticism of equality of welfare, if successful, refutes the reply that only actual welfare matters. 
His arguments for incorporating personal responsibility, if successful, strengthen the case that 
we could not complain in just circumstances if our option luck on the insurance bet has been 
bad. 
38 Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism, pp. 138-39. 
39 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1978), ch. 6. 
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that is justified by a deeper theory of political rights that accords every member of 
society with a right to equal concern and respect. The original position is then an 
appropriate device to test different conceptions of equal concern and respect. This is 
because the original position gives every party a veto power that corresponds to the 
political right of equal concern and respect. Rejection in the original position shows 
that the proposed basic structure of society violates the right to equal concern and 
respect. Principles of justice are ultimately correct not because they would attain 
hypothetical consent, but because they would be the best conception of a more 
fundamental right to equal concern and respect.40 Interpreted in this way, does 
Rawls’s original position still fall foul to Scanlon’s criticism? 
The alternative reading of the original position does not hold that 
hypothetical agreement is of moral importance by itself. Nor does it aim to give an 
expression of impartiality by the model of self-interested choice. Instead, the choice 
in the original position reflects the veto power everyone has in virtue of fundamental 
political rights. Scanlon’s criticism seems to be less forceful for these reasons. The 
alternative reading does not reduce justifiability to self-interested choice. The 
conditions of the original position set the boundaries for the political right. Dworkin 
gives the example of Hobbes’s state of nature. He assumes that Hobbes’s deep theory 
is a right to life and that this explains why the parties in Hobbes’s state of nature 
value security to an extreme extent. Of course, this reduction of political rights to self-
interested choice may fail. But whether or not it fails, it is not subject to the criticism 
raised by Scanlon. 
While this vindicates the device of the original position in general, it does not 
vindicate Rawls’s adaptation of it. The choice in the original position is still made 
with assumptions that betray the separateness of persons. The different role that the 
original position plays in a larger moral theory does not take away the fact that there 
is no sense we can attach to the separateness of the parties of the original position. 
 
40 Rawls reply to Dworkin gives a different answer. Rawls’s answer shares with Dworkin’s 
reinterpretation the idea that the original position is a device to give content to a more basic 
moral notion. In Rawls’s reply he highlights that the original position specifies what fair terms 
of cooperation between free and equal citizens look like. John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: 
Political not Metaphysical,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 14 (1985): 223-51, at pp. 234-39.  
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This feature of the original position also belies a key motivation Dworkin identifies 
for using the social contract device. Dworkin argues that the social contract, or 
hypothetical consent, can be motivated by a rights-based theory because it gives each 
distinct individual a veto power over political institutions.41 The veto power is an 
exercise of their fundamental political rights. It is therefore limited by the scope of 
these rights. The veil of ignorance imposes limits on what the parties in the original 
position can veto. It therefore limits their veto rights. This can be interpreted as a 
reflection of the scope of their political rights. The problem is that Rawls’s veil limits 
knowledge in a way that not only limits the ability to veto. It also makes disagreement 
impossible. Any alternative to Rawls’s two principles would be vetoed by every party 
of the original position. This removes the original motivation that each distinct 
individual has a veto power. A veil of ignorance, like Rawls’s, that reduces the parties 
of the original position to a single or only few types thereby crosses a line that other 
social contract devices do not. 
 
F. From Rawls to Dworkin: Collective Assets 
 
One further issue remains. In two passages of A Theory of Justice Rawls 
indicates that the difference principle constitutes an agreement about how to 
distribute and share the benefits of natural talents as collective assets.42 But is this not 
saying that natural talents belong to all of us as a whole? Does this not go against the 
separateness of persons? If talents are part of one’s person, then why are we allowed 
to treat them as collective assets? Talents are often central to one’s sense of self, so 
any distinction of talents from person would seem forced and highly artificial.43 
Whether or not we regard talents as collective assets depends on our 
justification for the difference principle. Not every justification for redistribution 
needs to assume that talents are assets that are collectively owned. If this is so, then 
 
41 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, pp. 176-77. 
42 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. edn., pp. 87, 156. 
43 This complaint is first raised by Robert Nozick. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, pp. 228-
29. See also Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 2nd edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), pp. 77-81. 
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the objection to collective assets is a justificatory version of the separateness of 
persons objection and not a substantive one. 
There are four main ways in which principles of distributive justice could be 
justified. Distributive justice may be justified derivatively. In this case, the justification 
would not make any appeal to distribution at all. For example, we might justify 
distributive justice only to the extent that is necessary to ensure democratic stability. 
This kind of argument makes no appeal to the idea of collective assets. It only holds 
that the moral reasons for democratic stability are strong enough to require 
redistribution. The second justification is by treating principles of distributive justice 
as principles for the division of surplus of mutually beneficial cooperation. Rawls’s appeal 
to collective assets is surprising given how important the idea of dividing the surplus 
of reciprocal cooperation is to his theory. The division of surplus assumes collective 
work, i.e. cooperation, instead of collective assets. The third justification is 
compensatory. Redistribution is done in order to compensate individuals for unfair 
disadvantage. This justification does not need to assume that talents are collective 
assets. Instead, the unfortunate are simply compensated. Only the last and fourth 
way assumes collective assets. I call this approach aggregate and divide. Given a fixed 
currency of justice, we determine the total of this currency. We then divide up the 
currency into individual shares according to the formula that our theory of justice 
provides. Utilitarianism can be explained in this manner. Utilitarians simply add up 
all welfare and divide it in order to bring about the distribution that maximizes the 
sum total of welfare. This justification has to assume that talents are collective assets.44 
The difference between the last two justifications can be seen in Dworkin’s 
construction of equality of resources. Dworkin contrasts his hypothetical insurance 
market with an alternative approach to the problem of handicaps.45 He suggests that 
a person’s “physical and mental powers” might count as resources for the purpose of 
the initial auction division. He even concedes that these powers are indeed personal 
 
44 This also holds for Harsanyi’s justification. Harsanyi simply assumes that principles of 
distributive justice have to be chosen. There is no attempt in justifying his principles as a form 
of compensation or as a division of cooperative surplus or by way of some derivative 
justification. 
45 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, pp. 79-80. 
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resources. In this alternative scenario every person would first receive a 
compensatory share of external resources before the auction can proceed with the 
remaining external resources. 
Dworkin rejects this approach on the following grounds.46 First, an initial 
compensation would require a standard of normal powers which is difficult to give. 
Second, it may not provide an upper bound for compensation. In practice 
compensation would then need to be determined by the political process. Third, he 
objects that treating resources this way would amount to seeing them as transferable 
and fungible between persons. The first two arguments are unconvincing. Dworkin 
concedes that mental and physical powers are resources. It should be possible then 
to determine how valuable these resources are. This might be very complex for any 
human to do. But this is in effect an epistemic concern. It does not establish that there 
is no right answer to the question of how valuable one’s personal resources are and 
how much initial compensation one is owed. Similar remarks hold for the second 
argument. Dworkin points out problems of implementation. Politicians might be 
unwilling to transfer even more resources to those badly off, but it may still be the 
case that this is what justice requires. 
The third argument is more promising. Dworkin writes that personal 
resources “cannot be manipulated or transferred, even so far as technology might 
permit”.47 Dworkin does not give a reason why transfers are impermissible even 
when they are feasible. Dworkin’s remark makes sense, however, if it is interpreted 
as a demand to respect the separateness of persons. It is incompatible to respect the 
separateness of persons while treating personal resources as transferable and 
fungible. This would amount to the divide and aggregate approach to distributive 
justice which I outlined above. We can then see that personal resources are excluded 
in the initial distribution in order to respect the separateness of persons. This creates 
the need for Dworkin’s alternative solution, the hypothetical insurance market, and 
thereby for the veil of ignorance. The veil of ignorance is only introduced in 
Dworkin’s theory in order to respect the separateness of persons. 
 
46 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, pp. 79-80. 
47 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, p. 80. 
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Having distinguished the various modes of justification for principles of 
justice, we can see that Rawls as well can be defended against the problem of 
collective assets. Only aggregate and divide makes an appeal to collective assets which 
violates the separateness of persons. The other three approaches do not need to 
regard talents as collective assets.48 Rawls’s theory has many resources to develop 
arguments based on all three permissible strategies, even though I will not pursue 
this task here. 
My interpretation can, however, explain the revisions Rawls made for the 
revised edition of A Theory of Justice on this point. In the original edition of A Theory 
of Justice Rawls writes that “[we] see then that the difference principle represents, in 
effect, an agreement to regard the distribution of natural talents as a common asset 
and to share in the benefits of this distribution whatever it turns out to be.”49 In the 
revised edition this passage is removed. Rawls there only writes that “[the] two 
principles are equivalent … to an undertaking to regard the distribution of natural 
abilities in some respects as a collective asset …. I do not say that the parties are 
moved by the ethical propriety of this idea.”50 In the later formulation Rawls distances 
himself from reasoning that treats natural abilities as common assets and as such 
disposable by everyone. He expressly says that the parties are not moved by this 
ideal. This inclusion and the other modifications indicate that Rawls himself is not 
moved by this ideal either. But he does not distance himself from the two principles 
of justice. Rather, he points out that the principles of justice which can be justified 
independently are extensionally equivalent to principles justified by appeal to 
collective assets. 
My interpretation can also shed light on the emphasis that the distribution of 
natural talents is regarded as a common asset as opposed to the individual talents 
 
48 This result is not trivial. Equality of outcome, for example, seems much less plausible if it 
has to be justified on either of the three grounds. It is difficult to see why every inequality 
should have to be compensated for. It is also difficult to see why the division of surplus should 
lead to flat equality irrespective of different contributions and different non-cooperation 
baselines. Lastly, it is difficult to see why non-distributive ideals would require such a 
demanding distributive implementation. 
49 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 179. 
50 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. edn., p. 156. Emphasis added. 
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themselves.51 Regarding the distribution of talents as an asset means that we regard 
the assembly of different talents as one asset of the community as a whole. Yet, the 
distribution of natural talents can also be interpreted in light of the aggregate and 
divide approach. Under this it is the totality of talents that is an asset to the society as 
a collective. But this is not the most charitable reading of Rawls and one that he 
himself disavows.52 Instead, Rawls thinks that the distribution of natural talents refers 
to their complementarity. The distribution of talents leads to a division of labor that 
is part of a system of mutual cooperation. The division of labor and mutual 
cooperation itself then is a collective asset. This can be captured well in my taxonomy 
as an approach that regard the difference principle as a principle for the division of 
mutually beneficial surplus. 
 
G. Summary 
 
My discussion of the justificatory requirement of the separateness of persons 
objection has shown that it is possible to employ the veil of ignorance without 
disrespecting the separateness of persons. For this, three things have to be kept in 
mind. First, the veil of ignorance must be designed in a manner that allows us to 
distinguish between the choosers behind the veil. Second, self-interested choice 
behind the veil cannot justify moral principles. The veil of ignorance must either be 
justified by some deeper principle or it must be used in presenting the theory as 
opposed to justifying it. Third, the veil of ignorance cannot be used as a tool for diving 
up collective assets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
51 See Samuel Freeman, Justice and the Social Contract (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
pp. 115-19; and John Rawls, Justice as Fairness. A Restatement (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard 
University Press, 2001), pp. 74-77. 
52 Rawls, Justice as Fairness. A Restatement, pp. 74-77. 
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III. Principles for Separate Persons 
 
A. Harsanyi’s Average Utilitarianism 
 
For the remainder of the chapter I will test the suggestion that the veil of 
ignorance systematically selects those principles of justice which substantively 
violate the separateness of persons. In particular, the concern is that the principles 
will treat intra-personal and inter-personal trade-offs the same and do not respect 
what I shall call the Shift between these different kinds of trade-offs. I begin with 
Harsanyi. 
Harsanyi’s average utilitarianism violates the separateness of persons 
substantively. This is the case regardless of which interpretation of Harsanyi’s view 
is taken. Harsanyi himself argued that his veil of ignorance will lead to the acceptance 
of average utilitarianism, but there is sustained criticism against this interpretation.53 
As it turns out, on either interpretation of Harsanyi’s veil, his result violates the 
separateness of persons. Average utilitarianism does not respect the Shift. For inter-
personal choices average utilitarianism endorses the choice which maximizes 
average well-being. For intra-personal choices average utilitarianism endorses the 
choice which maximizes expected well-being. The intra-personal choice is then only 
a risky correlate of the inter-personal choice. In effect, the same principle of choice is 
used in both circumstances. 
The criticism of Harsanyi’s interpretation is the following. Harsanyi’s 
theorem relies on von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utilities. Harsanyi interprets 
the vNM utilities to represent (or be a measure of) well-being. VNM utilities have 
two features which make this interpretation potentially problematic. First, they are 
not uniquely defined. There are an infinite number of mathematical transformations 
of one’s utility function that are all equally acceptable as vNM representations. This 
 
53 Amartya Sen, “Welfare Inequalities and Rawlsian Axiomatics,” Theory and Decision 7 (1976): 
243-62; Amartya Sen, “Non-Linear Social Welfare Functions: A Reply to Professor Harsanyi,” 
in Foundational Problems in the Special Sciences, ed. Robert E. Butts and Jaakko Hintikka 
(Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1977), pp. 297-302; John A. Weymark, “A reconsideration of the 
Harsanyi-Sen debate on utilitarianism,” in Elster, Roemer, Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-
Being, pp. 255-320; and Roemer, “Harsanyi’s Impartial Observer is not a Utilitarian”. 
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means that inter-personal comparability of well-being might not be guaranteed. A 
further assumption of comparability is needed. All utility functions need to be scaled 
together to ensure comparability. Otherwise the function that represents “average 
utilitarianism” would be subject to arbitrary factors such as the specific mathematical 
representation used for each individual. 
Second, vNM representations are risk-neutral with regard to utility. Imagine 
you are offered a gamble. A fair coin is flipped, and you receive either £100 or 
nothing. There will be some amount of money that you would rather receive for 
certain which makes you indifferent between the certain money or the gamble, say 
£45. Now you lead your life and experience a year with bad fortune. This makes it 
vivid for you how much you would like your life not to depend on pure luck. As a 
result, you become more risk-averse than you were before. But the year does not 
change your attitude towards money or the benefits you draw from money. After this 
year I ask you to play the game again. This time you would be indifferent between 
the gamble and a lesser amount of money, say £40. According to the vNM measure, 
this means that your utility of receiving £45 is now higher than it was before. 
But how is this possible? You did not change your evaluation of the outcome 
B. You value money just as much as you did before. What changed was your attitude 
towards risk. Psychologically there are two different reasons for why one might have 
changed one’s mind. It is possible for an agent to have changed their mind about the 
value of money. In this case the agent would consider having more money less 
valuable. Alternatively, the agent may have changed their attitude towards risk. In 
this case the agent would prefer to avoid risk without needing to think that the 
possible gains are less valuable. The agent would simply dislike betting.54 The von 
Neumann-Morgenstern framework treats these two psychological explanations the 
same. “Risk aversion” in the von Neumann-Morgenstern framework simply means 
having diminishing marginal utility with regard to some good. This collapses the two 
 
54 See also J.W.N. Watkins, “Towards a Unified Decision Theory: A Non-Bayesian Approach,” 
in Butts and Hintikka, Foundational Problems in the Special Sciences, pp. 345-79, at pp. 368-75; 
Lara Buchak, Risk and Rationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 24-36; and H. 
Orri Stefánsson and Richard Bradley, “What is Risk Aversion?,” British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science 70 (2019): 77-102, at pp. 80-83. 
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different kinds of psychological attitudes into one measure. After changing one’s 
mind, one’s utility of B has increased. 
But if the two attitudes are really distinct, then your well-being has not 
changed in my example. Well-being refers to an agent evaluation of how well one’s 
life goes, it does not make reference to a person’s attitudes on risk or gambling. As 
long as it is rationally permissible for an agent to be risk-neutral with regard to their 
good, this means that the vNM measure does not measure well-being for all agents. 
If we used the vNM measure as a guide to the distribution of resources we would, in 
the words of Kenneth Arrow, make giving of benefits dependent on the tastes of 
individuals for gambling.55 
A better interpretation of vNM utilities is that they do not represent well-
being but rather an index that includes both one’s valuation of states of affairs (i.e. 
one’s well-being) and one’s attitudes towards risk. Average utilitarianism on the other 
hand would require us to maximize the average of well-being as opposed to the 
average of this index. Harsanyi’s argument would then justify only maximizing 
average vNM utilities. Maximizing average vNM utilities, however, does not respect 
the Shift. VNM utilities are constructed by accounting for rational intra-personal 
trade-offs. As a moral theory, maximizing average vNM utilities would simply use 
the same kind of mechanism for inter-personal trade-offs. Whichever way we 
interpret Harsanyi’s theorem, it cannot account for the Shift and therefore Harsanyi’s 
veil does not provide a moral theory that respects the separateness of persons. 
 
B. Rawls’s Two Principles of Justice 
 
Rawls avoids the substantive version of the separateness of persons objection 
by restricting his principles of justice. They apply only to the basic structure of 
society. This immunizes Rawls from any possible violation of the Shift. His principles 
are simply not meant to apply to individual, intra-personal trade-offs. Furthermore, 
the restriction is not ad hoc. His conception of justice as being the first virtue of social 
 
55 Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd edn. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 
1963), pp. 9-10. 
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institutions is internally coherent and internally motivated. This point is important. 
It is technically possible for every moral principle that seemingly violates the Shift to 
limit its applicability to inter-personal choices. If every such limitation is permitted, 
then the Shift cannot be an effective argument against moral principles. In some cases, 
such limitations will be internally incoherent, they will belie the motivation given for 
the principle in the first place. This is clearly not the case with Rawls’s two principles 
of justice. 
 
C. Dworkin’s Equality of Resources 
 
Dworkin’s equality of resources makes decisions about social transfers 
dependent on individual hypothetical insurance decisions. Since insurance decisions 
balance out risks between different possible futures there is a concern that the theory 
assimilates inter-personal trade-offs to intra-personal trade-offs. To assess this 
objection, it is worthwhile considering a concrete case. Alex Voorhoeve has devised 
one against the application of equality of resources to health care rationing.56 
Voorhoeve imagines a three person society which can choose between three health 
care insurance plans. Unhealthy would most benefit from a large insurance policy, 
while Healthy would most benefit from a small insurance policy. Avy, the third 
member, knows that she will either develop the condition that Unhealthy has or have 
the health status of Healthy. The best option for her is a medium insurance plan. The 
hypothetical insurance model asks us to determine which insurance Unhealthy and 
Healthy would have purchased had they been unaware of their condition. Avy is 
currently unaware and chooses a medium plan. If we accept the judgment of a 
representative individual, then we would follow Avy’s judgment and select a 
medium plan for Unhealthy and Healthy too. 
 
56 Alex Voorhoeve, “May a Government Mandate more Comprehensive Health Insurance 
than Citizens Want for Themselves?,” in Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy. Volume 4, ed. 
David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne, and Steven Wall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 
167-91, at pp. 172-74. For the criticism in general see John E. Roemer, “Equality of Talent,” 
Economics & Philosophy 1 (1985): 151-88; and Fleurbaey, “Equality of Resources Revisited,” pp. 
90-97. 
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This brings out the separateness of persons objection. The trade-off between 
Unhealthy and Healthy is resolved in effect by the intra-personal trade-off that Avy 
faces. The hypothetical insurance model does not respect, so it seems, the Shift. Inter- 
and intra-personal trade-offs are treated the same. 
The example Voorhoeve uses is directed against the “representative prudent 
individual test” (RPIT) for health care coverage. RPIT is a simplification of equality 
of resources for health care. Once this simplification is removed, we can see that 
equality of resources can evade the separateness of persons objection. Under equality 
of resources there is not one choice of a representative individual which determines 
the overall distribution of resources. Instead, it is the interplay, in a market, of various 
person’s choices behind a veil of ignorance which determines the distribution of 
resources. It is not a single hypothetical insurance decision, but rather the result of a 
hypothetical insurance market that determines the right amount of transfers to those 
unfairly disadvantaged. 
In Voorhoeve’s example RPIT does not respect the Shift because of restrictions 
in the thought experiment. The size of the society is small, and all members of the 
society share an attitude towards risk. His example also uses well-being as a currency 
of justice, which is incompatible with the model of equality of resources. The 
restrictions are crucial to bring out one example in which equality of resources 
coincides with a theory that decides inter-personal trade-offs the same way as intra-
personal trade-offs. This is different from the charge that equality of resources turns 
questions of inter-personal transfers into questions of intra-personal risk-taking. 
Utilitarianism, for example, systematically violates the difference between inter-
personal and intra-personal trade-offs. To see why one example in which the answers 
to an inter-personal and intra-personal trade-off coincide is insufficient, consider the 
following. Under special circumstances utilitarianism coincides with outcome 
welfare egalitarianism in its allocation of resources.57 It would be incorrect, however, 
to take this as evidence for the egalitarian character of utilitarianism.58 It would also 
 
57 Namely, all individuals have the same preferences, there is diminishing marginal utility and 
distribution is costless. 
58 Utilitarianism is possibly egalitarian in a different sense, namely by embodying the principle 
that everyone counts for one and no one counts for more than one. 
Chapter 2. Separate Persons Behind the Veil 
99 
 
be incorrect to hold that for this reason outcome welfare egalitarianism violates the 
separateness of persons. It is noteworthy that both in the case of the egalitarian 
outcomes of utilitarianism and in Voorhoeve’s application of equality of resources, 
the restrictions on the thought experiment are overwhelmingly unlikely to arise in 
the scenarios that the theory is designed for. Equality of resources is designed to 
answer the question of distributive justice for societies or governments, not for 
smaller units like families. Furthermore, the mere fact that equality of resources has 
the implication Voorhoeve shows it has in this case is not good enough reason, on 
grounds of counterintuitive consequences, to reject equality of resources. The 
argument would only be successful if it could be shown that equality of resources 
violates the Shift, but this, I argued, is not the conclusion we should draw from his 
case. 
Dworkin does, however, introduce simplifying assumptions into his model of 
equality of resources which seem to make it appropriate to simply ask what the 
average member would have chosen.59 This additional simplification would mean 
that equality of resources systemically violates the Shift. Can we improve on 
Dworkin’s suggestion? Is there a simplifying assumption that respects the Shift? In a 
different context Lara Buchak has suggested that there is. Buchak argues that there is 
a wide array of reasonable and rationally permissible risk attitudes. When acting on 
behalf of others we should take a more conservative risk attitude, namely the most 
risk averse attitude which is still reasonable. This default is the default that should 
guide our deliberation behind the veil of ignorance.60 This model, Buchak contends, 
respects the separateness of persons. Inter-personal trade-offs should be decided in 
light of the default risk attitude. But individuals are free to depart from the default 
when it comes to intra-personal trade-offs. Indeed, since hardly anyone will adopt 
the most risk averse reasonable attitude, almost everyone will take different 
gambles.61 
 
59 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, pp. 78-79, 94-95. 
60 Buchak, “Taking Risks Behind the Veil of Ignorance,” pp. 624-33. 
61 Buchak, “Taking Risks Behind the Veil of Ignorance,” pp. 640-42. 
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Buchak has given a way how inter-personal and intra-personal trade-offs can 
be differentiated even with a single simplifying assumption for inter-personal trade-
offs. This assumption will not, however, help equality of resources. The project of 
equality of resources is to determine how people would be endowed in resources in 
just circumstances. The veil of ignorance is introduced to determine which resource 
bundle people would have chosen in these just circumstances. This question is one of 
individual choice and individual responsibility. Buchak’s risk attitude only makes 
sense as an attitude of acting on behalf of others. Therefore, her suggestion cannot be 
integrated into equality of resources. 
While Dworkin uses averaging as a simplifying assumption, he also makes 
clear that it is a second-best assumption.62 The model of equality of resources should 
always be refined with more information insofar as this information is available. 
Dworkin underestimates here the importance of this additional information, and he 
does so in a way that creates trouble for his own theory. Dworkin adjusts his veil of 
ignorance from Rawls in order to allow for the separateness of persons behind the 
veil. Resorting now to a standard of the average person risks repeating Rawls’s 
mistake. The parties behind the veil of ignorance are still formally separate but what 
counts is only how the average member would vote. The result is that intra-personal 
and inter-personal trade-offs are treated alike, as they are in the counterexample to 
RPIT. Instead, equality of resources requires for its viability a larger informational 
basis that allows us to refine the details of the hypothetical insurance market. 
This does not constitute an argument in favor of equality of resources. 
Equality of resources may still fail. There might be reasons apart from the 
separateness of persons that speak against it. There is also the possibility that equality 
of resources is hopeless if it cannot resort to simplifying assumptions of how the 
average person would choose behind the veil. If so, then the separateness of persons 
would play a crucial part in undermining the viability of Dworkin’s theory of justice. 
Intriguing as this suggestion is, I cannot discuss it here. 
 
 
 
62 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, p. 78 and 78fn5 
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IV. Conclusion 
 
This concludes my discussion of the veil of ignorance. The general argument 
against the veil of ignorance is central in assessing its usefulness as a philosophical 
tool. But I have argued that the veil of ignorance can be used in a manner that respects 
the separateness of persons. Ronald Dworkin’s use of the veil is one such example. 
Three conditions need to be met for the veil of ignorance to avoid the 
justificatory version of the separateness of persons objection. First, the choice behind 
the veil must be a choice of distinct individuals. Depriving the parties behind the veil 
of information that allows us to differentiate between them turns the choice behind 
the veil into a choice of a single or only few representative individuals. Second, 
rational choice behind the veil cannot be the justification for a moral principle. The 
veil can play an important part as a component of the theory specifying its contents. 
Alternatively, the veil can be motivated by some deeper justification which makes 
self-interest behind the veil morally relevant. Third, redistribution cannot be justified 
on grounds that innate talents are collective assets. The veil of ignorance cannot be 
employed to divide a common pool of innate talents. Instead, it needs to be justified 
as part of a theory of compensation for unfair disadvantage, as part of a theory of 
division of the surplus of mutually beneficial cooperation, or derivatively by appeal 
to some other moral ideal. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the veil of ignorance can violate the separateness of 
persons substantively. One way to safeguard against this is Rawls’s. Rawls insulates 
the veil of ignorance by limiting its role to choosing principles for the basic structure 
of society. This way the resulting principles of justice cannot violate the Shift since 
they have no applicability to intra-personal choices. Another way is Dworkin’s. 
Dworkin’s equality of resources determines inter-personal trade-offs by the interplay 
of various different intra-personal decisions. As a result, the trade-offs will differ and 
respect the difference between the separateness of persons and the unity of the 
individual. 
The separateness of persons is therefore not opposed to the veil of ignorance. 
Indeed, the veil of ignorance can sometimes be a tool to avoid violating the 
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separateness of persons. The limits that the separateness of persons sets to the veil of 
ignorance tell us however to depart from the simple model of individual rational 
choice of principles of justice behind the veil. 
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Chapter 3. 
Contractualism, Complaints, and Risk 
 
I. Contractualism and Risk 
 
The previous chapter focused on the demand that the separateness of persons 
imposes to respect the difference between intra-personal and inter-personal trade-
offs. Moral theories should respect the difference between the separateness of persons 
and the unity of the individual. In the following three chapters, I want to focus on the 
separateness of persons in a narrow sense. Utilitarianism aggregates all benefits and 
burdens of an action in order to decide whether or not the action is permissible. It 
thereby conflates the different standpoints of different individuals and treats all 
benefits and burdens an action produces as if they were the benefits and burdens of 
one entity or one system of ends. 
This objection to the aggregative feature of utilitarianism has motivated non-
consequentialists to propose conceptions of morality that are based on the competing 
claims or complaints that individuals can raise. Placing the commitment to individual 
claims or complaints at the heart of morality seems a promising route to ensure 
respect for the separateness of persons and the separateness of the standpoints of 
distinct individuals. The most systematic of these proposals is contractualism as 
developed by T.M. Scanlon. Scanlon argues that an act’s rightness or wrongness 
depends on its justifiability to each. As a test for justifiability, Scanlon proposes that 
the permissibility of an act depends on whether it follows from a principle that no 
one can reasonably reject. An act is permissible only when no one can reasonably 
reject a principle that entails the permissibility of that act. One natural idea is that the 
individual with the largest complaint has most reason to reject a principle. It then 
appears that a principle can be reasonably rejected only when the largest complaint 
is larger than the complaint anyone else could bring forward against any alternative 
principle.1  
 
1 See Scanlon, “Contractualism and utilitarianism”; and What We Owe to Each Other, ch. 5. 
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The individualistic foundations of contractualism have given rise to an 
opposite concern, namely that contractualist morality is unduly concerned with the 
fate of single individuals.2 Recently, Scanlonian contractualism has received scrutiny 
for the way it deals with cases where risks, rather than certainties of harm and benefit, 
are at stake.3 My discussion in this chapter will focus on Scanlonian contractualism, 
but my conclusions may apply more widely to any moral theory that places the idea 
of justifiability and individual complaints or competing claims at the heart of 
morality. 
The debate around contractualism and risk is typically framed as a debate 
between two opposing views. Ex ante contractualism is concerned with prospects 
while ex post contractualism is concerned with outcomes.4 I believe that this framing is 
unhelpful. What can it mean to say that a theory of risk impositions is concerned with 
outcomes when it is designed to provide guidance in cases where we are uncertain 
about the outcome? With the help of a sequence of thought experiments from Michael 
 
2 See Brink, “The Separateness of Persons, Distributive Norms, and Moral Theory” and also 
my discussion of anti-aggregation in the introduction to this dissertation. 
3 See Sophia Reibetanz, “Contractualism and Aggregation,” Ethics 108 (1998): 296-311; 
Elizabeth Ashford, “The Demandingness of Scanlon’s Contractualism,” Ethics 113 (2003): 273-
302; James Lenman, “Contractualism and risk imposition,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 7 
(2008): 99-122; Barbara H. Fried, “Can Contractualism Save Us from Aggregation?,” The 
Journal of Ethics 16 (2012): 39-66; Aaron James, “Contractualism’s (Not So) Slippery Slope,” 
Legal Theory 18 (2012): 263-92; Marc Fleurbaey and Alex Voorhoeve, “Decide As You Would 
with Full Information!,” in Inequalities in Health, ed. Nir Eyal, Samia A. Hurst, Ole F. Norheim, 
and Dan Wikler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 113-28; Johann Frick, 
“Uncertainty and Justifiability to Each Person. Response to Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve,” in 
Eyal, Hurst, Norheim, and Wikler, Inequalities in Health, pp. 129-46; T.M. Scanlon, “Reply to 
Zofia Stemplowska,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (2013): 508-14; S.D. John, “Risk, 
Contractualism, and Rose’s ‘Prevention Paradox’,” Social Theory and Practice 40 (2014): 28-50; 
Johann Frick, “Contractualism and Social Risk,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 43 (2015): 175-223; 
Rahul Kumar, “Risking and Wronging,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 43 (2015): 27-51; Michael 
Otsuka, “Risking Life and Limb: How to Discount Harms by Their Improbability,” in Identified 
versus Statistical Lives, ed. I. Glenn Cohen, Norman Daniels, and Nir Eyal (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), pp. 77-93; Joe Horton, “Aggregation, Complaints, and Risk,” 
Philosophy & Public Affairs 45 (2017): 54-81; and Korbinian Rüger, “On Ex Ante 
Contractualism,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 13 (2018): 240-258. 
4 For the former see James, “Contractualism’s (Not So) Slippery Slope”; John, “Risk, 
Contractualism, and Rose’s ‘Prevention Paradox’”; Kumar, “Risking and Wronging”; and 
Frick, “Contractualism and Social Risk”. For the latter see Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve, “Decide 
As You Would with Full Information!”; Otsuka, “Risking Life and Limb”; and Rüger, “On Ex 
Ante Contractualism”. 
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Otsuka, I provide a more helpful way of understanding what is at stake between 
different contractualist approaches to risk (Section II).5 In addition, the sequence 
allows me to propose a new view on contractualism and risk, which I call objective ex 
ante contractualism because of the special importance that it gives to objective as 
opposed to epistemic probability. My version of contractualism focuses on the 
complaints of would-be victims whose fate is already determined. After discussing 
the sequence, I will show that a natural extension of the sequence highlights that two 
principles which ex post contractualism should ideally fulfill are inconsistent with 
one another (Section III). In Section IV, I will present the defense of my objective ex 
ante view by arguing that it provides us with the best model of the key contractualist 
idea of acting in ways that are justifiable to each. Section V responds to objections. 
 
II. Otsuka’s Sequence 
 
Dust. A comet is en route to the Midwestern United States carrying a 
pathogen that will soon lead to millions of people being infected and 
dying. The government is briefed on two alternative ways of containing 
the pathogen. The first option has the side effect that a different hazard 
will be released over Florida. It is known that it would cause Bob Johnson, 
a resident of Boca Raton, to lose one leg. Unfortunately, Bob Johnson 
cannot be evacuated in time. The second alternative has the side effect 
that the hazard will have to be released in a dust cloud over California. 
Each of 40 million Californians faces a small risk of death and it is known 
that exactly one Californian will die. The Californian who will die has a 
genetic predisposition which will cause his or her death upon being 
subjected to the dust. 
 Intuitively, the right course of action here would be to release the hazard over 
Florida and cause Bob Johnson to lose a leg. But it appears that contractualism 
struggles to explain this intuitive answer. Bob Johnson’s complaint against choosing 
to release the hazard is not discounted. It is certain that he will suffer. The complaints 
 
5 Otsuka, “Risking Life and Limb,” pp. 77-88. 
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of the Californians should be discounted however. The likelihood of each of the 40 
million Californians to be the one who dies is only 1 in 40 million. Although death is 
terrible, a 1 in 40 million chance of death is not altogether that terrible. We often incur 
similar risks when crossing the road, cooking with gas or swimming in the ocean. 
The complaint against the imposition of the risk of death would suddenly be a rather 
trivial moral complaint. How can such a trivial moral complaint outweigh the quite 
serious complaint of Bob of losing his leg? 
One way for contractualism to accommodate the case is by pointing out that 
all the complaints combined add up to something significant: a complaint of the 
magnitude of certain death. But this response leads to highly counterintuitive results 
in other cases. 
Jones. Jones, a worker in a TV transmitter room, has had an accident. He 
is now lying on the floor and suffering extremely painful electric shocks. 
There is only one way to save Jones, namely by interrupting the current 
transmission signal for about fifteen minutes. This in turn will cause 
millions of viewers to be upset who want to see the football World Cup 
match that is in progress.6 
If we add up the complaints due to inconvenience and upset of all the millions 
of viewers, it seems that they will outweigh Jones's complaint against being subject 
to pain. But here it is clear that we should not let Jones suffer for the relatively mild 
loss of missing fifteen minutes of a football match. We should not aggregate morally 
trivial complaints so that they outweigh serious moral complaints of single 
individuals. 
 Otsuka, in his discussion of Dust, resists this solution and instead points to a 
different feature of the case. Unlike in Jones’s case, in Dust there is one person who 
will experience grave harm. The aggregated complaints add up to the real-life 
predicament of one person. We do not need to imagine a social entity that experiences 
the harms of dying, but there is an individual made out of flesh and blood who will 
die. It is merely a fact concerning our informational limitations that prevents us from 
identifying that person in the same manner that we were able to identify Bob Johnson. 
 
6 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, p. 235. 
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Yet we can still say something about the individual who is going to die. The person 
who is going to die is “the Californian with the genetic predisposition”. The 
complaint of “the Californian with the genetic predisposition” is non-discounted. Her 
(or his) complaint would outweigh Bob Johnson’s complaint. 
 Now is the complaint of “the Californian with the genetic predisposition” a 
complaint ex ante or ex post? Ex post contractualism can account for this complaint. 
We know that the result of the action will be one person dying. Since the outcome 
distribution of the action is already known to us, an ex post contractualist can peek 
ahead, anticipate this distribution, and assign complaints to those affected by it. 
But can ex ante contractualism? I think it can. “The Californian with the 
genetic predisposition” is a person with a determinate identity when we make the 
decision. Regardless of what happens and regardless of our action, “the Californian 
with the genetic predisposition” will always be the same person. If we limit our 
attention to only those possible worlds that are possible outcomes of our action, then 
we can say that “the Californian with the genetic predisposition” rigidly designates 
over this restricted domain of discourse. Since only those possible worlds that 
constitute possible outcomes of our actions are of interest to us, I will simply refer to 
such descriptions as “rigid designators”.7 Releasing the hazard over California will 
impose the certainty of death on this existing person with a determinate identity. 
From the ex ante perspective, “the Californian with the genetic predisposition” can 
object to the imposition of a 100 percent risk of death. We do not need to appeal to 
the outcome of the action ex post to make this claim. 
This means that our understanding of ex ante contractualism should be 
broader. The classical version of ex ante contractualism focuses on the risks as faced 
by individuals with proper names or otherwise identifiable individuals. But not all 
versions of ex ante contractualism focus on these risks. The version of ex ante 
contractualism that I defend focuses on the complaints that rigidly designated 
 
7 This definition also includes an element of temporality in the ex ante/ex post distinction. The 
possible worlds that are possible outcomes of the action are those possible worlds which 
coincide in their history until the point of action. Rigid designators are descriptions that refer 
to information that is contained in the shared history. Non-rigid designators are descriptions 
that refer to information about the future where the possible worlds no longer coincide. 
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individuals can raise. The two forms of ex ante contractualism differ thereby in whose 
complaints they focus on. This in turn is linked to a distinction between two kinds of 
risk: epistemic risks (credences) and objective risks (chances).8 The distinction that I 
am relying on here classifies some probability functions as expressing our uncertain 
degrees of belief or confidence about the world. These are epistemic probability 
functions, also called credence functions. By contrast objective probability functions 
express a mind-independent idea of probability. The objective probability function, a 
chance function, reflects information about the world and not about our knowledge 
of the world. If there are non-trivial objective probabilities, then there are truly 
“chancy” events. While there are various theories on what chances are, the 
differences between them are not important for my arguments.9 What I rely on is 
solely the contrast between chances and credences. 
In Dust we only have epistemic probabilities for the risks that each identifiable 
Californian faces. However, we can give objective probabilities for the risk that “the 
Californian with the genetic predisposition” faces. This suggests an important link 
between the question of whose complaints we are interested in and what kind of risk 
we are interested in. By focusing on rigidly designated individuals, objective ex ante 
contractualism gives primacy to objective risk assessments over epistemic risk 
 
8 I follow here the orthodox tradition in the philosophy of probability dating back to Rudolf 
Carnap who distinguished between two concepts of probability (frequentist and evidential) 
which are examples of the broader approaches of chance and credence. See Rudolf Carnap, 
“The Two Concepts of Probability,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 5 (1945): 513-32; 
Anthony Eagle, “Chance versus Randomness,” in The Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy. Spring 
2019 Edition, ed. Edward N. Zalta (URL: 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/chance-randomness/>), sec. 1; and Alan 
Hájek, “Interpretations of Probability,” in The Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy. Fall 2019 
Edition, ed. Edward N. Zalta (URL: 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/probability-interpret/>), sec. 3. 
9 The most common approaches are frequentism, propensity views, and Best Systems 
Approaches. In addition, some philosophers embrace a “no theory” approach to chances 
according to which objective probabilities are not reducible to anything else like frequencies 
or propensities. For an overview see Hájek, “Interpretations of Probability”, for the no theory 
approach see Elliott Sober, “Evolutionary Theory and the Reality of Macro-Probabilities,” in 
The Place of Probability in Science, ed. Ellery Ells and J.H. Fetzer (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), pp. 
133-61, at pp. 148-54. An exception to my claim that my view on objective chance is 
independent between these views are actual frequentist views according to which objective 
probabilities only refer to actually occurring frequencies. Under such a view objective 
probabilities only represent statistical facts about reference groups and have no obvious moral 
significance. 
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assessments. Objective ex ante contractualism holds that in a case like Dust where the 
uncertainty is merely a matter of failing to identify the victim, we should choose 
descriptions that reveal the objective risks that individuals are facing. This is the 
“objective” component in objective ex ante contractualism.10 
 Let me move on to the next case in the sequence: 
Wheel. The case is structurally similar to Dust. Again, we have a comet en 
route and a disaster about to occur. Again, one of our options is to release 
the hazard over Florida and cause Bob Johnson’s loss of a leg. But now 
our second option changes. As a side effect of averting the disaster, each 
Californian will be placed under a gigantic roulette wheel in the sky. The 
wheel will spin indeterministically and release a roulette ball that will kill 
exactly one person. 
 Otsuka reports his intuitive judgment that in Wheel, as in Dust, we should still 
prefer to release the hazard over Florida, causing the loss of Bob Johnson’s leg. But 
here we cannot rely anymore on the description of “the Californian who is genetically 
predisposed”. Instead, we would need to rely on a description like “the Californian 
who would be hit by the roulette ball” or “the Californian who would be most 
harmed by the decision”. These descriptions are non-rigid designators since different 
persons may die due to the falling ball. While the complaints of rigidly designated 
individuals have to be discounted, the complaints of non-rigidly designated 
individuals do not. The probability of someone being harmed by the wheel is 1. We 
can peek ahead and assign a complaint to that person. We may think that such 
statistical persons are still actual persons worthy of respect and with claims that 
ought to be taken into consideration.11 
 
10 Importantly the two kinds of risks are linked in a manner that should guard us from 
identifying epistemic or objective ex ante exclusively with one kind of risk. Whenever we have 
an objective probability for a given event (such as Charlotte Williams is going to be harmed), 
we should adjust our credence (i.e. our epistemic probability) to match the objective 
probability. The next case in the sequence is an example of this. This is, for example, an 
uncontroversial entailment of David Lewis’s Principal Principle. See David Lewis, “A 
Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance,” in Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, vol. 2, 
ed. Richard C. Jeffrey (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 263-93. 
11 See Norman Daniels, “Can There be Moral Force to Favoring an Identified over a Statistical 
Life?,” in Cohen, Daniels, and Eyal, Identified versus Statistical Lives, pp. 110-23, at p. 116; and 
Otsuka, “Risking Life and Limb,” pp. 85-86. 
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 This cannot be reconciled with the ex ante perspective. The complaint of “the 
Californian most harmed by the decision” is not a complaint of any person with a 
determinate identity prior to the action. There is no token individual for whom it is 
true that she has imposed on her a 100 percent risk of death. Accordingly, my 
objective ex ante view holds that releasing the hazard over California is permissible 
in Wheel. Ex ante contractualism bases its complaints on the imposition of risk itself 
rather than on the eventual injurious outcome. This indicates that the important 
difference between ex ante and ex post concerns what the complaint is directed 
against, the risk itself or the eventual harm. A description like “the Californian most 
harmed by the decision” raises a complaint against the eventual harm. It reasons 
backwards from the eventual outcomes of the decision and bases complaints on these 
outcomes. This indicates a version of ex post contractualism. 
 Anticipating the strongest complaint ex post is easy in a case like Wheel. We 
know for certain how the benefits and burdens will be distributed in the outcome. 
We only lack information about who will be in which position. I now move on to a 
case where certainty about the resulting distribution is absent. 
Guns. In this case we have the option to shoot down the comet with an 
automated weapons system. Unfortunately, the system also has guns in 
the sky pointed at each Californian. Each gun is operated by an 
indeterministic randomizer. The chance for each gun to fire and kill the 
person is 1 in 40 million. The guns, and thus the risks each gun imposes, 
operate independently of one another. 
 The objective risk for each Californian is the same as in Wheel, 1 in 40 million. 
Any assessment of rigid designators that relies on objective risks will be the same 
between Wheel and Guns. However, the assessment for non-rigid designators like 
“the Californian who will be most harmed” changes. Here we move away from 
certainty about the distribution that will come about and introduce risk as well. There 
is a 63 percent chance that at least one Californian will die, a 26 percent chance that 
at least two Californians will die, an 8 percent chance that at least three will die, and 
so on. What should ex post contractualists say about a case like this? 
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 One answer is that Guns highlights the limits of ex post contractualism. Under 
this version of ex post contractualism we should draw a distinction between two 
types of cases. In some cases, like Dust or Wheel we know that the risk imposition will 
lead to harm while in Guns this is not guaranteed. Anticipating the complaint of the 
eventual victim is permitted in Dust and Wheel but not permitted in Guns according 
to this view. Since we do not know for certain that someone will be harmed, we 
cannot anticipate this complaint already.12  
 The problem with this version of ex post contractualism is that it relies on a 
distinction between risky cases that is morally dubious.13 Cases with guaranteed 
harms can easily be transformed into cases without guaranteed harm without 
changing anything of moral relevance. Take the example of a coin flip with inversely 
correlated harms and benefits. If the coin lands heads, A benefits and B is harmed. If 
the coin lands tails, A is harmed and B benefited. This is a case of guaranteed harm. 
Ex post contractualism would sometimes rule out this kind of risk even if it is in the 
antecedent interests of both. But what if the coin lands on the edge? This would be a 
freak accident, but nonetheless it is a possibility. Let us assume that no one will be 
harmed if the coin lands on the edge. The case is now one without guaranteed harm. 
If we are not allowed to anticipate any complaint ex post, we should do what is in the 
antecedent interests of both. Similar things hold for a version of Wheel. If we allow 
only a tiny chance that no one will be harmed, the restricted ex post view would allow 
the risk imposition since this case would no longer involve guaranteed harm. Yet if 
we are convinced that imposing the risk in Wheel is impermissible it should be 
impermissible even in this varied scenario. We need a different version of ex post 
contractualism. 
Earlier I mentioned that in Guns we only know facts about what distributions 
of harms are to occur with which likelihood. For example, we know that the chance 
that at least one Californian will die is about 63 percent. One possibility for ex post 
 
12 Sophia Reibetanz Moreau defends such a view (“Contractualism and Aggregation,” pp. 302-
4). Victor Tadros, in a different context, argues that these two kinds of risks are distinct (Victor 
Tadros, “Controlling Risk,” in Prevention and the Limits of the Criminal Law, ed. Andrew 
Ashworth, Lucia Zedner, and Patrick Tomlin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 
133-55, at pp. 148-54). 
13 Otsuka makes a similar point in “Risking Life and Limb,” p. 88. 
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contractualists is to translate these facts about distributions into complaints. Imagine 
we specify a ranking of all persons affected. The main ranking criterion is how strong 
each individual complaint against the action is. In cases where individuals are equally 
affected, we need other tie-breaking criteria. This way we can assign each individual 
a unique place in the ranking. Then we repeat this for all possible outcomes. We can 
now construct fictional characters or “statistical persons” based on these rankings. 
“The worst-off Californian” refers to the first-ranked person in each of the outcomes. 
“The second worst-off Californian” refers to the second-ranked person and so on. In 
cases of objective risk imposition, these designators are non-rigid since they refer to 
different individuals in different possible worlds. This construction allows us to 
assign unique complaints to individuals instead of being limited to talking about 
distributions of harms. Speaking of the complaints of non-rigidly designated persons 
brings the ex post perspective closer to the theoretical core of contractualism. It can 
provide a model of justifiability to each that an analysis of different distributions of 
harms cannot offer.14 Ex post contractualists should therefore accept the following 
principle. 
Ex Post Discounting. When assessing the complaints of individuals, we 
should discount the complaints of non-rigidly designated individuals 
such as the worst-off, the second worst-off, and so on, by the 
improbability of harm. 
As mentioned, in our case of Guns, this means that the complaint of the worst-
off Californian is a discounted complaint against death rather than a non-discounted 
 
14 Joe Horton has proposed a method that generates the same kinds of complaints. For Horton 
we should take the strongest complaint for each outcome and discount it by the probability 
that this outcome will come about. In the end we should aggregate all these complaints. 
Horton calls this the expected strongest ex post complaint (Horton, “Aggregation, Complaints, 
and Risk,” pp. 65-66). There is a subtle difference between my motivation and Horton’s 
motivation for why the ex post contractualist cares about these complaints. Horton’s 
motivation is that we should avoid states of the world in which strong complaints exist. My 
motivation is that we should give importance to the complaint of a person, albeit one that is 
non-rigidly designated. (This is similar to how Rawls gives importance to the claims of “the 
worst-off group” when justifying his difference principle.) I think that Horton’s motivation is 
a greater departure from the theoretical core of contractualism than mine. Contractualism 
distinguishes itself from other theories by focusing on the moral complaints of persons as 
opposed to placing emphasis on properties of states of the world as Horton’s motivation does. 
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complaint as in Wheel. The complaint is discounted by the 37 percent probability that 
the worst-off will not be harmed. But now the second worst-off Californian has a 
discounted complaint as well, as has the third worst-off, and so on. Should this 
difference matter? 
Victor Tadros believes that it should. He gives the following argument based 
on an example that is a simpler version of the contrast between Wheel and Guns.15 
Imagine we have two options. If we choose the first option, then it is guaranteed that 
one and exactly one person will die. If we choose the second option, then there is only 
a 75 percent chance that someone will die but there is also a 25 percent chance that 
two persons will die. Whatever we do, the risks to each rigidly designated individual 
are the same. Under one view the options are equally choiceworthy. If we choose the 
second option, there is a possibility that no one may die but this is balanced by the 
possibility that more than one may die. Tadros, however, argues that we should 
choose the second option because we have special reason to prevent a situation where 
harm will definitely occur. We should not regard the loss of two lives as twice as hard 
to justify than the loss of one life. This is because the two lives are separate and not 
part of one aggregate which suffers a double loss. 
But it is hard to see why the separateness of persons should give us a special 
reason to avert definite harm. Tadros’s argument implies that we have less reason to 
prevent an additional second death. Attaching special significance to the fact that 
harm will occur means attaching special significance to an isolate harm as opposed 
to a harm that occurs alongside many other harms. Yet deaths should have the same 
disvalue regardless of whether they are part of an action in which only one, two, or 
many people die. The death is just as tragic and severe for this person regardless of 
how many other people have died.16 Respect for each individual and for her 
separateness would seem to indicate that we should treat her loss by itself and not 
accord it more or less moral force because of the number of other people who have 
died. If this is true, then we should treat both options in Tadros’s example as equally 
choiceworthy. The ex post contractualist should then regard Guns and Wheel as 
 
15 Tadros, “Controlling Risk,” pp. 153-54. 
16 See also Otsuka, “Risking Life and Limb,” pp. 88-92. 
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equally hard to justify. What should matter to us is the expected number of lives lost 
and not how the risk is distributed across non-rigid designators. This gives us a 
second principle that ex post contractualism would want to fulfill. 
Equal Treatment for Equal Statistical Loss. We should treat cases alike if in 
both cases there is the same expectation of statistical loss and the only 
difference is the distribution of possible losses across possible outcomes. 
 
III. A Problem for Ex Post Contractualism 
 
 Consider: 
Gas. We receive yet another option to prevent the catastrophe. This time 
we have to release a gas in the air that will travel to California. Scientists 
tell us that there is the possibility that in California it will react by means 
of an indeterministic process with another substance and become toxic. 
If that happens, all Californians will die. However, they assure us that 
this is very unlikely. The objective probability of this occurring is only 1 
in 40 million. 
 In one way, Gas is a continuation of Wheel and Guns. In all three cases, each 
rigidly designated Californian faces an objective risk of 1 in 40 million. The cases 
differ, however, in the distribution of risk across non-rigid designators. In Wheel, the 
distribution represents one extreme. All risk is concentrated in the likelihood of one 
person dying. In Guns, the distribution is spread out across all 40 million non-rigid 
designators ranked from “the worst-off” to “the best-off”. The risks for those higher 
up the list are very high, for those lower down the list they are minute. Now in Gas 
we face the opposite extreme. The risks are spread out perfectly even across all non-
rigid designators. All non-rigid designators are tied, because whatever will happen, 
everyone in California shares the same fate. What is particularly interesting about Gas 
is that the distribution of discounted complaints is the same for rigid and non-rigid 
designators. Whether we use rigid or non-rigid designators to determine the 
justifiability of our action does not matter since both will yield the same result. 
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 This is challenging for the ex post contractualist for the following reason: I 
have argued that ex post contractualists should accept the following two principles. 
They should accept Ex Post Discounting. This allows ex post contractualism to be 
applied to cases where harms are not guaranteed, and it provides the ex post 
perspective with a model of justifiability to each. Second, they should accept Equal 
Treatment for Equal Statistical Loss. This means that in Wheel and Guns what matters is 
the number of expected lives lost. The principle follows from accepting the claim that 
the disvalue of a given harm should not vary depending on how many other people 
will be harmed. The possibility that no person may die should be balanced by the 
possibility that more than one person may die. 
 My case Gas shows how these two principles can conflict. The number of 
expected lives lost in Gas is 1, just like in the other two cases. If Wheel and Guns are 
on a par, then so is Gas. But Gas contains only heavily discounted complaints by non-
rigidly designated persons. This is because the complaint of the worst-off Californian 
is based on only a 1 in 40 million chance of death, a morally trivial complaint. 
Following Ex Post Discounting, it should be these discounted complaints that 
determine the justifiability of the risk imposition. If we want to follow Equal Treatment 
for Equal Statistical Loss and hold that the risk imposition in Gas is impermissible, we 
would need to aggregate the complaints in Gas. But whichever way we calculate the 
complaints, the complaints in Gas seem very close to the complaints by the many in 
Jones. The complaint of Bob Johnson resembles the complaint of Jones, the worker in 
the transmitter room. As it turns out, the strongest version of an ex post view leads 
to a case that is very much like Jones. If we allow aggregating the complaints in Gas, 
then why can’t we aggregate the complaints in Jones? 
One proposal is that while individual and non-aggregated complaints matter, 
aggregative considerations can determine whether it is reasonable to reject 
principles.17 Following this proposal, it is still individual complaints that matter. But 
 
17 This is suggested by T.M. Scanlon as a general approach to aggregation in his latest revision 
of his contractualist views. Scanlon does not discuss risky cases in this context (T.M. Scanlon, 
“Contractualism and Justification,” (unpublished manuscript)). Véronique Munoz-Dardé had 
earlier presented the idea that in some cases agents with strong complaints cannot reasonably 
reject principles. Munoz-Dardé invokes the idea of a threshold of reasonable demands that 
one can make on others. This allows for the possibility that a person with a stronger individual 
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their strength would be magnified by the number of people having the same 
complaint. 
Ex Post Discounting (Multiplied). When assessing the complaints of 
individuals, we should discount the complaints of non-rigidly 
designated individuals such as the worst-off, the second worst-off, and 
so on, by the improbability of harm. The strength of their complaint is 
determined by multiplying the strength of their individual complaint 
with the number of non-rigidly designated individuals who will be 
equally affected. 
According to this proposal it would be unreasonable for Bob Johnson to insist 
on his complaint given that there are so many complaints on the other side. The 
strength of the individual complaint opposing Bob Johnson is magnified by the 
number of people who would be similarly affected. Yet Jones is equally faced with 
many complaints on the other side. Why should we not be allowed to multiply the 
individual complaint of a single football fan by the number of football fans that are 
equally affected? If we are allowed to magnify this individual complaint, then it 
would be unreasonable for Jones to reject a principle which allows the World Cup 
match to be broadcasted. The proposal to allow individual and non-aggregated 
complaints to be amplified reintroduces aggregative reasoning through the 
backdoor. So what could distinguish between Gas and Jones? Why should we 
understand Bob Johnson’s insistence on his individual complaint as unreasonable 
while Jones’s insistence is reasonable? 
Perhaps it is the following: In Jones, the small complaints stem from mere 
annoyance. In Gas, the small complaints are derivative of a very serious moral claim, 
namely the claim not to die. This very serious claim becomes less important to each 
individual taken separately due to the sharp discounting by the likelihood of its 
occurring. Maybe Bob Johnson’s insistence is unreasonable while Jones’s is not 
 
complaint may not be able to reasonably reject a principle (Véronique Munoz-Dardé, “The 
Distribution of Numbers and the Comprehensiveness of Reasons,” Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, 105 (2005): 191-217, at pp. 208-15). I return to this proposal in Chapter 5 
(Aggregation, Balancing, and Respect for the Claims of Individuals) and incorporate it in my 
positive proposal for the problem of aggregation. 
Chapter 3. Contractualism, Complaints, and Risk 
117 
 
because in Jones’s case the opposing complaints are not complaints of the right kind. 
The trivial joy of watching football is not relevant to Jones’s torture, while the risk of 
death, even if small, is relevant to Bob Johnson’s lost leg. This proposal is coherent 
with what I wrote earlier about the opposition to aggregation. I wrote that “we should 
not aggregate morally trivial complaints so that they outweigh serious moral complaints of 
single individuals”. Trivial complaints should not outweigh serious complaints 
regardless of the numbers involved. But this leaves open that complaints of similar 
magnitude or qualitative significance could outweigh each other depending on the 
numbers.18  
In line with the earlier distinction between the complaints of the Californians 
and the complaints of the World Cup viewers, we could think of complaints as being 
qualitatively different for different levels of actual or possible harm. Following this 
idea, heavily discounting a complaint against being killed does not make this 
complaint morally trivial. The complaint is still qualitatively on a different level than 
the complaint against mere annoyance. This allows us to distinguish the aggregation 
in Gas from the aggregation in Jones. 
One problem with the idea that risks of death are qualitatively different from 
very small certain harms is that the same answer is available to the ex ante 
contractualist. If we stop believing that heavily discounted risks of death are morally 
trivial, then we could engage in a limited form of aggregation in cases like Wheel too. 
And then ex ante contractualism can account for the same answer. In other words, 
once we adopt the view that heavily discounted harms are not morally trivial, we lose 
a key motivation for adopting ex post contractualism. 
Second, treating risks of death as qualitatively different from small certain 
harms fails Equal Treatment for Equal Statistical Loss in a central case. It cannot treat 
 
18 The idea that complaints can only be aggregated in some circumstances is called limited 
aggregation. The view is suggested by Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, pp. 238-41; and 
also endorsed and defended by Frances M. Kamm, Morality, Mortality, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), pp. 156-61; Intricate Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
pp. 31-40; Temkin, Rethinking the Good, ch. 3; and Alex Voorhoeve, “How Should We 
Aggregate Competing Claims?,” Ethics 125 (2014): 64-87. I justify my own theory of limited 
aggregation that coheres with Scanlon’s latest revision of contractualism in Chapter 5 
(Aggregation, Balancing, and Respect for the Claims of Individuals). 
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identified victims and statistical victims alike, even though equal respect for 
identified and statistical victims was one of the key motivations for ex post 
contractualism. Suppose that in a one versus one confrontation a complaint against 
missing fifteen minutes of a World Cup match is as strong as a complaint against a 
risk of death of 1 in 40 million. If we can either save one person from missing part of 
the match or one person from this risk of death, we should be indifferent. If, however, 
there were two people subjected to this risk of death, we should save them at the 
expense of the person missing parts of the World Cup match. Now what if there are 
many people who would be missing fifteen minutes of the World Cup match? It 
seems that here numbers should matter. Otherwise we would give undue importance 
to small risks. We should rather spare a million people of missing the World Cup 
match, then to reduce a 1 in 40 million risk of death to a single person. In other words, 
here we should be allowed to aggregate the complaints against missing parts of the 
World Cup match. If this is so, then we should be allowed to aggregate both the 
complaints against the risk of death and the complaints against missing fifteen 
minutes of the World Cup match. If there are many complaints against small risks, 
similar to my Gas case, then these might add up to one expected life lost. But since 
we are also allowed to aggregate the complaints of the World Cup viewers, these 
might be decisive. However, if we contrast a single identified person with the World 
Cup viewers, as in Jones, we are required to save the identified person. Distinguishing 
between different kinds of harm can therefore not treat cases where a statistical life is 
lost the same as cases where an identified life is lost. 
Third, the idea that heavily discounted complaints against serious harm 
remain morally significant is also implausible in its own right. One downside of this 
view is that it has a problem analogous to Kamm’s Sore Throat Case. In Kamm’s 
original case we have a choice between saving one life and saving another life and 
saving someone from a sore throat. Kamm wants to say that here we should not 
decide in favor of saving the second person’s life solely on the grounds that we can 
also save someone from a sore throat.19 Now imagine that the tiebreaker is not the 
sore throat but the imposition of a tiny risk of death, for example, by calling an 
 
19 Kamm, Morality, Mortality, 1:146-47. 
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ambulance. Not only is it the case that we are then permitted to save the person who 
does not require the ambulance on grounds that her rescue does not impose a trivial 
risk. Even further, we are required to save her. It would be impermissible not to use 
the trivial risk as the deciding factor. Together with the insufficient motivation for 
treating equally strong complaints differently, I think this gives us grounds to treat 
equally strong complaints as either relevant or irrelevant. What we should accept, 
however, is that complaints can be aggregated when their strength is relevant to the 
strength of the complaints with which they are competing. 
Since the ex post contractualist cannot distinguish between the aggregation in 
Gas and the aggregation in Jones, she should accept the risk imposition in Gas as 
permissible. She then cannot accept the principle of Equal Treatment for Equal 
Statistical Loss. This is bad news for the ex post contractualist for two reasons. First, 
she must reject the plausible claim that harms have the same disvalue regardless of 
how many other people will also be harmed. The risk that one person will be harmed 
will receive greater weight than the risk that any additional victim over and above 
the first victim will be harmed. Second, a version of ex post contractualism that 
accepts the risk imposition in Gas includes a bias against statistical lives, a charge ex 
post contractualists usually raise against their ex ante colleagues. In some cases, like 
Gas, a statistical life will not be saved even though an identified life would have been. 
This criticism against the ex ante view becomes less convincing, since the two theories 
differ only in the degree to which they are biased against statistical lives. 
 
IV. What We Owe … to Whom? 
 
 My discussion of the sequence has revealed two things: First, it has shown 
that two plausible principles that an ex post view would want to fulfill cannot be 
jointly fulfilled. Second, it has given us a better way of understanding ex ante and ex 
post views. We can understand these views as answering the question of whose 
complaints we should be concerned with as contractualists. Should we appeal to the 
complaints of identifiable individuals (epistemic ex ante)? Should we appeal to the 
complaints of rigidly designated individuals (objective ex ante)? Should we appeal to 
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the complaints of non-rigidly designated individuals (ex post)? In what follows I will 
argue in favor of objective ex ante contractualism. The concern with the complaints 
of rigidly designated individuals expresses the best model of acting in ways that are 
justifiable to each separate person. As I explained earlier, such a concern with rigidly 
designated individuals means that we should draw a distinction between cases 
involving epistemic and cases involving objective risk. In a second step, I argue that 
this is a virtue of objective ex ante contractualism since it illuminates the distinction 
between luckless and doomed victims. 
 
A. Justifiability to Each Separate Person 
 
The core idea of contractualism is that actions must be justifiable to each. 
Moreover, in order to respect the separateness of persons our actions must be 
justifiable to each as a separate person. This guiding idea, I argue, supports the view 
that our justification should address rigidly designated individuals rather than 
identifiable individuals or non-rigidly designated individuals. In other words, the 
basic idea of contractualism supports objective ex ante contractualism. 
Consider the difference between the following three statements made by the 
U.S. President after deciding on which option to take. The three statements mirror 
the three options for who the ideal addressee of justification is. In each scenario the 
President addresses a victim and tries to justify the imposition of the burden on her.20  
A: “To Charlotte Williams, born on the 1st of June 1975, resident of Santa 
Barbara, who is going to die from this measure, I can only say that I am deeply sorry 
but that your complaint against the measure was outweighed by other complaints. 
Even though it is hard to accept, I am convinced the measure is justifiable to you too.” 
B: “To the Californian with the genetic predisposition, whoever he or she may 
be, I hope that you hear me. I can only say that I am deeply sorry but that your 
 
20 I grant that this is the least plausible part of my dissertation and stretches the imagination 
of the reader. I invite the reader to imagine another President making these compassionate and 
carefully crafted words to make it more believable. 
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complaint against the measure was outweighed by other complaints. Even though it 
is hard to accept, I am convinced the measure is justifiable to you too.” 
C: “To the Californian who is going to die from the measure, whoever he or 
she turns out to be, I can only say that I am deeply sorry but that your complaint 
against the measure was outweighed by other complaints. Even though it is hard to 
accept, I am convinced the measure is justifiable to you too.” 
Should we believe that there is an important moral difference between 
justification A and justification B? Epistemic ex ante contractualists like Johann Frick 
believe that there ought to be. Frick, for example, holds that it makes a difference 
whether or not we can identify a given individual with a complaint. Should it be 
impossible or overly burdensome to identify which person is going to die from the 
proposed policy, then we ought to treat this as a case of many discounted complaints 
against killing.21 I disagree. Frick’s argument relies on an idea about what we can 
justify to each person. But this, I think, misrepresents the core idea of contractualism. 
Contractualism is about justifiability rather than actual justification. Justifiability is 
already an idealized concept. It requires us to take into account all effects of actions 
on everyone concerned and to take into account all complaints everyone may have. 
It also requires us to take into account complaints that no one in fact has or will raise. 
The ideal of justifiability is one of acting in accordance with principles that would 
sustain a hypothetical and ideal form of justification. Since we have already idealized, 
it is difficult to see why we should not idealize epistemic limitations as well. 
Therefore, I believe that we should think of A and B as equally good 
justifications. In both cases the President is justifying her behavior to the victim. Both 
speeches are meant for one person alone and address and justify the action to one 
person alone. The only difference is that speech A includes more detail that allows us 
to identify the individual. While identifiability is important for Frick, he does not 
discuss what is required to identify an individual. Taking a cue from Casper Hare, 
we can think of “identifying” an individual by knowing more personal information 
 
21 Frick, “Contractualism and Social Risk,” pp. 193-94. 
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about that particular person.22 We might then have identified a victim without 
knowing their name as long as we know enough distinctive personal information. 
But whether or not the President is able to include more detail in the description, such 
as name, birth date, place of residence or other identifying information, is morally 
irrelevant. We are not interested in token individuals because of names or other 
personal information such as appearance, tastes, or talents that allow us to identify 
them. This information is morally superfluous. We are interested in token individuals 
because of their particular situation and predicament. The description “the 
Californian with the genetic predisposition” conveys everything that is morally 
important. Objective ex ante contractualism bases its complaints only on morally 
relevant information about a person’s situation. This ensures that we do not confuse 
justifiability which is at the heart of contractualism with actual justification. 
Even more so, at times additional information that allows us to identify 
individuals can even distort our moral reasoning. Imagine a doctor who has to decide 
on which treatment to administer to two unconscious patients, Deborah and Eric.23 
Out of expediency the doctor has to administer the same treatment for both, even 
though they have two different diseases, X and Y. On the one hand, the doctor can 
think of the prospects that Deborah and Eric have. Without any further information 
the doctor would assign a 50-50 probability that Deborah has either of the two 
diseases. (And the same for Eric.) The trade-off between the two diseases will then be 
regarded as an intra-personal trade-off where Deborah’s and Eric’s interests are the 
same. On the other hand, the doctor could think of the interests of “the patient with 
disease X” and “the patient with disease Y”. In this way she would regard the trade-
off as inter-personal. This way of regarding the case is superior. The doctor knows 
that she is dealing with an inter-personal trade-off, she knows that the interests of her 
two patients are not aligned. Doing one act will harm one and benefit the other. The 
doctor should not deceive herself into thinking that this is a choice without a conflict 
of interests. 
 
22 Caspar Hare, “Should We Wish Well to All?,” Philosophical Review 125 (2016): 451-72, at pp. 
467-71. 
23 The case is a variation of one by Anna Mahtani (“The Ex Ante Pareto Principle,” The Journal 
of Philosophy 114 (2017): 303-23, at pp. 310-11.) Mahtani credits Caspar Hare as her inspiration. 
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Rather than between A and B, we ought to hold that there is an important 
difference between B and C. While the contrast between A and B has shown the 
importance of justifiability as opposed to actual justification, the contrast between B 
and C shows the importance that justifications have to be addressed to separate 
persons. In statements B (and A), the President addresses and talks to one person 
alone, while in C the President does not address any specific person. At the time of 
the President’s address, the words are not addressed to one individual alone. The 
first two speeches constitute a private channel of communication between the 
President and the victim. The communication and the justification are one-to-one. If 
what the President says is correct, then she would have succeeded in justifying her 
action to this person. 
In the third speech, however, the words cannot address only one person. The 
justification cannot be private or one-to-one in the same sense. At best the President 
will have addressed a person once the policy is applied, but this does not make it the 
case that the President did address this person prior to the action or when acting.24 It 
is thus difficult to see how the justification in C conforms to the contractualist ideal 
of justifying one’s action to each. Justification is owed to each separate person. But 
the discourse in C does not address persons separately. The appeal of a justification 
like C stems from the way we assimilate this thought with justifications given along 
 
24 The formulation here implies a rejection of the view that future contingents already have 
truth-values. But my argument is not restricted to this metaphysical view. Some philosophers 
believe that future contingents already have truth-values and that this view is compatible with 
indeterminism (see Nuel Belnap and Mitchell Green, “Indeterminism and the Thin Red Line,” 
Philosophical Perspectives 8 (1994): 365-88; or David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 206-9). If this is true, then it is the case that the President’s 
justification does actually address one individual even though the identity depends on the 
objectively risky event. However, this only holds if the President actually acts this way. Should 
the President decide not to act this way, we have to assess a counterfactual rather than a future 
contingent. Under most standard views of counterfactuals these counterfactuals will be open 
counterfactuals without a truth-value (see Caspar Hare, “Obligations to Merely Statistical 
People,” The Journal of Philosophy 109 (2012): 378-90, at pp. 380-82). This means that the model 
of justifiability used in C and whether it addresses a person will depend on what the decision-
maker ends up doing. But this puts the cart before the horse. An action should not be more or 
less justifiable based on what the agent actually does. The fact that alternative actions will be 
open counterfactuals also means that the model of justification used in C cannot be applied to 
help decide between different alternatives, since all but one of the alternatives include an open 
counterfactual.  
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the lines of my proposed speech B. In these cases the “someone” refers to a given 
individual. But this is not the case in C. In C, the justification addresses a compound 
of different individuals across different possible worlds.25 
We can see this even more clearly when we consider cases where the 
complaint of “the Californian who is going to die” outweighs the complaint of a 
rigidly designated individual, such as Bob Johnson. Bob Johnson could rightly ask 
who the person is that can reasonably reject the proposal that would get him off the 
hook. It cannot be that we determine the identity of said person only after the fact. 
Even more so, ex post contractualism makes it impossible for us to know or determine 
who that person would be. It would be morally impermissible to perform the actions 
which uniquely could determine the identity of this person. It will never be 
determined who the person was for whose sake we sacrificed Bob Johnson’s leg. 
Indeed, there is a compelling justification for imposing risks in cases like 
Wheel even though we know one person will be harmed. Note that no individual 
victim in cases like Wheel would have been permitted to save herself over Bob 
Johnson. She was facing only a small risk of death, a risk small enough that she would 
have been required to bear this risk. We can give the following powerful reason to 
the victim: You were not allowed to save yourself even accounting for your partiality 
towards yourself. So, you cannot complain to a third party that was not allowed to 
be partial towards you, that she did not save you.26 
The fact that speech C, and thereby the model of justifiability ex post 
contractualism employs, fails to address a particular person can also be seen clearly 
in a different context. By carrying the logic of speech C forward ex post 
contractualism makes the permissibility of risk impositions dependent on mere 
population size. For this see the following case: 
Water (County Level). There is a toxic pollutant in the groundwater all over 
California. The pollutant will lead to every Californian losing the small 
finger of the right hand if nothing is done. Scientists have developed a 
chemical that will neutralize the pollutant. However, the chemical is still 
 
25 See also Frick, “Contractualism and Social Risk,” pp. 196. 
26 See also Voorhoeve, “How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims?,” p. 74. 
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in development and thus risky. The scientists have reduced the risk of 
death considerably to only 1 in 40 million. The risks are objective and 
probabilistically independent for each Californian. While the pollutant 
affects the groundwater of all of California, the water systems are 
separate for each county. Each local authority has to make the decision. 
Let us take as an example Santa Barbara County which has only about 450,000 
residents in contrast to the 40 million residents of California as a whole. The objective 
risk for each individual to die is still 1 in 40 million. But while the likelihood of at 
least one person dying is significant across California, the likelihood of at least one 
person dying in Santa Barbara County is now lower. The probability is only slightly 
over 1 percent. Perhaps discounting the harm of death by 99 percent makes the harm 
less grave than the loss of the finger. (If you do not believe the harm is discounted 
enough, just reduce the population size further.) If this is the case, then ex post 
contractualism allows releasing the chemical for Santa Barbara County. If all the other 
counties are of a similar or smaller size than Santa Barbara, the risk imposition would 
be permissible there too.27 
This leads to an absurd conclusion. Ex post contractualism needs to hold the 
following. If the government of California were to decide, releasing the chemical 
would be impermissible in the contractualist sense; it would not be justifiable to each. 
If each local government were to decide, releasing the chemical would be permissible 
in each case. It would be justifiable to each. Even though every single person is 
affected in the very same manner, the policy would turn out to be unjustifiable to one 
of them if the decision was taken at a different level. Ex post contractualism somehow 
generates a person with a complaint from a group of persons without a complaint. 
The absurdity is even clearer if we accept that unjustifiable risk impositions are 
wronging an individual.28 While none of the county governments would be wronging 
 
27 Some counties of California are comparably large, e.g. Los Angeles County with over 10 
million people. We can imagine that in those counties more local authorities have to make the 
decision. 
28 See e.g. John Oberdiek, Imposing Risk (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 126-53. 
Frances Kamm has argued for the more radical claim that Scanlon’s account for wrongness 
should generally be understood as an account of wronging (Kamm, Intricate Ethics, pp. 461-
68).  
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an individual if they released the chemical, the Californian government would be 
wronging an individual. But who would be wronged? This reveals that ex post 
contractualism fails to give us a model of acting in ways that are justifiable to separate 
persons. 
 
B. The Luckless and the Doomed 
 
Objective ex ante contractualism draws a distinction between cases like Dust 
in which the risk imposition is epistemic and cases like Wheel in which the risk 
imposition is objective. This is because in cases of epistemic risk, like Dust, we can 
identify a rigidly designated individual who is certain to be harmed while in cases of 
objective risk, like Wheel, we cannot. This distinction may seem suspect and none of 
the other authors writing on contractualism has considered it relevant.29 However, 
far from being a defect of the view, I believe that distinguishing between 
epistemically risky cases and objectively risky cases is a virtue of the view. The reason 
is that the distinction tracks another distinction about the moral relevance of luckless 
and doomed victims. In epistemically risky cases like Dust there is going to be one 
doomed victim while in objectively risky cases like Wheel there is going to be one 
luckless victim. While the effect on both is the same, we can see that there is a 
significant difference between having doomed a person who ends up dying and 
having given that person a very favorable chance of survival. 
John Broome in his discussion of fairness makes the following remark about 
persons who lose out in the allocation of a scarce good.30 Whoever loses out has 
grounds for complaint. But the person would have an even bigger ground for 
complaint if it was never even on the cards for her to have received the good. We 
cannot justify our allocation to this person by saying that we gave her a fair shot at 
receiving the good. Losing out for this person is not “tough luck” but, worse, an 
inevitable feature of our decision. The fact that she may have won, that it once was 
on the cards for her to win, mitigates her complaint against missing out. In short, after 
 
29 Indeed, Frick argues against its relevance in “Contractualism and Social Risk,” pp. 197-201. 
30 John Broome, “Fairness,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91 (1991): 87-102, at p. 98. 
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the allocation a luckless loser has a less strong complaint than someone who has been 
doomed to lose. The lottery example shows how the kind of risk that is at play in 
allocating the good matters for the complaints that individuals can raise. In a lottery 
that employs epistemic risks, it was never on the cards for anyone other than the 
winner to win. In an objectively risky lottery this is not the case. Every person stood 
a chance of getting the good. The lottery is fair because it is the “luck of the draw” 
that decides who gets it.31 Objectively risky lotteries are such that we can say to the 
person that she could have received the good. We designed the lottery such that it 
could have easily gone the other way and she may have won.32 
These points about fairness in allocating goods are not limited to the 
allocation of benefits. They should also apply to the allocation of burdens or harms. 
Common examples to illustrate lottery fairness include such cases. The Draft lottery 
to select soldiers for the Vietnam war is a paradigm example. The cases I have 
discussed are similar. In all cases harms are avoidable only at the expense of a moral 
catastrophe. We have to decide about the allocation of harm. This means that we can 
say to those who are luckless that they could have avoided the harm whereas those 
who would have been doomed would not have had any such chance. It is a virtue of 
objective ex ante contractualism that it can distinguish in this manner between 
luckless and doomed victims. 
While the previous considerations on fairness illustrate the importance of the 
distinction between luckless and doomed in giving reasons after the risk materializes, 
there are also reasons to care about the distinction before the action. Consider the 
 
31 This idea is even invoked by critics who account for lottery fairness in a different manner. 
George Sher and Michael Otsuka gives accounts of lottery fairness of merely epistemic 
lotteries since both doubt that lotteries with objective risks exist. Sher mentions the “luck of 
the draw” interpretation as the most obvious rationale for lottery fairness which is incomplete 
because it cannot account for the fairness of lotteries that do not employ objective risks. 
Otsuka argues that objectively risky lotteries would be fairer than epistemically risky lotteries, 
if it was possible to run them. George Sher, “What Makes a Lottery Fair?,” Noûs 14 (1980): 203-
16, at pp. 203-4; and Michael Otsuka, “Determinism and the Value and Fairness of Equal 
Chances,” (unpublished manuscript). 
32 I owe this point to Kai Spiekermann. He explores this idea in connection to lottery fairness 
and social risk in Kai Spiekermann, “Good Reasons for Losers: Lottery Fairness and Social 
Risk,” (unpublished manuscript). 
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following case narrated by Anatol Rapoport.33 In the Second World War an allied air 
base in the South Pacific faced the problem that most of their planes did not survive 
their allocated missions. The chance of survival was only one in four. An alternative 
but rejected policy would have increased the chances of survival. Only half of the 
planes would fly missions with increased bomb load. The increased load would mean 
that less fuel would be available and the pilots could not return to safety and would 
crash. Instead of giving everyone a chance of one in four, the policy would fate half 
the pilots to certain death. The repulsion against and failure to adopt the policy is best 
explained by an objection against dooming individuals to death.34 
However, the difference between doomed and luckless victims goes beyond 
cases where the victims know their fate. Assume a small variation of this case where, 
in order to ensure compliance, after the selection by lot all pilots are boarding a plane. 
The commanders in turn do not know which planes are loaded and which carry 
empty loads. Pilots who fly an empty plane have orders to return to a different base 
when they realize their empty load at the first target. At the decision to order the 
pilots to fly, every pilot faces an epistemic risk of death of 50 percent. This variation 
is no less objectionable than the initial plan. By distinguishing between doomed and 
luckless victims, objective ex ante contractualism can account for this. The doomed 
pilots are certain to die whereas under the ordinary protocol all pilots face a three 
quarter objective risk of death. By contrast, epistemic ex ante contractualism may 
justify the order to fly given that it reduces the epistemic risk each pilot faces. Ex post 
contractualism in turn would justify the order to fly given that it reduces the number 
of expected lives lost. Only objective ex ante contractualism can account for the 
answer which is both the actual decision at the base and the intuitively correct one. 
One might object to my analysis of the case of the pilots. Assuming that the 
selection by lot is random, every pilot would have faced a 50 percent objective risk of 
death under the alternative policy as opposed to a 75 percent objective risk of death 
 
33 Anatol Rapoport, Strategy and Conscience (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 88-90. 
Rapoport presents this case as a real-life case but could not vouch for its authenticity. 
34 Jonathan Glover reports that the horror of certain death motivates the refusal to accept the 
policy of one-way missions in Rapoport’s example. Jonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving 
Lives (London: Penguin Books, 1977), pp. 212-13. 
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under the standard policy. However, it is not accurate to draw the conclusion that 
objective ex ante contractualism would therefore endorse the alternative policy. The 
problem here is similar to the problem of medical experimentation discussed by 
Frick. In the example of medical experimentation there is an ex ante selection of 
persons to be experimented upon. At the stage of selection the policy of 
experimenting is beneficial to all, but after the selection is made, severe hardship is 
imposed on some. Objective ex ante contractualism can avail itself to the same reply 
as epistemic ex ante contractualism and adopt what Frick calls the Decomposition 
Test.35 The Decomposition Test imposes a requirement to always act, in each action, 
in ways that are justifiable to each. The policy of selecting people at random first and 
then imposing severe hardships on them does not meet this test. This holds for the 
case of medical experimentation as well as for the case of the pilots. When sending 
out the pilots to fly, some pilots are doomed to certain deaths. Objective ex ante 
contractualism prohibits this.36 
Our objection to dooming the pilots to certain death are linked with our 
intuitions about risk concentration and risk dispersal. Take, for example, our reaction 
to a now debunked story about the Coventry Blitz, the horrendous bombing raid of 
Nazi aircrafts on the city of Coventry. According to the story Churchill knew about 
the impeding devastating attack on Coventry and could have averted it. In order to 
not reveal military intelligence, Churchill sacrificed Coventry for the sake of the 
overall war effort and reducing the overall death toll. When the story was published 
it was perceived as a grave accusation and moral flaw for Churchill to have acted this 
 
35 Frick, “Contractualism and Social Risk,” pp. 201-12. 
36 Nir Eyal has suggested that what is problematic with Rapoport’s case is not that the pilots 
are doomed, but rather that they are doomed by their commanders. The commanders, as 
opposed to enemy fire, would be killing the pilots by adopting the policy. See Nir Eyal, 
“Concentrated Risk, the Coventry Blitz, Chamberlain’s Cancer,” in Cohen, Daniels, and Eyal, 
Identified versus Statistical Lives, pp. 94-109, at pp. 105-7. However, I believe that this part of 
the story is not central. My reaction would not change if some of the planes had insufficient 
fuel due to sabotage and the commanders had the choice of aborting the mission and calling 
the planes back. (Imagine that bombs are loaded automatically according to overall weight.) 
The commanders would still doom some pilots to certain death, even if the pilot would not 
be killed by the commanders. 
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way.37 Distinguishing between doomed victims in Coventry and unlucky victims 
elsewhere in the United Kingdom can explain why. Rapoport’s pilot case as well as 
the Coventry Blitz reveal that our intuitions about concentrating and dispersing risks 
are sensitive to what kind of risk we are talking about. The plan to fly one-way 
missions disperses and reduces epistemic risks, but this does not make the plan very 
appealing given that objective risks are concentrated. There is little point in 
dispersing epistemic risks if we knew that it is already carved in stone who will die. 
However, dispersing objective risks is a genuine sense in which burdens are shared 
and additional burdens are spread more widely. 
Thus far I argued that part of the reason why the distinction between objective 
and epistemic risks is meaningful is because it can explain the moral difference 
between luckless and doomed victims. This allows me to respond to one concern 
about my view. Imagine a vaccine that we know carries a certain small risk of serious 
harm. Whether or not the foreseen harms of mass vaccination are a reason against the 
mass vaccination will depend, on my view, on the specific mechanism by which the 
risk manifests itself. If the mechanism is a random mutation, then it is a small 
objective risk whereas if the mechanism relies on genetic predispositions, then it is a 
small epistemic risk but a large objective risk. Why should this mechanism matter? 
In response: The mechanism matters because in the case of the random mutation the 
harmed victim is luckless whereas in the case of the genetic predisposition we would 
doom the victim to be harmed. As I have argued, there is an important moral 
difference between luckless and doomed and this moral difference makes the 
otherwise uninteresting seeming difference in the biological mechanism of the 
vaccine relevant. While often we do not know with certainty what mechanism 
applies, we often have information whether our applied case is more like the case of 
random mutations or more like the case of genetic predispositions. This, I believe, 
rightly influences how we ought to act in the case. 
The distinction between objective and epistemic risks is also important for 
another reason. It can illuminate the importance of hypothetical consent. An 
 
37 See Eyal, “Concentrated Risk, the Coventry Blitz, Chamberlain’s Cancer,” pp. 94-95. Eyal 
seeks to vindicate Churchill’s imagined reasoning. 
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important and familiar reason for rejecting ex post contractualism is that it makes 
actions impermissible even if these actions would receive the hypothetical consent by 
all affected parties. For each individual it is sometimes rational to take small risks of 
death for moderate gains. For example, it would be rational to take a vaccine against 
a disease that is not life-threatening even if there is a risk of a lethal allergic reaction. 
If such risks are imposed on a large scale, then we can be virtually certain that some 
person will die from the risk. Not only are these risk impositions intuitively 
permissible, but we can give a strong argument in favor of them. Frick has called this 
the Argument from the Single Person Case.38 If the risk imposition were to affect only 
a single person, it would be permissible. In such a case it seems reasonable that we 
should do what is in that person’s rational self-interest. Now in a second step, we 
learn that there is a second person in an identical position from the original person. 
The risky treatment is available at no additional cost for that person too. The case is 
still relevantly similar to deciding for one person. It does not involve any competing 
claims. We can add more and more people. Individually, we would always favor 
giving them the treatment. Yet ex post contractualism needs to hold that for a 
sufficiently large group the risk imposition becomes impermissible. 
Is there anything the ex post contractualist could say to reject the Argument 
from the Single Person Case? The best response seems to be the following. The 
hypothetical consent that each person would give is vitiated because they are 
imperfectly informed.39 If we knew that a person would only consent because she is 
insufficiently informed, it is less plausible to assign moral weight to this hypothetical 
consent. Imagine that you are a guardian charged with that person’s interest. If you 
were fully informed and knew that the risk imposition is in that person’s interest only 
because of imperfect information, you would not assign moral importance to that fact 
about self-interest. A close variation of this case is a case where you are in charge of 
various person’s interests. You may not know which person is going to lose out, but 
 
38 Frick, “Uncertainty and Justifiability to Each Person,” pp. 133-34; and Frick, 
“Contractualism and Social Risk,” pp. 186-88. Similar arguments are made by Tom Dougherty 
(“Aggregation, Beneficence and Chance,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (2013): 1-19, 
at pp. 8-11) and Caspar Hare (“Should We Wish Well to All?,” pp. 455-67). 
39 Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve raise this criticism. See Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve, “Decide As 
You Would With Full Information!”. 
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you still know the related fact that one of the persons whose interests you look after 
is going to lose out. As a fully informed guardian you would therefore object to the 
action. In epistemically risky cases like the vaccine case this is the case. Somewhere 
in the chain there is a person for whom it is not in their fully informed self-interest 
that the risk will be imposed. The chain of single person cases is no longer fully 
symmetrical under conditions of full information. Since we can anticipate this 
already, we have grounds to object to the risk imposition. 
The reply to the Argument from the Single Person Case helps us refine the 
importance of hypothetical consent. Unlike actual consent, we have no reason to give 
moral significance to hypothetical consent that arises due to imperfect information. 
Yet this challenge does not impede giving significance to hypothetical consent which 
is not tainted in this manner. This is the case for objectively risky cases. Remember 
the Water case I introduced earlier. In Water every Californian faces the same problem 
for deliberation. Either they will lose their small finger or they incur a minute risk of 
death. The risk at stake here may be in the neighborhood of many risks that the 
Californians voluntarily incur on a regular basis for small benefits. The gamble is in 
the self-interest of each Californian; each would hypothetically consent. In this case 
the response that hypothetical consent arises only out of imperfect information has 
no bite. Even if all Californians knew all relevant facts about themselves, it would 
nonetheless be in their self-interest to take the gamble. The Argument from the Single 
Person Case stands. Distinguishing between objective and epistemic risks helps us 
understand that the Argument from the Single Person Case is compelling in some 
cases while unconvincing in others. By distinguishing between these cases, objective 
ex ante contractualism retains what is attractive in the Argument from the Single 
Person Case while avoiding the charge that hypothetical consent is vitiated due to 
imperfect information. In the revised case all risk impositions are independent from 
one another. There is no conflict over the resource that gives everyone a favorable 
prospect for their lives. Since there is no connection between the risks, there is no 
reason why it should not be permissible to impose all of them at once. Consequently, 
objective ex ante allows imposing all risks at once. 
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V. Objections 
 
I will consider three main lines of objection to my version of ex ante 
contractualism that discounts objective rather than epistemic risk. The first line of 
objection stems from the possibility that determinism is true. The second line of 
objection raises objections to the ex ante Pareto principle. The third line of objection 
criticizes an identified victim bias in my position. 
 
A. Determinism 
 
My view distinguishes between objective risks and epistemic risks. There is a 
worry that even if this distinction would be of moral importance, it is irrelevant in 
the real world. If determinism is true, the worry goes, then there is no such thing as 
objective risk. There might be actually observed frequencies but no objective risk in a 
robust sense that could be morally relevant. The view that the truth of determinism 
implies the absence of objective chances was once taken as the orthodox view in the 
philosophy of probability. Recently, however, there has emerged a growing literature 
in the philosophy of probability that argues that objective chance or objective 
probability is compatible with determinism.40 
 
40 See Barry Loewer, “Determinism and Chance,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern 
Physics 32 (2001): 609-20; Carl Hoefer, “The Third Way on Objective Probability: A Sceptic’s 
Guide to Objective Chance,” Mind 116 (2007): 549-96; Luke Glynn, “Deterministic Chance,” 
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (2010): 51-80; Antony Eagle, “Deterministic 
Chance,” Noûs 45 (2011): 269-99; Michael Strevens, “Probability out of Determinism,” in 
Probabilities in Physics, ed. Claus Beisbart and Stephan Hartmann (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), pp. 339-64; Nina Emery, “Chance, Possibility, and Explanation,” British Journal 
for the Philosophy of Science 66 (2015): 95-120; Roman Frigg and Carl Hoefer, “The Best Humean 
System for Statistical Mechanics,” Erkenntnis 80 (2015): 551-74; Christian List and Marcus 
Pivato, “Emergent Chance,” Philosophical Review 124 (2015): 119-52. There is a subtle difference 
in the literature between objective chance and objective probability. Some philosophers have 
argued that while there might be objective probabilities, these probabilities do not express the 
true randomness that is associated with chance (see Aidan Lyon, “Deterministic probability: 
neither chance nor credence,” Synthese 182 (2011): 413-32; Strevens sets this issue aside without 
taking a stand, see Strevens, “Probability out of Determinism"). Since these probabilities are 
nonetheless objective and features of the world, my arguments may still apply to this type of 
objective risk. 
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A first reason to think that the objective probabilities are compatible with 
determinism stems from the existence of probabilistic laws in science. To give some 
examples, classical statistical mechanics, evolutionary theory, Mendelian genetics, 
meteorology and the social sciences all include probabilistic laws. In fact, it appears 
that deterministic laws are largely confined to just one branch of science, namely the 
physical sciences. The probabilities posited by the laws of the special sciences, 
including parts of the physical sciences like classical statistical mechanics, do not 
appear to be epistemic. For example, the process of ice cubes melting when being put 
in water is a probabilistic process according to classical statistical mechanics. It 
appears that classical statistical mechanics can, by virtue of this probabilistic law, 
explain why the ice cube is melting. Indeed, if we believe that special sciences above 
the micro-physical level are able to explain phenomena, then they explain these 
phenomena by reference to probabilistic laws. This makes it difficult to conceive of 
such laws as being concerned with epistemic probabilities. The laws of classical 
statistical mechanics cannot both incorporate our ignorance about deterministic 
processes and at the same time explain why ice cubes are melting or why the climate 
system is changing. Our ignorance cannot explain. 
So how can we accommodate the fact that laws of the special sciences posit 
objective chances with the idea that the universe is deterministic at the micro-physical 
level? One rationale for the compatibility of objective chance and determinism at the 
micro-physical level is that the descriptions of “chance” and “determinism” are level-
specific.41 It is imprecise to talk about whether or not the world is deterministic. The 
real question is whether the world is deterministic or not at a specific level. A helpful 
test to see whether or not the world is deterministic at a given level is to ask whether 
knowing the entire history of the world described at that level determines a future 
event. Those who argue that the world is deterministic at the micro-physical level 
mean to say the following: If we knew all the laws of nature as well as the initial 
conditions of the universe described in micro-physical language, then the only 
chances of an event happening are zero or one. But this does not say anything about 
whether or not the world is deterministic at some macro-level. It does not follow that, 
 
41 Glynn, “Deterministic Chance”; List and Pivato, “Emergent Chance”. 
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at the macro-level, the history of the world already determines the event. In other 
words, determinism at the micro-physical level can coexist with indeterminism at 
some macro-level. This way macro-level events like melting ice cubes or coin tosses 
will have their own macro-level chances. 
For the purposes of moral theorizing, we are predominantly concerned with 
the agential level, the level at which we describe agents and their actions. The agential 
level is the appropriate level for the moral decision-making of agents. What would 
rule out the possibility of objective chances in the relevant sense is, therefore, not 
determinism at the micro-physical level but rather determinism at the agential level. Yet 
there is no reason to think that our world is deterministic at the agential level. To the 
contrary, all indications of our best available (social) science at the agential level tell 
us that the world is indeterministic at the agential level. Even if we knew the entire 
history of the universe described at the level of agents and macro-objects like coins 
together with all laws of human behavior, we would not be able to predict, say, the 
outcome of the next Presidential election. Arguments for determinism rely on 
information about micro-physical particles and their properties, something that is 
inadmissible when thinking about whether the world is deterministic at a higher 
level. The level-specific approach to determinism and chance retains the ability to 
draw a distinction between objective chance and epistemic credence at each level of 
description.42 Imagine an agent is about to toss a fair coin. The odds of the coin 
landing heads are 0.5. These are objective chances since the prior history of the world, 
at the level of coin tosses, does not determine this event. After the coin toss the agent 
is covering the coin and asks again what the odds are of the coin having landed heads. 
The answer would seem to be 0.5. But this statement about probabilities is clearly 
different from the earlier one. The second odds are credences, the first are chances. 
Thus, the level-specific view can retain the distinction between chances and credences 
at every level. This distinction in turn means that while agents can create objective 
chances, they can also create merely epistemic risks. A lottery based on whose 
birthday is earliest in the year would create epistemic risks if the birthdays of 
participants are unknown, but it would not create objective risks for the participants. 
 
42 See List and Pivato, “Emergent Chance,” pp. 139-42. 
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We can see the point of the level-specific view in another way. Consider again 
the coin flip. Assume that we hold all other factors constant except for the force 
exerted on the coin. The following conditionals might all be true: 
“If I flip the coin with a force between 0.18345 and 0.18348 N, it will land 
heads.” 
“If I flip the coin with a force between 0.18349 and 0.18352 N, it will land tails.” 
“If I flip the coin with a force between 0.18353 and 0.18356 N, it will land 
heads.” 
And so on. But what about the conditional “If I flip the coin, it will land 
heads”? Or the conditional “If I flip the coin, it will land tails”? The antecedents of 
these conditionals are underspecified. They do not tell us with which force the coin 
is flipped and the deterministic laws of physics tell us that small changes in the force 
applied to the coin lead to different outcomes. The antecedents of the underspecified 
conditionals describe a set of possible worlds. In this set there are some possible 
worlds where the coin lands heads and some possible worlds where the coin lands 
tails. What we can give for the underspecified conditional is a probability of how 
many worlds are head-landing worlds.43 The fact that this probability is not merely 
epistemic can be seen if we consider the case in which the conditional is a 
counterfactual conditional. Processes like this coin flip are counterfactually open. No 
head-landing world is relevantly more similar to our actual world than any tail-
landing world. Since the process is counterfactually open, there will not be a fact of 
the matter about what would have happened had we flipped the coin. There would 
only be a counterfactual probability. Since there is no fact of the matter what would 
have happened, this probability cannot be interpreted to refer to our ignorance about 
what would have happened. 
Now why should we be interested in underspecified conditionals as opposed 
to fully specified conditionals? After all, in a conditional that is specified at the micro-
physical level there are no non-trivial probabilities, if we assume determinism at the 
 
43 See also Caspar Hare, “Obligation and Regret When There is No Fact of the Matter About 
What Would Have Happened if You Had not Done What You Did,” Noûs 45 (2011): 190-206, 
at pp. 190-94; and Hare, “Obligations to Merely Statistical People,” pp. 380-82. 
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micro-physical level. The reason is the link between contractualism and evidence-
based criteria of rightness. Risk impositions are only an issue for contractualism if it 
is interpreted as an evidence-based criterion of rightness. Interpreted as a fact-based 
criterion of rightness, a risk imposition would be wrong if and only if it leads to 
eventual harm. But a fact-based criterion is unhelpful in guiding the choices of agents. 
Evidence-based criteria, on the other side, link moral permissibility to a choice an 
agent can make. They capture morality as answering deliberative questions for 
agents. The actions that contractualism is concerned with are therefore those that are 
in the choice set of an agent.44 As agents, we are unable to choose the option “flip the 
coin with a force between 0.18345 and 0.18348 N”. This is simply not an option 
available to us. The option that is available to us is an option at the agential level, 
namely “flip the coin”. This gives us an argument for specifying conditionals at the 
agential level. The agential level captures the options that are available, open to the 
agent whereas a micro-physical level does not. 
The argument for the compatibility of lower-level determinism and objective 
chances has another upshot. A perennial challenge to ex post contractualism is that it 
prohibits many intuitively permissible forms of risk imposition where small risks are 
imposed on large populations. It would seem that traffic victims have reason to reject 
principles that allow higher speed limits. Major construction works would be 
impermissible to be built because of the risk of harm to workers. Air traffic may be 
difficult to be justified because it leads to harms to bystanders. The list goes on.45 What 
these divergent risks all have in common is that they appear random in a relevant 
sense. They contrast with, for example, the risk of a lethal allergic reaction of an 
individual. Such an individual’s death may have been difficult to prevent, but it is 
not random in the same sense. The aforementioned examples all appear random 
because none of these events is determined by the previous history of the world at 
the agential level. The event “person is killed in car accident” is not already 
 
44 T.M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions (Cambridge, MA.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2008), pp. 56-62. This also explains how this argument succeeds if we understand 
contractualism as a decision procedure for risky cases. 
45 See Alastair Norcross, “Comparing Harms: Headaches and Human Lives,” Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 26 (1997): 135-67, at pp. 159-67; Ashford, “The Demandingness of Scanlon’s 
Contractualism,” pp. 298-99; James, “Contractualism’s (Not So) Slippery Slope,” pp. 268-72. 
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determined by the past history of the world. At most a description of the event in 
micro-physical language is determined. This means that at the agential level, the level 
which counts, all the familiar examples are objectively risky. Therefore, objective ex 
ante contractualism can appealingly explain why it is permissible to impose such 
risks. 
 
B. Ex Ante Pareto 
 
Let me turn to the ex ante Pareto principle. Ex ante Pareto says that if one 
alternative has a higher expected utility than all other alternatives for all individuals 
concerned, then it ought to be chosen. While the principle has great intuitive appeal, 
it has recently come under criticism.46 Note that my version of ex ante contractualism 
differs in two relevant respects from ex ante Pareto. First, the Pareto principle only 
takes well-being into consideration, while the grounds for reasonable rejection need 
not be restricted to well-being. Importantly, we should think that different ways of 
conferring benefits or imposing harms are relevantly different even if they lead to the 
same outcome in terms of well-being.47 Second, the ex ante Pareto principle is often 
associated with epistemic risks. Some putative counterexamples to ex ante Pareto 
therefore do not apply to my objective version of ex ante contractualism.48 
 
46 For example, Matthew D. Adler, “The Puzzle of “Ex Ante Efficiency”: Does Rational 
Approvability Have Moral Weight?,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 151 (2003): 1255-
90, and Well-Being and Fair Distribution, pp. 496-518; Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve, “Decide As 
You Would With Full Information!”; and Mahtani, “The Ex-Ante Pareto Principle”. 
47 Scanlon, for example, mentions generic reasons of fairness as an example of a ground of 
reasonable rejection that is not based on well-being. Scanlon’s discussion of the relation 
between contractualism and well-being and his rejection of “welfarist contractualism” is also 
instructive (Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, pp. 206-18). 
48 This includes the mammogram case by Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve who argue that we have 
broadly contractualist reasons to favor preventive screening since it benefits those who would 
be worse off otherwise (a group that is already determined). Also, Fleurbaey’s and 
Voorhoeve’s objection that ex ante Pareto can violate the guidance given by a fully informed 
decision-maker depends on an epistemic interpretation of the risk. If the risk is objective, then 
a fully informed decision-maker would not know which outcome will come about. See 
Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve, “Decide As You Would With Full Information!”. Similarly, 
interesting questions about the incompleteness of ex ante Pareto only arise under an epistemic 
interpretation (See Mathani, “The Ex-Ante Pareto Principle”). 
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A main source of worry is that ex ante Pareto (and thus, it is held, ex ante 
contractualism) admits of large inequality ex post. This is seen most clearly in cases 
where risks are inversely correlated, we can even be certain that this ex post 
inequality will arise. However, ex ante contractualism has some resources to alleviate 
this worry. We should first remind ourselves that complaints are not based 
exclusively on well-being. The manner in which benefits and harms are distributed 
matters as well. For example, it seems plausible to say that we have a stronger moral 
complaint against being harmed intentionally than against the same level of harm 
when imposed as a merely foreseen side effect. In inversely correlated risks it seems 
plausible that there is another special causal mechanism at play. The gains to the 
winner are the causal flipside of the losses of the loser. In other words, the winner 
gains at the expense of the loser. This peculiar way in which gains and losses are 
intertwined gives rise to an additional moral complaint.49 
For each of the two individuals involved in the inversely correlated case it is 
true that they are subject to a 50 percent chance of losing out by someone gaining at 
their expense. That moral complaint can be articulated by either of the two people 
involved even before the risk is imposed. We do not need to appeal to the eventual 
outcome distribution to make this complaint. We do not have to talk about the 
complaint of “the loser” but can simply appeal to the complaint against the 
imposition of a risk that someone gains at another’s expense. Thus, in contrast to ex 
post contractualism, my argument does not imply that cases of inversely correlated 
risk can be seen as equivalent to inter-personal cases involving certainty. 
In cases where the gain in expected utility is modest, this could give us 
decisive reason not to impose the inversely correlated risk. On the other hand, my 
reasoning cannot support a preference for the non-risky option when the gain in 
expected utility is sufficiently great. Yet the ex post model of transforming the risky 
case into a certain outcome distribution would still counsel for the non-risky option 
in these cases, provided that the secure option has a higher level of utility than the 
 
49 I owe this idea to Thomas Rowe. For further defense see Thomas Rowe, “Risk and the 
Unfairness of Some Being Better Off at the Expense of Others,” Journal of Ethics and Social 
Philosophy 16 (2019): 44-66. 
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worse outcome of the risky option. But this preference does not seem justified. Both 
persons gain something from the inversely correlated risks, namely the prospect of a 
better life. We should give due weight to this consideration.50 
 
C. Identified Victim Bias 
 
The third objection arises from the discussion concerning identified and 
statistical lives. Ex ante contractualism generally favors a bias towards identified lives 
and has received criticism for giving too strong an endorsement to saving identified 
lives over statistical lives. Whilst this observation is broadly correct, the relationship 
between my version of ex ante contractualism and the problem of identified and 
statistical lives is more complex. Objective ex ante contractualism does not place any 
emphasis on the victim being identified. Rather, what is relevant is whether the 
victim is already determined. In a case like Dust, we do not have a way to identify 
the victim but, given that we have a rigid designator for the victim, we should favor 
her. 
Indeed, my proposal can at times account for saving a statistical life rather 
than an identified life. For this, see a simplified version of a case by Caspar Hare.51 
You have two options, either you head North or you head South. If you head North, 
you will save one person for certain. If you head South, you can flip an 
indeterministic coin. If it lands heads, you will save another person. If it lands tails, 
you will save yet another person. The two potential Southern victims can complain 
that if you head North they will die. You deprived them of a 50 percent chance to 
live. They can also complain that you would allocate chances to live more unequally 
if you were to head North. The potential Northern victim can complain that heading 
South you deprived her of a 100 percent chance to live. The Northern victim cannot 
 
50 Ex post contractualists would reverse their opinion once the complaints against the safe 
option and the worst case scenario are close enough to be aggregated. The risky option will 
have more aggregate well-being and presumably be preferred in spite of the complaint against 
gaining at the expense of someone. However, it seems more plausible that our judgment 
should be reversed to favor a risky option not because of the aggregate well-being but rather 
because both individuals receive a valuable chance of a better life. 
51 Hare, “Obligations to Merely Statistical People,” pp. 382, 385. 
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raise an additional complaint about the unfairness of the unequal distribution of 
chances. If we accept limited aggregation, then it seems plausible that a complaint 
against a 50 percent chance of death is close enough to a complaint against a 100 
percent chance of death. If this is correct, and we are permitted to aggregate the 
claims of the Southern victims, then the added complaints against unfairness would 
tip the balance. It would follow, on my view, that you ought to head South and save 
the statistical rather than the identified life. 
Nevertheless, the general observation is correct. Ex ante contractualism 
retains a bias against statistical lives even though this bias is substantially weakened 
due to the permissibility of limited aggregation. Take, for example, the following 
revision of Wheel: The indeterministic roulette wheel does not release one ball but ten 
balls that will kill ten different persons. To many it is difficult to accept that we should 
prioritize Bob Johnson’s leg over multiple statistical victims. However, we should 
note that the individual risk for each person, while higher than in the standard 
version of Wheel, is still vanishingly low at 1 in 4 million. 
On reflection we notice that small risks of serious harms are omnipresent. It 
is inevitable that large-scale policies will lead to serious harms. In many such cases 
of social risk, we nonetheless believe that the risk imposition is permissible. Indeed, 
accounting for these cases is a key challenge to ex post contractualism. Take, for 
example, the following stylized case: 
Vaccine. In order to protect the entire population of California from an 
infectious disease, which everyone would come down with in the 
absence of any intervention, the Government is considering a mass 
vaccination program. The disease is not life threatening but would cause 
the Californians to limp for two months, similar to the effects of a 
sprained ankle. While the temporary limp is much less bad than the 
impairment due to loss of a leg, it is significant enough that the 
Californians want to avoid it. In extraordinary circumstances, the vaccine 
can, however, be lethal, although the chance of death for each Californian 
is only 1 in 4 million. The Government is able to administer the vaccine 
without intrusion on the bodies of any Californian. 
Chapter 3. Contractualism, Complaints, and Risk 
142 
 
Even though the policy in Vaccine will also lead to ten expected statistical 
deaths, we want to account for the permissibility of Vaccine. The risk of death is 
sufficiently small that it is outweighed by the benefit of avoiding the temporary limp. 
For example, according to the National Safety Council, the odds of a U.S. resident being 
struck by lightning in their lifetime is a bit over 1 in 180,000, more than 22 times more 
likely than the harm due to the vaccine.52 Rejecting risks of the kind involved in 
Vaccine would make it difficult to pursue many large-scale policies or practices. The 
challenge is now the following. In the case of Vaccine, we prefer saving the population 
of California from the temporary limp over the loss of ten statistical lives. In the 
revised Wheel case, we prefer saving the ten statistical lives over Bob Johnson’s loss 
of a limb. Now what if we could choose between saving the population of California 
from the temporary limp or Bob Johnson from the loss of a leg? Since the temporary 
limp is much less bad than the permanent loss of a leg, it is plausible that a 
contractualist would reject the aggregation of the complaints against the temporary 
limp. Hence, we should save Bob Johnson. This leads us to a preference cycle over 
the three options. 
It is not clear how we could justify such a preference cycle. One attempt would 
be to point out that in Vaccine the gamble is in the ex ante interest of all, whereas this 
is not the case in the revised Wheel case.53 This may explain why the option of “ten 
statistical victims when it was in their ex ante interest to take the risk” is not the same 
option as “ten statistical victims”. I am not convinced that this explains our intuitions 
well. While it is true that the gamble is in the ex ante interest of all in the stylized 
Vaccine case, I do not believe that this is necessary to the case. I believe that delivering 
the vaccine would be permissible even if some small and unidentifiable part of the 
population was already known to be immunoresistant. The vaccine would, therefore, 
be neither to the ex ante nor the ex post benefit of any of them. In fact, it appears that 
in most cases of intuitively permissible large-scale risks the benefits are widespread 
but not universal. 
 
52 See the overview at: https://injuryfacts.nsc.org/all-injuries/preventable-death-
overview/odds-of-dying/.  
53 See Alec Walen, “Risks and Weak Aggregation: Why Different Models of Risk Suit Different 
Types of Cases,” Ethics (forthcoming). 
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What the response shows, however, is that it is a mistake to frame the problem 
in the revised Wheel case as either saving ten people from death or one person from 
the loss of a leg. Such a framing already assumes that what matters is the harm that 
is the result of the risk imposition. In other words, this framing already assumes the 
ex post perspective. If my arguments against the ex post perspective are successful, 
then we should rather phrase this choice as saving the leg of one and reducing the 
risks of very many by a small amount. So understood, it is more plausible to maintain 
that it is permissible to impose the risk in the revised Wheel case. 
We can give the following justification for our choice. At the time of our 
decision, there was no person who had as strong of a complaint as Bob Johnson did. 
We were able to justify our action to each of the 40 million persons involved, each of 
whom faced only a very small risk of death. In fact, none of the 40 million would have 
been permitted to save themselves from such a small risk if doing so had required 
the loss of Bob Johnson’s leg. For example, each would have been required to call an 
ambulance to save Bob Johnson’s leg even if this would have created a 1 in 4 million 
chance of being killed by an ambulance sliding out of control. We can acknowledge 
that a better outcome could have been brought about, in which only one person loses 
a limb rather than ten people losing a life. But that is the sort of thing non-
consequentialists are already willing to acknowledge across a range of familiar cases. 
Non-consequentialists accept that oftentimes it is impermissible to do what brings 
about the best outcome because doing so would violate the claims of a single 
individual. We can understand deontological constraints in this way. 
In line with the analogy to deontological constraints, we can accept a further 
claim. While non-consequentialists accept some inefficiency in terms of failing to 
bring about the best outcome, non-consequentialists typically accept that there are 
some cases in which deontological constraints can be overridden. Most non-
consequentialists believe that rights may permissibly be violated in cases where 
doing so is necessary to avoid a moral catastrophe or some other high threshold of 
weighty moral considerations. In those cases, even deontological constraints such as 
those which stand in the way of being harmfully used as a mere means can be 
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exceptionally suspended.54 In such cases it can be permissible to do what otherwise 
would be unjustifiable to the rightsholder, for example, violating the right not to be 
harmed as mere means. If it is plausible that we can override the individual complaint 
not to be used as a mere means, then it also seems plausible that we can sometimes 
override the individual complaint of a determined victim not to be saved. If anything, 
the complaint against being used as a mere means appears to be a stronger complaint 
than the complaint against failing to be saved in the cases under discussion in this 
chapter. 
The analogy is strengthened by a deep theoretical connection that 
contractualism has with a rights-based morality. Contractualism only covers a part 
of morality, the part that Scanlon identifies with “what we owe to each other”. This 
part is a part that is concerned with our relations to other persons. A natural thought 
is when we act in ways that are not justifiable to a given person, we thereby wrong 
this person. Similarly, when we violate the right of a person, we thereby wrong this 
person. This suggest an important theoretical connection between contractualism and 
a rights-based morality given that both are concerned with wrongs done to other 
persons.55 Therefore, the idea that there is some threshold of statistical victims at 
which point we need to depart from contractualist morality is no more problematic 
than the widely accepted idea that there is some threshold of bad consequences at 
which point we need to depart from deontological constraints. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have argued for a new version of ex ante contractualism 
which focuses on the complaints that rigidly designated individuals can bring 
forward. Their complaints ought to be discounted by the objective probability that 
the harm will come about. Unlike other ex ante contractualists, I do not believe that 
we should always discount epistemic risk, nor do I believe that we should be 
 
54 See e.g. Nagel, Mortal Questions, ch. 5; and Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights 
(Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1990), ch. 6. 
55 See e.g. Kamm, Intricate Ethics, pp. 461-68.  
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concerned only with individuals that we can identify. Such an objective version of ex 
ante contractualism provides us with a plausible model of justifiability to each. It 
insists that our actions must be justifiable to everyone at the time that we act. It also 
insists that justification is owed to separate persons. But it does not require the use of 
morally superfluous, identifying information that would make actual justification to 
each possible. Objective ex ante contractualism is alone in drawing a distinction 
between cases in which objective risks are at stake and cases in which merely 
epistemic risks are at stake. But far from being a defect, this is a virtue. We can thereby 
illuminate the morally relevant difference between luckless and doomed victims. For 
these reasons, I conclude that objective ex ante contractualism is a viable and better 
alternative, which is theoretically superior to both epistemic ex ante and ex post 
contractualism. 
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Chapter 4. 
Skepticism about Aggregation and Uncertain Rescues 
 
Consider the following (Anne’s Rescue): Anne is a miner who is trapped in a 
mineshaft. We can launch a rescue mission that will, with certainty, bring Anne to 
daylight. If we fail to launch the rescue mission, then Anne will surely die in the 
mineshaft. However, undertaking the rescue mission has an opportunity cost. 
Instead of paying for the rescue mission we could use the resources to cure the sore 
throats of a very large number of people. What should we do? To many it seems 
that we should save Anne’s life. The sore throats are not the right kind of 
consideration that can outweigh what is at stake for Anne. Regardless of how many 
sore throats we can cure, we should always save a single life over sore throats. The 
sore throats do not add up to anything that is of greater moral significance than 
Anne’s life. 
 However, few actual cases are of this sort. In Anne’s Rescue we know with 
certainty what will happen if we launch the rescue mission and what will happen if 
we provide the pain relief. In the real world, we very often face situations where we 
are unsure about the results of our action. How should we think about cases like 
Anne’s Rescue in circumstances of uncertainty? 
The sentiment that sore throats do not add up to the moral significance of a 
single life expresses skepticism about the permissibility of aggregating harms across 
different individuals. As I have explained in the introduction to the dissertation, 
such skepticism is best understood as grounded in the separateness of persons. 
Skepticism about aggregation can take different forms. A more radical form, which 
I call no aggregation, holds that we should engage in pairwise comparisons between 
different individuals and never save a person who has a less strong claim to our 
aid.1 According to “no aggregation”, we should, for example, not save a very large 
 
1 No aggregation is easily confused with “numbers skepticism”, the view that we have no 
duty to save the greater number. However, it is possible to justify a duty to save the greater 
number without aggregation, for example, by adopting a Leximin decision procedure. For a 
discussion on non-aggregative arguments to save the greater number see Otsuka, “Saving 
Lives, Moral Theory, and the Claims of Individuals,” esp. pp. 118-26. No aggregation is a 
broad tent. Some proponents of no aggregation believe that while aggregating claims is not 
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number of people from paraplegia over a single person from death. Paraplegia, we 
can assume, is a substantial harm even if it is much less bad than death for the 
individual. A less radical form of aggregation skepticism, which I call limited 
aggregation, holds that while it is permissible that the numbers count in deciding 
whom to save in some trade-offs, in other trade-offs the relative numbers should 
not count.2 For example, the numbers can count only in trade-offs between harms 
that are relevant to one another. Limited aggregation can then hold that the 
numbers count in the trade-off between life and paraplegia, but that the numbers do 
not count in the trade-off between life and sore throats. In line with the acceptance 
of limited aggregation in the previous chapter, I will focus on limited aggregation. 
How should limited aggregation be extended to cases in which we are 
uncertain about what will happen? This is the question I want to address in this 
chapter. One idea is that we discount the harms each individual might suffer by 
their improbability. Anne’s claim to aid would then be determined not by the harm 
she is certain to suffer, but rather by the prospect of harm that she faces. This 
approach can be called ex ante limited aggregation. My previous chapter has defended 
a contractualist version of ex ante limited aggregation.3 A competing approach is 
the ex post approach which determines claims by actual harms and not by prospects. 
In the previous chapter I discussed ex post contractualism. I argued that the most 
plausible version of ex post contractualism embraces a principle that I called Ex Post 
Discounting. The key to Ex Post Discounting is that complaints will be assigned to a 
non-rigidly designated individual such as “the worst-off”. But ex post limited 
aggregation need not embrace a contractualist morality where we need to assign 
complaints to particular individuals. In Section I of this chapter, I begin by outlining 
 
required, aggregative considerations are an intelligible reason that an agent may act upon. 
See Munoz-Dardé, “The Distribution of Numbers and the Comprehensiveness of Reason”. 
Other proponents of no aggregation believe that in cases of equally strong claims we should 
give each person an equal chance. See Taurek, “Should the Numbers Count?”. 
2 Kamm, Morality, Mortality, 1:156-61; Intricate Ethics, pp. 31-77; Scanlon, What We Owe to 
Each Other, pp. 238-41; David Lefkowitz, “On the Concept of a Morally Relevant Harm,” 
Utilitas 20 (2008): 409-23; and Voorhoeve, “How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims?”. 
3 This is in line with most of the discussion on ex ante views that are skeptical of 
aggregation. See in particular James, “Contractualism’s (Not So) Slippery Slope”; John, 
“Risk, Contractualism, and Rose’s ‘Prevention Paradox’”; Kumar, “Risking and Wronging”; 
Frick, “Contractualism and Social Risk”. 
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an alternative approach to ex post limited aggregation. I introduce the notion of ex 
post claims and show how an appeal to ex post claims is grounded in the reasons 
critics of the ex ante approach give for rejecting the ex ante approach. However, 
building a theory of limited aggregation based on ex post claims leads to a 
dilemma. I explain both horns of the dilemma in Sections II and III. 
 
I. Ex Post Claims 
 
 Ex post limited aggregation is puzzling in one respect. It is a theory about 
how to decide in circumstances of uncertainty. However, it aims to focus on actual 
harms as opposed to individual prospects of harm. How is this possible? It may 
help to consider an example. 
Consider the following argument by Marc Fleurbaey and Alex Voorhoeve.4 
Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve analyze cases such as the following where one of two 
treatments can be given to two children, Adam and Bill, facing total blindness in the 
absence of any treatment. With the egalitarian treatment both are guaranteed the 
benefit of having merely a significant, but partial visual impairment instead of full 
blindness. From a moderate distance they would be unable to recognize a friend but 
would be able to make out basic shapes. From close distance they would be able to 
read newspapers, albeit with great difficulty. With the risky treatment, we know that 
one child will end up with good sight and the other child will end up with a visual 
impairment even worse than the other intervention would have guaranteed him. 
This unlucky child will only be able to make out basic shapes from close distance. 
But we do not know which child would be the lucky one. 
Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve then reason that there are only two possibilities. 
Either Adam is the child for whom the risky treatment would be beneficial relative 
to the egalitarian treatment, or Bill is. If it is Adam, then we know that Bill has a 
strong claim to the egalitarian treatment. Bill’s claim is, we can suppose, stronger 
than Adam’s claim to the risky treatment which would be beneficial to him. If it is 
Bill, then we know that Adam has a strong claim to the egalitarian treatment which, 
 
4 Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve, “Decide As You Would with Full Information!”. 
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once again, is stronger than Bill’s claim to the risky treatment. Whichever way 
things are, or turn out, we know that there are strong claims to the egalitarian 
treatment. 
 The claims in Fleurbaey’s and Voorhoeve’s argument are ex post claims. 
These claims compare how an individual fares given one course of action with how 
the individual fares given the alternative course of action. Importantly, the ex post 
claim is tied to one state of the world, i.e. tied to one way things may turn out to be. 
Adam’s ex post claim is on the assumption that Bill is the one who would benefit 
from the risky intervention. 
 The case of Adam and Bill is not the kind of case which invites skepticism 
about aggregation. There are only two people involved and their respective claims 
seem relevant to one another. But the case of Adam and Bill illustrates how we can 
think about ex post claims. This idea can be transferred to cases which raise doubts 
about aggregation. For example, we can imagine that there is a third option on the 
table, namely, to save neither Adam nor Bill but rather to provide pain relief for 
sore throats to a large number of people. An aggregation skeptic convinced of the ex 
post approach could reply that we should not choose this option because in either of 
the two possible states of the world there is a much stronger ex post claim 
advocating for the egalitarian treatment. The claims to sore throat relief would be 
irrelevant in either state of the world. 
While in this imagined variation of Adam’s and Bill’s case the ex post claims 
unanimously favor one course of action, we can easily imagine cases where this is 
not the case. What if, for example, there is the third possibility that treatments will 
be highly inefficient and provide no greater improvement in sight for either Adam 
or Bill than sore throat relief would give to the others? While in the first two 
possible states of the world, the ex post claims favored the egalitarian treatment, in 
this third possible state of the world the ex post claims favor the sore throat relief. 
Aggregation skeptics need a theory for how to decide cases like these. 
A follower of “no aggregation” could, for example, engage in a pairwise 
comparison between the strongest ex post claim in each state of the world. We 
would compare, for example, Adam’s ex post claim to the egalitarian treatment in 
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S1 with Bill’s ex post claim to the egalitarian treatment in S2 with the ex post claim of 
a person benefiting from sore throat pain relief in S3. A version of this idea would 
first discount each ex post claim by the likelihood that their state of the world is the 
actual state of the world. In either case, one concern with this response is that it 
takes the idea of pairwise comparisons too far. It makes the decision whom to save 
dependent entirely on what happens in one state of the world. While using pairwise 
comparisons in cases of certainty is motivated by respecting the different 
standpoints of individuals, pairwise comparisons between ex post claims are rather 
indicative of avoiding a worst-case scenario. In cases in which the worst-case 
scenario is much worse than all other outcomes, we disregard all the other 
possibilities and pay attention only to the worst-case. While it may make sense to 
believe that we should be guided only by the fate of a single individual who has 
much at stake, it makes little sense to believe that we should be guided only by one 
possible eventuality. 
A more plausible proposal is to adopt limited aggregation and to aggregate 
ex post claims according to one’s favored theory of aggregation. We then need a 
principle that tells us which ex post claims we can aggregate. There are two 
possibilities here. First, only the ex post claims within one state of the world can 
determine whether we can aggregate claims. Second, both ex post claims within one 
state of the world and across different states of the world determine whether we can 
aggregate claims. As I shall argue, neither of the options is plausible. This dilemma 
reinforces the conclusion of my previous chapter that we should reject ex post views 
in favour of a suitably constructed (objective) ex ante view. 
 
II. First Option: Relevance Tied to a State of the World 
 
According to the first option, whether or not claims can be aggregated is 
determined solely by reference to the claims in that state of the world. A basic 
version of this view would tell us to determine first which claims are relevant to the 
strongest claims in each state of the world, second discount these relevant claims, 
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and third aggregate all discounted relevant claims. We should then perform the 
action that satisfies the greatest aggregate of discounted relevant ex post claims. 
The proposed view is a natural extension of Alex Voorhoeve’s Aggregate 
Relevant Claims view.5 Voorhoeve’s view is developed only for cases of certainty. 
The proposed view supplements Voorhoeve’s view with an emphasis on ex post 
claims and the idea that the relevance of claims is determined only within the same 
state of the world. The proposed view is also a simplified version of Seth Lazar’s Ex 
Post Maximize Satisfactions of Claims.6 Lazar’s view is intended to provide a 
version of ex post limited aggregation. 
Consider now the following case (Uncertain Rescue): As in Anne’s Rescue we 
have Anne, the miner, who is trapped in a mineshaft. Again, we know that the 
rescue mission will certainly bring Anne’s body to daylight and that the 
opportunity cost is not being able to provide pain relief for sore throats to a very 
large number of people. However, Uncertain Rescue differs from Anne’s Rescue 
insofar as there is a very small chance that all help will come too late. Anne might 
already be dead. Although we heard life signs from Anne only a few seconds ago, it 
is possible that Anne will have died by the time we reach her. If this is so, there is 
nothing we can do for her and the rescue mission serves no purpose.7 Should this 
very small chance make much of a difference? It is hard to see why. It is 
overwhelmingly likely that we can still save Anne and the gains we can achieve by 
not trying to save Anne are of much less significance than what is at stake for Anne. 
Importantly, proponents of limited aggregation consider their theory to be of 
practical relevance. In any real-world scenario there will always be a small chance 
that rescue will be futile. If limited aggregation fails to account for Uncertain Rescue, 
then it appears to be practically inert. 
 
5 Voorhoeve, “How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims?”. 
6 Seth Lazar, “Limited Aggregation and Risk,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 46 (2018): 117-59, at 
pp. 139-42. I should note that Lazar ultimately rejects the view but calls it a “real contender” 
(p. 141). Instead, Lazar embraces a hybrid view (pp. 149-58). This hybrid view contains the 
ex post component in it. If the ex post view is implausible as an ex post view, then this sheds 
doubt on the plausibility of Lazar’s hybrid view. 
7 We can assume that Anne lives in a society which attaches no special meaning to burial 
rites. This explains why, if Anne is dead, the rescue mission would have provided not even 
small benefits to Anne’s loved ones in terms of coming to terms with their loss. 
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Devastatingly, the present option to extend limited aggregation to 
uncertainty fails to account for this judgment. Here is why. The first step is to 
identify which are the different ex post claims in each state of the world and which 
claims are relevant. In S1, the state of the world where Anne is still alive, Anne has a 
strong claim to the rescue option. Her life is at stake. Everyone in the large group 
has only a small claim in the dispersal of the small benefit. In S2, the state of the 
world where Anne is already dead, Anne has no claim. There is nothing we could 
do for her. Here as well, everyone in the large group has a small claim in the 
dispersal of the small benefit. Now are these claims also relevant? In S2 they are: 
Since Anne does not have a claim in S2, the claims by everyone in the large group 
are unopposed and thereby relevant. In S1 there is a competition of claims. Given 
that Anne’s claim is much stronger than the claim of everyone in the group, her 
claim is the only relevant one. 
Anne’s claim in S1 is very weighty, while the claims of the members of the 
large group in S2 will carry only little weight. In the second step, we have to 
discount everyone’s claim by the likelihood that their associated state of the world 
obtains. Anne’s claim is discounted by the likelihood of Anne being already dead 
which is very low. Her claim remains very strong. Discounting the claims of the 
many group members will further weaken them since the probability of Anne being 
still alive is very high. Nonetheless, the third step allows us to aggregate all relevant 
claims in the end. If there are enough members of the group, then they together will 
outweigh Anne’s claim.8 
 
8 I mentioned earlier that this is a simplified version of Lazar’s view. For interested readers, 
here is how the view is simplified and why this does not affect my argument. (1) Instead of 
talking about claims and relevant claims, Lazar talks about interests and claims. Lazar 
believes that we can aggregate all claims, not only relevant ones, but that only some interests 
are protected by a claim. (2) An interest is protected by a claim if and only if the person 
whose interest it is would be permitted to save themselves rather than everyone with a 
relevant competing interest combined. (3) An interest is relevant in turn if that person would 
be permitted to save themselves rather than the initial person. (4) The differences in Lazar’s 
approach do not affect my argument. In the above argument one can replace “claim” with 
“interest” and “relevant claim” with “claim” and we have translated the argument into 
Lazar’s approach. The interests of the members of the large group would still be protected 
by claims because they are unopposed. Anne’s interest would similarly survive the more 
complicated test of Lazar’s for being protected by a claim. (5) One further difference is the 
following: Lazar determines ex post interests counterfactually by comparing the well-being 
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This does not correspond to what we intuitively thought about the case. The 
introduction of even a small chance that Anne cannot be helped tips the balance 
against Anne. Anne is almost certain to be saved from death if we intervene, but the 
tiny possibility that she may not be makes all the difference here. The problem is 
that this method allows relevant claims to arise in a given state of the world too 
easily. Even a fairly small gain can become a relevant claim if it is sufficiently larger 
than its competitors in that state alone. Provided that there are sufficiently many of 
these small gains, they can then, in the end, outweigh the relevant claims of other 
states of the world. 
 
III. Second Option: Relevant Inside and Across States of the World 
 
To avoid the problem that claims can easily arise in one state of the world 
and outweigh claims in other states of the world, we can opt for the second option 
that I distinguished. Following this option, it is the interests within the same state of 
the world and across different states of the world that determine whether 
aggregation is permissible. This option is not an ad hoc adjustment of our view to 
avoid the problem I just outlined. It can also be justified by appealing to a core idea 
of limited aggregation. 
In her justification of a limited aggregationist view, Frances Kamm 
introduces the idea of irrelevant utilities.9 The idea is that certain utilities or claims 
are not important in the face of other more significant claims. To take Kamm’s 
example, it would be inappropriate and disrespectful to consider the claim to being 
cured from a sore throat when deciding between whom to save from death. A 
similar idea can be applied to risky cases. It seems inappropriate and disrespectful 
 
of the person given the chosen action with the counterfactual well-being given the 
alternative action. If we compare the action of providing pain relief for sore throats, we 
cannot observe, however, whether Anne is dead or alive. So how should we assess Anne’s 
interest here? For Lazar we should take the expected value for Anne, whereas I advocate 
distinguishing between different states of the world, even if they are epistemically 
indistinguishable. Given the near certainty of Anne still being alive, this small difference has 
no bearing on my argument either. 
9 Kamm, Morality, Mortality, 1:144-63. 
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to consider the claim to be cured of a sore throat in one possible outcome when the 
other possible outcome is a life and death decision. 
Kamm’s view has one relevance test in the case of certainty. Claims are 
relevant, and thus allowed to be aggregated, only if it would not be disrespectful to 
consider the weaker claim in light of the gravity of the stronger claim. In uncertain 
cases we could use a two-stage relevance test. Claims have to be relevant to the 
strongest competing claim within their state of the world and across states of the 
world. 
The two-stage relevance test for claims fails. Consider Desperate Rescue: We 
are again uncertain about whether or not Anne, the miner, is still alive in the 
mineshaft. We have not heard life signs for a long time and the rescue team is losing 
hope. There is only a very small chance that Anne is still alive, saving her now 
would be a miracle. The rescue mission is costly, and the recourses could be used to 
save a large group of people from moderate chronic pain. Moderate chronic pain, 
we can suppose, is not relevant to death in cases of certainty. Anne’s ex post claim 
in the state of the world where she is still alive is the only relevant one. In case that 
Anne is already dead, the group members have claims to be relieved of the chronic 
pain. However, none of their claims are relevant to Anne’s claim in the eventuality 
that Anne is still alive. We should try saving Anne, regardless of how likely it is that 
our intervention will be successful. A very small chance here would make all the 
difference. The idea that the mere possibility of death should make it disrespectful 
to consider lesser claims is not convincing either. 
A more plausible relevance test is one where the inter-state-of-the-world 
relevance is determined only after discounting the claims by their likelihood. The 
idea that considering small claims in the presence of a substantial claim is 
disrespectful is certainly more plausible when the claims were discounted by their 
likelihood. This revision also explains what is wrong with the answer that the 
previous proposal gave in Desperate Rescue. Anne’s overall claim given the small 
likelihood that she is still alive is not weighty enough to render the claims against 
chronic pain relief irrelevant. We can revise the test to a three-stage relevance test. 
In the first stage we determine which claims are relevant in their state of the world. 
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In the second stage we discount these claims by the likelihood of their state of the 
world being actual. In the third stage we determine which claims are relevant to the 
strongest claim. 
The three-stage relevance test struggles to account for cases where risk is 
dispersed among various states of the world. Consider Anonymous Rescue. A large 
group of people is trapped on a sinking ship. We are able to communicate with the 
ship and know that at most one person is still alive. We do not know who among 
the 10,000 crew and passengers is the person who might still be alive. There is also 
an about 50 percent chance that none of the 10,000 is still alive. We have the choice 
between a rescue mission or providing a small and certain benefit to a very large 
group of people. In this scenario there are 10,001 states of the world. In each of the 
10,000 states of the world where one person is still alive, that person’s ex post claim 
is relevant and outweighs all other claims. In S10,001, the state of the world where 
there is nothing we can do for the people on the ship, the claims of the large group 
members are relevant. The ex post claims of each passenger must be discounted by 
1 in 20,000. It is quite likely that the ex post claims will then not be relevant to the ex 
post claims of the group members receiving a small benefit. By dispersing the risk 
across states of the world, we decide not to try to save the person on the ship. 
However, if there had been a single, identified person on the ship, her claim would 
not have been discounted heavily enough to be rendered irrelevant. On the 
contrary, her claim would have rendered the claims to the moderate benefit 
irrelevant. Such an identified victim bias is a motivation for ex post views and 
should not be a component of them. 
One way to resist this implication is to protest that my way of setting up the 
problem was erroneous. It was false to distinguish between the first 10,000 states of 
the world. A state of the world is a set of possible worlds, or a model of possible 
worlds, that leaves no relevant aspect of the world undescribed. A state of the 
world is not a full description of a possible world. One might protest that I 
overdescribed the states of the world. If we should treat the expectation of a 50 
percent chance of saving someone to be equivalent to a 50 percent chance of saving 
a particular person, then this is because the identity of the person to be saved does 
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not matter. If the identity of the person does not matter, the protest goes, it is 
because the identity of the person is not a relevant feature in this case. 
Consequently, the states of the world do not different in any relevant aspect. What 
should matter is that some person on the ship might die rather than who exactly has 
the claim to be rescued. Anonymizing for the victim, the different possible worlds 
do not differ in any relevant respect. 
When we frame the decision problem for risky cases we inevitably have to 
group possibilities together. Often there will be small differences in possible 
outcomes that do not have any moral relevance. Our criterion for how to group 
possibilities will depend on what we think is morally relevant in this case. The fact 
that in one outcome a shirt will be blue and in another it will be red should not lead 
us to consider these two as distinct outcomes. The ex post proponent can now argue 
that since we should not be biased in favor of identified lives, the specific identity of 
a victim does not matter morally either. Hence, we should not divide outcomes 
where only the identity of the victim differs in different states of the world. 
Even though this way of framing the decision problem helps us with 
Anonymous Rescue, it does not help with a related case. In Anonymous Rescue all 
10,000 people faced the same fate, death. This is why the alternative way of framing 
the decision problem would only speak of two states of the world, one where 
someone is alive and another one where no one is alive, both of which are equally 
likely. Framed this way, we should try to rescue the person rather than giving the 
small benefit to any number of persons. But plausibly we should also try to rescue 
one person from, for example, the loss of a limb, rather than giving the small benefit 
to any number of persons. So, if all 10,000 people are facing the loss of a limb, we 
can again re-describe this as one state of the world where someone is facing the loss 
of a limb. Suppose, however, that one of the 10,000 is facing the loss of a limb, 
another person is facing permanent paraplegia, a third person is facing chronic pain 
worse than paraplegia, and so on. All 10,000 persons are facing a different harm that 
is different in morally relevant respects. All 10,000 persons are facing a harm 
between the loss of a limb and death. In this variation the re-description strategy is 
no longer possible. These are genuinely different states of the world. The problem of 
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Anonymous Rescue reappears here. Even worse, if every person were to face the loss 
of a limb we should try preventing this loss. But if some people are facing a more 
serious loss, then we should no longer try preventing this loss. If all were to face the 
loss of a limb, we might be able to reframe the decision problem as having only two 
states of the world in which case the ex post claim against the loss of a limb is not 
heavily discounted. But because some people are facing a more severe hardship, the 
strategy of reframing the decision problem no longer works. Since these people 
might face a more serious hardship their ex post claims have to be counted as 
belonging to separate states of the world and discounted separately. This way they 
become irrelevant. 
 
IV. Ex Post Limited Aggregation Without Ex Post Claims 
 
 Thinking about ex post claims leaves us in a dead end. None of the 
principles that tell us when claims can be aggregated are plausible. Determining 
when claims can be aggregated only by looking at one state of the world allows 
aggregation too easily. Determining when claims can be aggregated by looking also 
at other states of the world makes aggregation either too difficult or too dependent 
on how the risk is distributed across different states of the world. A common 
feature of the failure of both approaches is that both give special emphasis to 
uncertainty. Both treat near-certainty radically different from certainty. The first 
option radically changed its verdicts once we introduced the small probability of all 
help coming too late. The second option radically changed its verdict once we 
introduce the small probability of being able to help at all. 
 What does this mean for ex post views? One possibility is that ex post views 
are restricted in their scope. I started my explanation of ex post claims by referring 
to an argument that Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve bring forward. Fleurbaey and 
Voorhoeve ultimately argue for what they call the Principle of Full Information.10 
The Principle of Full Information includes a dominance condition. If in all states of 
the world the ex post claims weakly prefer one action and in no state of the world 
 
10 Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve, “Decide As You Would with Full Information!,” pp. 120-22. 
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the ex post claims disprefer this option, then we ought to perform the action. If the 
ex post claims in all states of the world are indifferent, then we ought to be 
indifferent. Because of its dominance reasoning, the Principle of Full Information 
does not tell us what to do when different options are preferred by the ex post 
claims in different states of the world. As I made clear the Principle of Full 
Information would therefore be silent on all the cases I discussed in this chapter. It 
would be striking if ex post reasoning would not apply to any of these. 
Furthermore, it seems concerning for the Principle of Full Information that we 
cannot expand its core reasoning, the idea of ex post claims, in a plausible manner. 
 The other alternative is to return to Ex Post Discounting. Ex Post Discounting 
is able to resolve the problems of all the cases mentioned here. However, this brings 
us back to the problems outlined in the previous chapter with ex post 
contractualism. This provides a challenge for critics of the ex ante view. Critics of 
the ex ante view would need to show that their objections can provide a foundation 
for an alternative position. They have, so far, not been able to do this. This 
strengthens my argument that we should reject the ex post view in favor of a 
suitable ex ante view. While I explained how objective ex ante contractualism deals 
with questions of risk and mentioned that it should embrace a form of limited 
aggregation, I have not yet shown how limited aggregation can be justified. This is 
the task I take up in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5. 
Aggregation, Balancing, and Respect for the Claims of Individuals 
 
I. Introduction 
 
One theme in my thesis has been the opposition to the aggregation of harms 
across different individuals. Such strong resistance to the aggregation of harms across 
different individuals is the hallmark of a particular kind of non-consequentialism that 
is inspired by the separateness of persons.1 Such non-consequentialists object in 
particular to aggregation when trivial harms might thereby outweigh significant 
harms. 
Few skeptics regarding aggregation believe, however, that we can avoid all 
forms of aggregation in all cases. Most of these skeptics regarding aggregation would, 
however, still like the numbers to count when one can save either a lesser or greater 
number from equal or similar harm. What is therefore needed is a moral theory that 
allows the relative numbers to count sometimes but not always. Several philosophers 
have proposed theories of this kind.2 The different approaches are motivated by a 
powerful idea: our decision whom to save should respect each person’s separate 
 
1 While the opposition to full aggregation is a central feature of one prominent type of non-
consequentialism, we should not confuse non-consequentialism simpliciter with the 
opposition to full aggregation. One can be opposed to full aggregation as part of one’s theory 
of the good (e.g. Temkin, Rethinking the Good, ch. 3) while still being a consequentialist about 
rightness. Similarly, forms of non-consequentialism are not opposed to aggregation. For 
example, some non-consequentialists only depart from consequentialism by accepting either 
deontological constraints or agent-centered prerogatives (e.g. Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection 
of Consequentialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). These forms of non-
consequentialism, however, are only partial departures that tame a basically consequentialist 
outlook of morality with additional considerations. It is a half-hearted form of non-
consequentialism (see Thomas Sinclair, “Are We Conditionally Obligated to be Effective 
Altruists?,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 46 (2018): 36-59, at pp. 43-49). The opposition to full 
aggregation which is subject of this chapter is instead the core of a more thorough form of 
non-consequentialism. 
2 Kamm, Morality, Mortality, 1:156-61; Intricate Ethics, pp. 31-77; Scanlon, What We Owe to Each 
Other, pp. 238-41; Lefkowitz, “On the Concept of a Morally Relevant Harm”; and Voorhoeve, 
“How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims?”. In this chapter, I am concerned with 
limited aggregation as a view about what we ought to do and not as an axiological principle. 
For the axiological version of limited aggregation see Temkin, Rethinking the Good, ch. 3 and 
Dale Dorsey, “Headaches, Lives and Value,” Utilitas 21 (2009): 36-58. 
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claim to our help; in particular it should respect those in need whose claims are the 
greatest. Such views have been called limited aggregation. In this chapter, I will set out 
my own view of limited aggregation and show how such a view can be both 
intuitively plausible and respect the demands of the separateness of persons. 
The standard cases for limited aggregation are cases in which groups are 
homogenous; i.e. groups in which everyone in the group has a claim that is as strong 
as the claim of every other member of the group. However, many cases are not like 
this. Oftentimes we face decisions where the groups are heterogenous; i.e. not all 
groups members face the same plight. Current proposals of limited aggregation have 
been shown to have devastating flaws when they are extended to cases with such 
heterogeneous groups. Patrick Tomlin has shown that applying a leading proposal 
of limited aggregation, Aggregate Relevant Claims, to heterogenous group cases 
violates one of two uncontroversial principles. On one extension of Aggregate 
Relevant Claims it violates a principle he calls Equal Consideration for Equal Claims 
which requires us to give all claims of equal strength equal weight in determining 
whom to save. On its alternative extension Aggregate Relevant Claims violates what 
he calls the Principle of Addition, which requires that adding a claim to a group cannot 
make saving this group less choiceworthy.3 In this chapter, I show how these 
problems can be resolved by a new theory of limited aggregation that is well-
grounded in the reasons we have to be skeptical of aggregation in the first place and 
that meets this challenge set by Tomlin and related recent challenges. I propose the 
following theory: 
Hybrid Balance Relevant Claims. Relevant individual claims ought to be 
balanced against one another, starting with the strongest claim(s) overall. 
 
3 Patrick Tomlin, “On Limited Aggregation,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 45 (2017): 232-60. 
Tomlin’s criticism has been extended by Joe Horton, “Always Aggregate,” Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 46 (2018): 160-74. An earlier line of criticism objected that limited aggregation violates 
axioms of rational choice, namely transitivity and the independence of irrelevant alternatives. 
See Derek Parfit, “Justifiability to Each Person,” Ratio 16 (2003): 368-90, at pp. 384-85; and John 
Halstead, “The Numbers Always Count”. Since this criticism has been, in my view, 
adequately responded to I will not address it except where it serves as a useful comparison to 
my arguments. For the responses see Kamm, Intricate Ethics, pp. 297-98, 484-87; Voorhoeve, 
“How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims?,” pp. 76-79; Alex Voorhoeve, “Why One 
Should Count Only Claims with which One Can Sympathize,” Public Health Ethics 10 (2017): 
148-56, at pp. 152-53; and Tomlin, “On Limited Aggregation,” p. 236fn11. 
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If there are unbalanced relevant claims, then these will be decisive in what 
we ought to do. If the claims are evenly matched, then we are permitted 
to save either group, or perhaps required to give equal chances. The 
relevance of claims is determined by two conditions: 
(1) The local relevance condition: A claim can only be balanced with 
another claim if the two claims are relevant to one another. 
(2) The global relevance condition: Every individual with a strong claim 
has a veto against the consideration of any type of claim that is irrelevant 
to her claim, if considering these claims would lead to her not being 
saved. 
In Section II, I will establish that the idea of relevance is key to any plausible 
theory of limited aggregation. Then, in Section III, I will provide my defense of 
Hybrid Balance Relevant claims. I will explain more precisely what I mean by 
“balancing” claims against one another and I justify the hybrid character of having 
both a local and global relevance condition. Given the complexity of Hybrid Balance 
Relevant Claims, I offer some illustration in Section IV before discussing how my 
view escapes all recent challenge that have been raised against limited aggregation 
in Section V. 
 
II. Relevance and Limited Aggregation 
 
 I have already mentioned that many philosophers are opposed to aggregation 
because it allows a large number of trivial claims to outweigh the significant claim of 
a single individual. A paradigm case for this phenomenon is Life versus Headaches. A 
fully aggregative view struggles to accommodate the intuition that we should not let 
the single person die. It seems that if we can aggregate the pain of the various 
headaches, there will be a number of people suffering from headaches that outweighs 
the life of the one.4 
 
4 Of course, some nonetheless defend full aggregation. See Norcross, “Comparing Harms”; 
Hirose, Moral Aggregation, chs. 2-3; Horton, “Aggregation, Complaints, and Risk”; and 
Horton, “Always Aggregate”. Fully aggregative views differ with respect to what ought to be 
aggregated. Norcross believes we ought to aggregate harms, Hirose believes in formal 
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There are some views that allow aggregation in all cases but seek to avoid this 
conclusion. For example, a view could be fully aggregative but assign infinite 
disvalue to deaths. Such a view would then, however, struggle to accommodate the 
intuition that sometimes the relative numbers should count. The disvalue of two 
deaths would also be infinite and no number of a slightly lesser harm than death 
could outweigh single deaths.5 Another attempt to accommodate the intuition in Life 
versus Headaches is to argue that we should accept full aggregation while adding that 
value functions are bounded. In such bounded value functions, the aggregate value 
of any number of a given harm has an upper bound. As the number of headaches 
approaches infinity, the value of saving these people approaches a fixed value lower 
than the value of saving a single person from death.6 Such views imply, implausibly, 
that our reasons for saving persons from serious harm diminish with the number of 
affected people. At some large number n, we have virtually no reason whatsoever to 
save additional people from serious harm. Such a view would therefore imply that 
we should rather save n people from a severe disability alongside one person with a 
headache instead of saving n+1 persons from a severe disability.7 
 The better solution is, therefore, to adopt the idea that there are different kinds 
of claims. There is something that distinguishes headaches from deaths in a manner 
 
aggregation which can integrate a variety of moral factors, Horton believes we should 
aggregate complaints. Arguably Liao also falls into this category, though some remarks about 
irrelevant utilities seem to indicate otherwise. See S. Matthew Liao, “Who Is Afraid of 
Numbers?,” Utilitas 20 (2008): 447-61. 
5 See also Otsuka, “Saving Lives, Moral Theory, and the Claims of Individuals,” pp. 127-28. 
6 See Seth Lazar and Chad Lee-Stronach, “Axiological Absolutism and Risk,” Noûs 53 (2019): 
97-113. For objections similar to the one I raise see Otsuka, “Saving Lives, Moral Theory, and 
the Claims of Individuals,” p. 127fn31 and Alex Voorhoeve, “Balancing small against large 
burdens,” Behavioural Public Policy 2 (2018): 125-42, at pp. 132-34. 
7 A proponent of bounded value functions might argue that not all value functions for saving 
people from harm are bounded. Perhaps the value of saving persons from death and all 
conditions which can be traded off against death is not bounded. The problem for this reply 
is two-fold. First, it would need to explain why it is the case that only for some conditions the 
value of saving additional persons diminishes. This appears like an unjustified restriction 
made only to avoid counterexamples. Second, the above argument would still hold provided 
that the severe condition is such that it cannot be traded off against death. For example, 
assume no number of broken legs may outweigh a single death. Then the value of saving 
people from broken legs is bounded. This would imply that while no number of mild 
headaches can outweigh a single broken leg, saving n+1 persons from a broken leg can be 
outweighed by saving n persons from a broken leg and a single person from a mild headache. 
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that bars us from trading off lives against headache relief. The idea of relevance can 
help here.8 Claims to headache relief are not relevant to claims to be saved from death. 
The same idea can explain why when the harms are more similar it is that the 
numbers should count. Consider Life versus Paraplegia. If we save whichever group 
has the strongest individual claim, disregarding the numbers entirely, then we 
should save a single person from death regardless of the number of people that we 
could save from paraplegia.9 However, Life versus Paraplegia is different from Life 
versus Headaches insofar as the claims to be saved from paraplegia are, plausibly, 
relevant to the claims to be saved from death.10 
 While the idea of relevance can give us a principle that can explain our 
intuitions in cases like Life versus Paraplegia and Life versus Headaches, the idea is 
incomplete in two ways. First, it is unclear how the idea of relevance can plausibly be 
extended to more complicated cases including those involving heterogenous groups. 
Second, even if we had a decision procedure for such cases the question remains how 
to theoretically justify this decision procedure. While intuitive fit is an important part 
 
8 See Kamm, Morality, Mortality, 1:144-97 and Lefkowitz, “On the Concept of a Morally 
Relevant Harm”. 
9 Throughout the chapter, I am using the term “group” liberally and sometimes refer to single 
individuals as a group. 
10 Again, some disagree and think that in both cases we ought to save the single person from 
death. Most of those who disagree embrace the further claims that there is no obligation to 
save the greater number even when the harms are identical. See G.E.M. Anscombe, “Who Is 
Wronged? Philippa Foot on Double Effect: One Point, in Elizabeth Anscome, Human Life, Action 
and Ethics, ed. Mary Geach and Luke Gormally (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2005), pp. 249-51; 
Taurek, “Should the Numbers Count?”; and Tyler Doggett, “Saving the Few,” Noûs 47 (2013): 
302-15. Munoz-Dardé (“The Distribution of Numbers and the Comprehensiveness of 
Reasons”) can be interpreted to support this position as well. As with full aggregation, these 
opponents of aggregation form a broad tent. Munoz-Dardé believes that while there is no 
duty to save the greater number, aggregative reasons can be intelligible reasons to act upon. 
Taurek seems to deny this and advocates giving equal chances. Anscombe and Doggett only 
argue for the permissibility of saving the few which indicates that they are not opposed to 
saving the many. However, it is possible to accept a duty to save the greater number and treat 
both Life versus Paraplegia and Life versus Headaches alike. Scanlon outlines an argument before 
embracing a form of limited aggregation in What We Owe to Each Other, pp. 230-38. Otsuka 
canvasses a variety of arguments for the duty to save the greater number which do not imply 
that we can trade off paraplegia against lives in “Saving Lives, Moral Theory, and the Claims 
of Individuals,” pp. 118-24. R. Jay Wallace advances such an argument for the duty to save 
the greater number without noting that his argument does not extend to cases in which lesser 
but relevant harms are at stake. See R. Jay Wallace, The Moral Nexus (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2019), pp. 215-19. 
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of a good moral theory, we also need to give a justification for the theory. Otherwise 
our theory merely summarizes rather than justifies our immediate reactions about 
cases. This is the task I set out to do in the next section. 
 
III. Justifying Hybrid Balance Relevant Claims 
 
 The starting point for my view is an idea that appears in the work of Thomas 
Nagel. Nagel writes about the reconciliation of two standpoints, the impartial and the 
partial standpoint. Impartial concern is, however, non-aggregative. Impartiality 
should not be confused with impersonality which is aggregative.11 Impartiality is 
based on the recognition that everyone’s life, including one’s own, has objective 
importance and significance. Realizing this, we extend this significance to the lives of 
others. We imagine ourselves to be in their shoes and extend an impartial concern for 
them. This impartial concern is fragmented. It is divided between the different 
individuals. Unlike fully aggregative theories that interpret impartiality as 
impersonality, we are not eroding the distinction between different viewpoints. This 
fragmented concern takes seriously the separateness of persons.12 The realization of 
the objective significance of everyone’s life need not, however, lead us to abandon 
our own personal perspective in the world. Impartial concern goes along with 
legitimate partial concern for oneself. 
The ideal that we are striving towards is unanimity. It is not unanimity in our 
rational self-interest, but rather unanimity among persons committed to finding 
common principles guiding our interactions. Our actions should be justifiable to each 
and every one who is affected. There are different models of unanimity. One model 
of unanimity is the kind of unanimity that is achieved behind a veil of ignorance. 
 
11 Nagel, Mortal Questions, ch. 8; Nagel, Equality and Partiality, chs. 2-8. Unlike me, Nagel 
sometimes speaks of impersonal concern as interchangeable with impartial concern. 
Impersonality might be one way to show impartiality, but it is not the only one. In Chapter 2 
(Separate Persons Behind the Veil) I discussed the relation between impartiality and 
impersonality or monopersonality. I argued that respect for the separateness of persons 
dictates that we should not equate impartiality with impersonality. The contrast is also drawn 
by Rawls in A Theory of Justice, rev. edn., pp. 165-68. 
12 Nagel, Mortal Questions, pp. 126-27. 
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Such a veil of ignorance achieves unanimity only by assimilating persons and 
depriving them of their separateness. By contrast, the kind of unanimity we are 
searching for is unanimity that is achieved by convergence from different 
standpoints.13 
 The two different perspectives, partial and impartial, can explain which 
claims are relevant.14 From our first-personal perspective we have a justified stronger 
concern for our own life than for the lives of others. When we imagine ourselves to 
be in the position of others, such imagination includes their self-favoring concerns. 
While individuals are entitled not to make use of their self-favoring concern, we 
cannot assume that individuals have volunteered to waive their moral claim to be 
aided. In the absence of any such waiver, we need to assume that individuals aim to 
promote their own perspective to the maximum extent that is morally permissible. 
The maximum extent of such concern determines when claims are relevant. A claim 
is relevant to another claim if and only if this claim can be preferred to the other claim 
from someone’s point of view. A claim might be weaker and still relevant if the claim 
can be preferred from someone’s self-favoring, partial perspective. 
 This explanation fits best with a non-welfarist understanding of moral 
claims.15 The ultimate question is whether individuals are allowed to have a stronger 
concern to save themselves from a given harm rather than someone else being saved 
from a greater harm. Our judgments about the relative priority or urgency to come 
to the rescue of persons do not always track the judgments of the people benefited 
about what makes their life go best. A person may believe that her wish to play all of 
Beethoven’s sonatas is more important than a decent diet. But this does not make it 
the case that our reasons to aid her in the endeavor of learning the sonatas are 
stronger than our reasons to aid her with nutrition.16 If this is so, we should not 
 
13 Nagel, Equality and Partiality, pp. 33-40. 
14 I borrow this argument from Voorhoeve, “How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims?”. 
15 Here I differ from the way Voorhoeve sets up his view. His Aggregate Relevant Claims 
gives an analysis of claims in terms of the contributions to well-being that helping the person 
would make. “How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims?,” pp. 64-66. 
16 The idea originates with T.M. Scanlon, “Preference and Urgency,” Journal of Philosophy 72 
(1975): 655-69. The example is from Nagel’s further development of this idea in terms of 
person-neutral and person-relative reasons in The View From Nowhere (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1986), pp. 166-75. 
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believe that we can explain the strength of individual claims to be saved in terms of 
the contribution that saving the person will make to her well-being. 
The relevance test that invokes the partial perspective means that in a case 
where the claims of only one of the groups are relevant, unanimity naturally emerges. 
We can see this with our paradigmatic case Life versus Headaches. From the perspective 
of the person about to lose her life, she should be favored. Both her impartial and 
partial concern favor this. From the perspective of each of the persons about to suffer 
a headache, the rescue of the life should be favored too. Their partial concern does 
not extend to the saving of themselves from a minor headache rather than another 
person’s life. It would be unreasonable for these people to insist on their claim to be 
rescued. We can give a powerful justification to them for not rescuing them. Not even 
you with your partial concern would have been allowed to rescue yourself. So, how 
can you complain to me who does not have partial concern for you, for not rescuing 
you? 
More difficult are those cases in which claims of equal strength are at play, 
but the relative numbers differ. For example, we can save either A or B&C from equal 
harm. In this case every person has a claim that survives the test of partial concern. 
Everyone can legitimately stake their claim to rescue. This means that we have a 
conflict of different standpoints. How should we resolve this conflict of standpoints? 
I endorse a method that I call Balance Relevant Claims. Balance Relevant Claims 
resolves conflicts of standpoints by balancing individual claims against one another.17 
Consider the following pair of cases. In the first case we can either save A or B, in the 
second case we can either save A or B&C. While in the first case the considerations 
for saving A and the considerations for saving B are equally strong, this is not the 
 
17 Proponents of views similar to Balance Relevant Claims are Kamm and Scanlon. See Kamm, 
Morality, Mortality, 1:101, 114-19; Intricate Ethics, pp. 31-77; Bioethical Prescriptions (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 367-71, 515-22; and Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 
pp. 231-35, 240-41. Views similar to Balance Relevant Claims are also called “local relevance” 
see Victor Tadros, “Localized Restricted Aggregation,” in in Oxford Studies in Political 
Philosophy. Volume 5, ed. David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne, and Steven Wall (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2019), pp. 171-204; and Aart van Gils and Patrick Tomlin, “Relevance Rides 
Again? Aggregation and Local Relevance,” in Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy. Volume 6, 
ed. David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne, and Steven Wall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 
pp. 221-55. 
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case in the second case. The fact that C is a third person means that C can break the 
tie and decide that we should save B&C. We can explain the tie-breaking idea in terms 
of balancing claims. When we see that we can save A from death, we notice a strong 
claim on our help. If A’s claim were the only thing to consider, we would be required 
to save A. But B’s presence and B’s claim balances the moral claim that A can raise. 
B’s claim is just as strong as A’s. Neither claim can ultimately decide what we ought 
to do. Since we are required to save someone, this means that either option is 
permissible, or perhaps we are required to give equal chances to both. But when C 
enters the picture, C’s claim is not balanced. C’s claim can then have the power to 
ultimately decide what we ought to do: namely, save B&C. 
The tie-breaking idea helps us to better understand how Balance Relevant 
Claims works, but it is not a good guide to justifying it. One unsuccessful justification 
for Balance Relevant Claims involves an appeal to the moral complaint that if we are 
not required to save B&C, then the additional presence of C does not make a moral 
difference. However, the additional presence of C can make a moral difference in 
other ways. For example, a weighted lottery that reflects the different numbers would 
ensure that the additional presence of C makes a moral difference by shifting the 
odds.18 For this reason, we should not rest our case for Balance Relevant Claims on 
the idea that tie-breaking is the only way to respect the fact of C’s additional presence. 
Instead, Balance Relevant Claims is justified holistically. Its justification depends on 
the prior acceptance of limited aggregation and the idea of relevance for which I 
argued in the previous section. It is then justified as a plausible method of resolving 
conflicts of standpoints in a manner that explains the intuitions that limited 
aggregation wants to capture. My aim in the following discussion is to make clear 
 
18 Both Kamm and Scanlon rest their argument for Balance Relevant Claims on this moral 
difference argument. See Kamm, Morality, Morality, 1:101, 114-19; Intricate Ethics, pp. 31-32; 
and Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, pp. 231-35. The objection that one can make a moral 
difference in other ways is due to Michael Otsuka (“Saving Lives, Moral Theory, and the 
Claims of Individuals,” pp. 114-18). In their analysis of Kamm and Scanlon, David Wasserman 
and Alan Strudler helpfully distinguish between what they call the marginal difference 
argument and the balancing argument. They clarify that Kamm and Scanlon think that the 
marginal difference argument grounds the balancing argument. My point here is that we can 
retain the balancing argument by giving it fresh and better foundations. David Wasserman 
and Alan Strudler, “Can a Nonconsequentialist Count Lives?,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 31 
(2003): 71-94, at pp. 82-89. 
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that Balance Relevant Claims can be developed into an overall compelling theory of 
limited aggregation. 
Before proceeding, one further clarification is needed. We should distinguish 
carefully between balancing and canceling.19 It is misleading and incorrect to say that 
the claims of A and B cancel each other out and can thus be ignored. We can see this 
in the case where only A’s and B’s fate is at stake. Even though the claims balance 
each other, we are required to save one of the two. The claims are not canceled and 
thus remain within our moral deliberation. Not saving either of the two is 
impermissible. The fact that the claims are balanced only means that they do not have 
the force to ultimately decide which course of action is required. 
 This case of balancing highlights and expresses a different model of 
unanimity. In the case of Life versus Headaches we achieved unanimity by individuals 
withdrawing their claims because their partial perspective did not allow them to 
stake their claim. In the present case all claims are considered and weighed. We 
engage in a genuine confrontation of standpoints. But we can still say the following. 
It would be unreasonable for A to insist that his claim ultimately decides that she 
should be saved in the case of A versus B&C. Her claim was considered and balanced 
with the claim of someone else. She cannot insist that her claim has greater force than 
balancing a single claim. She can only insist on a fair decision procedure that takes 
her moral claims and the severity of her plight into consideration. Balancing meets 
this demand. But she cannot insist on more. It would be unreasonable for her to insist 
on a particular outcome in which she is saved and to reject a principle requiring B&C 
to be saved.20 
 
19 In the first version of her argument Frances Kamm did speak about canceling (“Equal 
Treatment and Equal Chances,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 14 (1985): 177-94). Later on, Kamm 
admits that the canceling metaphor is misleading (Morality, Mortality, 1:116-17). Rahul Kumar 
used a neutralizing metaphor in later work (“Contractualism on saving the many,” Analysis 
61 (2001): 165-70). Kumar’s argument was criticized on similar grounds to the ones presented 
here by Michael Otsuka (“Saving Lives, Moral Theory, and the Claims of Individuals,” pp. 
118-19). 
20 This idea forms part of Scanlon’s latest revision of his contractualism in response to the 
problems of aggregation. See Scanlon, “Contractualism and Justification”. A similar idea is 
brought forward by Munoz-Dardé. See Munoz-Dardé, “The Distribution of Numbers and 
Comprehensiveness of Reasons,” pp. 208-15. 
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If we accept the balancing of claims, the question arises whether we can 
extend the idea of balancing to cases that are different from tie-breaking cases. For 
example, can several claims to be saved from paraplegia balance a single claim to be 
saved from death?21 It seems plausible that sometimes a greater number of weaker 
claims can balance a lesser number of stronger claims. Having a relevant claim means 
that one’s own partial perspective allows one to maintain one’s claim and to insist 
that one’s claim will be considered. All cases involving opposing relevant claims 
thereby become conflicts of standpoints in which multiple people can rightfully insist 
that their claims are considered by the decision-maker. While they can all reasonably 
insist that their claims are considered, no one can insist that their claim has to be 
decisive. Balancing is a general method that allows us to resolve cases of such 
conflicts of standpoints. If one claim is outweighed by a multitude of weaker claims, 
this person was outweighed by people who were entitled to voice their claims and 
have their claims considered. If one’s claim has been considered and was outweighed, 
it is unreasonable for single individuals to insist that their claim has to have absolute 
priority over all weaker claims. If we accepted the absolute priority of stronger over 
weaker claims, there would be little point in distinguishing between relevant and 
irrelevant claims. However, the view that I advance here draws a distinction between 
cases in which claims cannot be staked because they are irrelevant, and cases in which 
claims are considered and outweighed. 
 The next extension of the idea of balancing concerns cases with heterogenous 
groups. How should we decide which claims are relevant in cases in which not all 
members of the group have claims of equal strength? And how should we decide in 
which order to balance claims against one another? In cases like Life versus Headaches 
or Life versus Paraplegia, the questions of relevance and order are more 
straightforward. Either the claims that compete with the claims to be saved from 
death are relevant to the claim to be saved from death, or they are not. Given that all 
opposing claims are of equal strength, there is no question of different orders in 
which to balance claims either. Things are more complicated in heterogenous group 
 
21 Wasserman and Strudler urge that they should. Wasserman and Strudler, “Can a 
Nonconsequentialist Count Lives?,” pp. 89-92. 
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cases. However, I believe that we can apply the same principle that explains the 
difference between Life versus Headaches and Life versus Paraplegia to the case of 
competing heterogenous groups. 
Not saving a person with a strong claim to be saved requires a special 
justification to this person. Given that the person with the strongest claim is most 
likely to have grounds for grievance or complaint against our failure to save her, our 
justification for acting as we do must be primarily addressed to those who have the 
strongest claim on our aid. This gives an answer to the question of the order of 
balancing. It explains why balancing starts with the strongest claim and then works 
its way down to less strong claims. The stronger the claim the greater is the urgency 
to give a justification to this person.22  
The same idea can also illuminate when claims are relevant. The justification 
we can give to this person has to respect the claim of the person to assistance. In Life 
versus Paraplegia, we can point out to the person dying that the claims of the many are 
all relevant to her plight. The other individuals are entitled to stake their claims on 
us. By contrast, it would be disrespectful to deny saving a person from death by 
pointing out that doing so would enable the agent to prevent some number of 
headaches. To consider the headaches as a reason not to save the person from death 
would trivialize her situation. The headaches are simply not relevant in comparison 
to the death.23 To say to the person: “I am sorry, but we cannot save your life because 
we are busy preventing many minor headaches” would trivialize what she stands to 
lose. This is not the case when we say: “I am sorry, but we cannot save your life 
because we are busy preventing many people from becoming paraplegic”. The 
“because” clause in the justification indicates that whether or not a justification is 
 
22 A possible alternative way to recognize the priority of the strongest claims is to balance in 
the interest of the person with the strongest claim. For a discussion of this possibility see van 
Gils and Tomlin, “Relevance Rides Again?,” pp. 250-52. Fortunately, we need not decide 
between the two principles. In my appendix “The Order of Balancing” I argue that balancing 
in the interest of the person with the strongest claim is equivalent to my Hybrid Balance 
Relevant Claims view except in cases where balancing in the interest of the person with the 
strongest claim violates Equal Consideration for Equal Claims. 
23 For this see Kamm, Intricate Ethics, pp. 297-98, 484-87; Bioethical Prescriptions, pp. 368-71; 
Lefkowitz, “On the Concept of a Morally Relevant Harm,” pp. 421-23; and Voorhoeve, “Why 
One Should Only Count Claims with which One Can Sympathize,” pp. 152-53. 
Chapter 5. Aggregation, Balancing, and Respect for the Claims of Individuals 
171 
 
respectful depends on for whose sake we fail to save the person from death. This 
suggests the following general principle: 
Respectful Failure to Save Principle. Every person that we fail to save is 
entitled to a respectful justification for our failure to save. It is 
disrespectful and impermissible to fail to save a person with a strong 
claim for the sake of persons whose claims are irrelevant to this strong 
claim. 
 The Respectful Failure to Save Principle tells us that what should guide our 
thinking about whether or not claims are relevant is determined by considering 
whether we can give a respectful justification to the person whom we fail to save. 
Applied to the case of balancing the claims of heterogenous groups, this principle 
identifies two scenarios in which counting claims as relevant renders us unable to 
respectfully justify our refusal to save. 
The first scenario concerns a local feature of the confrontation of two claims. 
Whether or not we can justify the balancing of claims will depend on the relation 
between the claim that is balanced and the balancing claims. These claims will need 
to be relevant to one another in order for the balancing to be respectful. Balancing a 
claim means depriving it of the force to ultimately decide what one ought to do. The 
claim still has force in deciding what ought to be done; in this sense it is not canceled. 
But it loses the force to ultimately “tip the balance”. This is quite serious and deserves 
justification. We cannot justify it to a person that the moral force of her claim is 
diminished because of claims that are irrelevant to her claim. It is part of the meaning 
of an irrelevant claim that if a claim is irrelevant to claim X, then it can neither 
diminish nor override claim X. 
 The second scenario is different. It highlights the existence of what Frances 
Kamm has called “irrelevant utilities”.24 To consider a trivial harm like a headache or 
a sore throat as the ultimate reason to save a group would be trivializing the fate of a 
person whose life will not be saved and thus be disrespectful to her. The headache or 
sore throat is not relevant for this decision. This type of disrespect that flows from the 
Respectful Failure of Save Principle is rather a global feature of the entire trade-off. It is 
 
24 Kamm, Morality, Mortality, 1:144-64. 
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disrespectful not because of the confrontation of two claims but rather because 
counting the trivial harm is disrespectful to the person whose life is at stake. The 
strongest claim in the opposing group fixes globally that trivial harms do not count. 
 What this means is that in each case of balancing, the claim must be relevant 
to the claim that is being balanced. As long as a person’s claim is relevant to the fate 
of the other person, this person can rightfully insist that her claim ought to be taken 
seriously. But if her claim is irrelevant, then the person would have to withdraw her 
claim and cannot insist that her claim needs to be balanced against the competing 
claim. This is the first part of my view. However, there is a second condition. What 
about claims that are locally relevant and would be ultimately decisive? Suppose, for 
the sake of argument, that claims to be saved from minor headaches would ultimately 
determine that we ought not save a person from death. From her personal perspective 
the person facing the minor headache would not be allowed to save herself if 
someone else would otherwise die. She would not be allowed to uphold her claim if 
her claim was only competing with the claim of the person about to die. So why 
should this person then be allowed to uphold her claim if doing so results in failing 
to save the dying person in the more complex case where more claims are at stake? 
In both cases, we would fail to save someone from death for the sake of another 
person whose claims are not relevant to the person whom we fail to save. This cannot 
amount to a satisfactory and respectful justification to the dying person. Therefore, 
the claims against headaches should not be counted as relevant. 
This argument leads to the following two conditions for determining the 
relevance of claims: 
(1) The local relevance condition: A claim can only be balanced with 
another claim if the two claims are relevant to one another. 
(2) The global relevance condition: Every individual with a strong claim 
has a veto against the consideration of any type of claim that is irrelevant 
to her claim, if such consideration will lead to her not being saved. 
The first scenario illustrates the need for a local relevance condition, while the 
second scenario illustrates the need for a global relevance condition. The two 
relevance conditions also illustrate and underline how balancing is distinct from 
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ordinary aggregation. Balance Relevant Claims contrasts here with Aggregate Relevant 
Claims.25 Aggregate Relevant Claims resolves conflicts of standpoints by appealing to 
aggregation. It thereby allows for aggregation, but only in a subset of cases. Only in 
those cases in which there is a conflict of standpoints, i.e. only in those cases in which 
the opposing claims are relevant to one another, can we permissibly aggregate. For 
Aggregate Relevant Claims it is clear from the outset which claims are relevant and 
hence can permissibly be aggregated. It is a crucial aspect of this view that the reason 
why we ought to save one group rather than the other is that the sum-total of claims 
is greater. This form of limited aggregation has a greater affinity with full 
aggregation. 
By contrast, for Balance Relevant Claims we need to reason sequentially and 
match individual claims against one another in order to determine which claims are 
relevant. The process of balancing makes it possible to identify which opposing 
claims deprived a person’s claims to be rescued. Balancing also allows us naturally 
to mention for whose sake we fail to save someone. It thereby sets clearly and 
intuitively apart cases where the ultimate reason for failing to save a person is a claim 
of the same magnitude, a relevant magnitude or an irrelevant magnitude. This means 
that we need to depart from a model that determines whether claims are relevant or 
not at the outset and then proceeds to aggregate those claims that are relevant. 
Aggregate Relevant Claims could not distinguish for whose sake we fail to save a 
person if different kinds of claims are allowed to be aggregated. 
This difference in determining the relevance of claims further indicates that 
the method of counting claims employed by Balance Relevant Claims is subtly 
different from the method employed by Aggregate Relevant Claims. The following 
analogy can help bring this out. There are two ways in mathematics to determine 
whether one set is larger than the other. One way counts the members of the set and 
then compares the number of elements in the set. Here the cardinal number, or sum-
total, matters. Another way of comparing the size of sets does not require any 
numeracy skills or even knowledge of numbers. We can see whether there is a 
 
25 A proponent of Aggregate Relevant Claims is Voorhoeve, “How Should We Aggregate 
Competing Claims?”. 
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bijection, a one-to-one correspondence mapping between all elements of the two sets. 
In this method we only need to map individual members against one another. 
Balancing is like this second approach in that it maps claims against one another 
rather than counting a sum-total. The way balancing counts claims employs a similar 
form of reasoning as the anonymous Pareto principle does. Like Paretian reasoning, 
balancing places the claims of different groups in one-to-one correspondence 
relations and observes whether one group ends up with stronger claims than the 
other. B&C is anonymously Pareto superior to A because while B’s claim can be 
matched by A’s claim, C’s claim cannot be so matched. The logic of the anonymous 
Pareto principle departs from simple aggregation.26 Balancing extends a similar 
reasoning beyond the case of tie-breakers. 
The difference between the way Balance Relevant Claims counts claims and 
the way Aggregate Relevant Claims counts claims highlights that it would be a 
mistake to lay too much emphasis on the question whether or not Balance Relevant 
Claims is aggregative in some sense. For example, in “Saving Lives, Moral Theory, 
and the Claims of Individuals” Otsuka discusses and rejects ideas about balancing 
inter alia because they do not abide by the individualist restriction, i.e. the constraint 
that the justifiability of moral principles depends only on that principle’s implications 
for single individuals.27 I advocate here that we should not think that all ways of 
violating the individualist restriction are equally bad. While both Aggregate Relevant 
Claims and Balance Relevant Claims seek to limit the role of aggregation, Aggregate 
Relevant Claims does so by appealing to a form of restricted aggregation while Balance 
Relevant Claims seeks to introduce a form of aggregation light. To better respect the 
separateness of persons, Balance Relevant Claims proposes a different way of 
reasoning about cases in which the standpoints of different individuals conflict. 
Before proceeding, I address one concern about the hybrid character of my 
view. The worry is that it is gerrymandered and can explain our intuitions about cases 
only because it relies on divergent conditions that cannot be coherently defended. In 
 
26 See also Iwao Hirose, “Saving the greater number without combining claims,” Analysis 61 
(2001): 341-43. 
27 For the individualist restriction see Parfit, On What Matters, 1:193. 
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response, I have argued that both conditions originate from a single overarching 
principle. This principle illuminates the idea of respect that proponents of limited 
aggregation have relied upon. The fact that there are two conditions is only the 
reflection of the fact that disrespect can manifest itself in various ways. A related 
concern is that the combination of the two conditions does not fit well the model of 
balancing. The concern is that the conditions license a form of double counting. 
Individuals with a claim that is balanced can nonetheless exercise their veto against 
the consideration of other claims. This claim would have balanced some claims and 
vetoed other claims. In response, we can see more clearly that this is not double 
counting by reminding ourselves of the distinction between balancing and canceling. 
Balancing means that a claim is only deprived of some of its moral force. In a 
confrontation between two equally strong claimants, each of the claims will be 
balanced yet nonetheless we are required to save one of them. These balanced claims 
retain some moral force to ensure that we cannot escape our duty to save because of 
the fact that both are equally deserving of our aid. The reason why a balanced claim 
retains this power is that failing to save anyone in the case of equally balanced claims 
would disrespect their moral standing as persons who deserve to be saved. Similarly, 
without the veto condition, a decision-maker would be licensed to fail to save the 
person in a disrespectful manner. A person’s claim can never be deprived of the force 
to insist on respectful treatment. 
 
IV. Illustrations of Hybrid Balance Relevant Claims 
 
 The view that I defend is complex. I will help to illustrate it with three 
examples. We can imagine the examples to be decisions about the allocation of scarce 
medical resources that can be used to save people from permanent medical 
conditions and restore them to full health. The medical conditions are specified by 
broad categories of severe impairments, moderate impairments, and mild 
impairments. While the mild impairments are relevant to the moderate impairments 
and the moderate impairments are relevant to the severe impairments, mild 
impairments are not relevant to severe impairments. The use of general categories 
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leaves open room for disagreement about what conditions are relevant to one 
another. It also leaves open the possibility that two individuals have the same claim 
to aid even though one is facing a slightly worse hardship.28 I take no stance on these 
issues here and will rather assume that the claims of individuals fall within these 
three categories. Hybrid Balance Relevant Claims is compatible with a variety of 
views concerning the relative moral importance of alleviating different conditions. 
For the sake of my illustrations we can assume that ten claims against a moderate 
impairment are equal in strength to one claim against a severe impairment. Likewise, 
ten claims against a mild impairment are equal in strength to one claim against a 
moderate impairment. In my examples I illustrate claims that are balanced on either 
side by bracketing them. 
 
In Case One the claim to be saved from a severe impairment is balanced by 
the ten claims against moderate impairment. If it was not for my global relevance 
condition, the claim against moderate impairment in favor of Group A could be 
outweighed by the claims against mild impairment. However, the global relevance 
condition blocks this. It would be disrespectful to the person with the severe 
impairment not to save her for the sake of people afflicted with a mild impairment. 
Considering the mild impairments vitiates a respectful justification that we can give 
to the person losing out. 
 
 
28 See Kamm, Bioethical Prescriptions, pp. 408-11. 
Table 4.1: Case One
Group A Group B
(1 Severe)
1 Moderate (10 Moderate)
11 Mild
Table 4.2: Case Two
Group A Group B
(1 Severe)
(10 Moderate) + (1 Moderate)
(10 Mild) + 1 Mild
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Case Two illustrates when claims that are irrelevant to the strongest overall 
claim nonetheless remain relevant. Here the claims against severe impairment are 
balanced by ten claims against a moderate impairment. The moderate impairment 
would then indicate that we should save Group B. But B’s claim can be balanced in 
favor of A by taking into consideration the claims of the mildly impaired. Ignoring 
the claims of the mildly impaired here would not be disrespectful towards the one 
with the severe impairment. On the contrary, it is in her interest that these claims are 
to be counted. 
 
But what about Case Three then? Here the last unbalanced claim is one of a 
mild impairment and this claim advocates not saving the group with the most serious 
claim of severe impairment. Can we justify this to the person with the severe 
impairment? I believe we can. Had we not counted the persons with mild 
impairments in this case, we should still save Group B. The claims in Group B to be 
saved from a moderate impairment would outweigh the claim of the single person 
with a severe impairment in A. The person with the severe impairment cannot 
complain that we do not save her because of the claims to be freed from the mild 
impairment. Had we not counted these we would still not be permitted to save her. 
If only claims against severe and moderate impairment count, we ought to save B. 
Accordingly, my global relevance condition does not block considering the claims of 
mild impairment in this case. There is no point for the person with the severe 
impairment to exercise her veto, since she would not be saved even if we fail to 
consider the claims of mild impairment. Consequently, we can justify our failure to 
save to the person with the severe impairment. Counting the persons with mild 
impairments does not vitiate a justification that we can give to this person. 
Cases One and Two illustrate that the hybrid view has a certain asymmetry. 
We consider claims of mild impairment when they favor the person with the 
Table 4.3: Case Three
Group A Group B
(1 Severe)
(10 Moderate) + (1 Moderate)
(10 Mild) + (1 Mild) (1 Mild) + 1 Mild
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strongest claim, but not when they oppose the strongest claim. This asymmetry may 
seem suspect. The asymmetry does not, however, violate the principle that Tomlin 
has called Equal Consideration for Equal Claims. According to Equal Consideration for 
Equal Claims, we should give equal weight to claims of equal strength. My view does 
this. Whenever some claims of a certain relevance class become relevant, all claims of 
that class become relevant. If, in Case Two, there were other claims against mild 
impairment on the side of Group B, these would equally have to be counted. For 
every moral choice, it is either the case that the claims of a given class are relevant or 
irrelevant. 
The asymmetry is more modest than a violation of Equal Consideration for 
Equal Claims in that the relevance of less strong claims depends, inter alia, on which 
group has the strongest claim in its favor. This modest asymmetry can be defended. 
My previous argument that illustrates the different justifications we can give to the 
person with the strongest claim does just this. Counting mild impairments in Case 
One would make the failure to save the person with the severe impairment 
disrespectful. Counting the mild impairment in Case Two, however, would not be 
disrespectful to the persons in Group B whom we would fail to save. Further, for the 
reasons I outlined above, counting mild impairments in Case Three does not vitiate 
the justification we can give to the person with a severe impairment. If this 
explanation succeeds, then the asymmetry is justified. 
One other feature may seem to violate Equal Consideration for Equal Claims. 
Consider the following two cases. 
 
Table 4.4: Variation on Case Two
Group A Group B
(1 Severe)
(10 Moderate) + (1 Moderate)
(10 Mild) + 1 Mild
(1 Severe) + (1 Severe) (1 Severe)
(10 Moderate) + 1 Moderate
11 Mild
Case Two
Case Two*
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In Case Two, we ought to save Group A. The claims against mild impairment 
are locally relevant to the claims of moderate impairment in Group B. In Case Two*, 
we ought to save Group B. The claims against mild impairment are irrelevant 
according to my global relevance condition because of the presence of a claim against 
severe impairment in Group B. Even though we added equal claims to both sides, 
our verdict of permissibility changes. This feature does not violate Equal Consideration 
for Equal Claims. Both claims against severe impairment are equally considered. 
Indeed, it is because they are considered equally that claims against mild impairment 
become irrelevant on either side. 
While it might seem counterintuitive that the addition of equally strong 
claims should change the permissibility of our decision, there is a rationale for this. 
With the addition of the claim against severe impairment in Group B something 
important changes. We can no longer justify considering the claims against mild 
impairment as ultimately decisive. In Case Two this was plausible since doing so 
would not result in a person not being saved whose claims are in a different class of 
relevance. But this changes in Case Two*. This change should lead us to consider the 
case differently and accept the verdict that Group B ought to be saved. The addition 
of the same claim on both sides can therefore change what one ought to do. 
 
V. Hybrid Balance Relevant Claims and  
Objections to Limited Aggregation 
 
So far, I have defended Hybrid Balance Relevant Claims as a theory of limited 
aggregation that can be applied both to homogenous group cases and to 
heterogenous group cases. It is also well-grounded in the commitment to the 
separateness of persons. In the remainder of the chapter I will show how the hybrid 
character of my view escapes challenges that other views of limited aggregation face. 
I will start with challenges to views that rely on a global relevance condition before 
moving on to challenges against purely local relevance. In a third step, I discuss and 
reject one challenge which all views of limited aggregation face. 
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A. Problems with Global Relevance 
 
Consider first Tomlin’s challenge to limited aggregation. Tomlin has 
presented this as a problem against Voorhoeve’s version of Aggregate Relevant 
Claims. Tomlin has pointed out that the idea of relevance in Aggregate Relevant 
Claims is ambiguous between two interpretations. Are claims relevant if they are 
relevant to the strongest claim with which they compete? Or are claims relevant if 
they are relevant to the strongest claim overall? Tomlin calls this the Anchoring 
Problem and goes on to argue that in either case Aggregate Relevant Claims has 
deeply implausible implications when applied to heterogenous group cases. The 
problem with Voorhoeve’s Aggregate Relevant Claims is that it only contains a global 
relevance condition. The two alternatives that Tomlin outlines are both forms of 
global relevance that tell us that claims either are or are not relevant in a given choice 
situation. Since my view is a hybrid view that incorporates both a global and a local 
relevance condition, it avoids the Anchoring Problem. 
The first possibility is that claims are relevant when they are relevant to the 
strongest claim with which they compete (Anchor by Competition).29 Tomlin provides 
the following counterexample. 
 
In Case One the two groups are evenly matched. In Case Two, the claim of 
the member of Group A against a mild impairment is relevant because it is relevant 
 
29 Tomlin, “On Limited Aggregation,” pp. 240-44. 
Table 4.5: Anchor by Competition
Group A Group B
1 Severe
10 Moderate
1 Severe
10 Moderate
1 Mild n  Mild
Anchor by Competition Case One
Anchor by Competition Case Two
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to the claims against moderate impairment in Group B. But the claims against a mild 
impairment in Group B are not relevant since they are not relevant to the claim 
against severe impairment in Group A. No matter how large the n, we will always 
favor Group A. This is deeply implausible. Not only is this implausible, it would also 
be very difficult to theoretically accept this conclusion. Anchor by Competition 
illustrates Equal Consideration for Equal Claims. 
By contrast, my view resolves Case Two differently. In Case Two the global 
relevance condition treats the mild impairments as irrelevant utilities. This means 
that nothing changes for this case. We are still in a tie. The global relevance condition 
that I adopt respects Equal Consideration for Equal Claims. If a person with a strong 
claim can veto other claims, the person vetoes all claims of the same type. Thus, 
claims are always either relevant or irrelevant in a given situation. 
 Consider now Tomlin’s second alternative (Anchor by Strength).30 This 
alternative holds that relevance is determined by reference to the strongest overall 
claim, regardless of which side this claim favors. The following example illustrates 
this. 
 
 In Case One, the claims against mild impairment are relevant since the 
strongest overall claim is against moderate impairment. The claims against mild 
impairment can therefore outweigh the claims against moderate impairment. In Case 
Two, however, the claims against mild impairment are no longer relevant to the 
 
30 Tomlin, “On Limited Aggregation,” pp. 244-47. 
Table 4.6: Anchor by Strength
Group A Group B
11 Moderate
111 Mild
1 Severe
11 Moderate
111 Mild
Anchor by Strength Case One
Anchor by Strength Case Two
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strongest overall claim. This makes it the case that the claims against moderate 
impairment can now outweigh the claim against severe impairment. Group B ought 
to be saved even though Group A has now one additional strong claim in its favor. 
This violates the Principle of Addition since Group A is less choiceworthy even though 
there is an additional claim in Group A present. 
Anchor by Strength has the problem that only the strongest claim determines 
which claims are relevant. My hybrid view on the other hand allows that claims that 
are not relevant to the strongest claim can be relevant in balancing claims provided 
that it is not to the disadvantage of any person with the strongest claim. This means that the 
hybrid view, unlike Anchor by Strength, fulfils Tomlin’s Principle of Addition. The 
violation of the Principle of Addition occurs when adding a claim can render less 
important claims irrelevant. But my view admits that such claims can still remain 
locally relevant and we are allowed to consider them when doing so does not weaken 
the case for the strongest claim. In the counterexample to Anchor by Strength it is 
even in the interest of the person with the strongest claim that the weaker claims are 
counted. The strongest claim cannot complain that considering these claims would 
be disrespectful to her. These claims are her “allies” and according to my view a 
strong claim cannot lose its “allies” by rendering them globally irrelevant. This means 
that the hybrid view, unlike Anchor by Strength, fulfils Tomlin’s Principle of Addition. 
Since my view implies neither of the two problematic case judgments and also 
does not violate either of the two principles that Tomlin proposes, it avoids the 
Anchoring Problem. As I have just shown, part of the reason for this is the acceptance 
of some form of local relevance condition. Tomlin himself, together with Aart van 
Gils, has proposed a view that embodies a form of local relevance as a possible 
response to the Anchoring Problem.31  
 
 
 
31 Van Gils and Tomlin, “Relevance Rides Again?”. Already in “On Limited Aggregation” 
Tomlim tentatively suggests a view of local relevance (pp. 259-60). He cites Garett Cullity and 
Victor Tadros as inspirations for this kind of view. See also Tadros, “Localized Restricted 
Aggregation”. I discuss the difference between Tomlin’s (and van Gils’s) version of balancing 
and mine in the appendix Hybrid Balance Relevant Claims versus Sequential Matching. 
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B. Problems with Local Relevance 
 
Unlike Tomlin’s (and van Gils’s) own solution to the Anchoring Problem, I 
believe that while we should incorporate local relevance, we should not give up on 
global relevance altogether. To see why the hybrid character of my view is important 
consider Kamm’s Sore Throat Case. Kamm’s Sore Throat Case is an illustration of the 
problem of irrelevant utilities. In Kamm’s case we have the choice between saving 
one life and saving another life alongside saving a person from a sore throat. But this 
additional sore throat should not tip the balance and render it mandatory to save the 
second person.32 Not all versions of limited aggregation are able to accommodate this 
case. In particular, this case presents a challenge to versions of Balance Relevant 
Claims that lack a global relevance condition. Such views cannot tell us why it is 
impermissible to count the claim of the sore throat. 
My view that combines a local and global relevance condition can do so. In 
the Sore Throat Case the claim to be saved from a sore throat is globally irrelevant. It 
should not feature in our deliberation. The two claims to be saved from death would 
be evenly balanced against one another. Their force in ultimately deciding what we 
ought to do is thereby deprived. We are left with a tie. Either we have to give equal 
chances, or it is permissible to save either group. 
The global relevance condition also allows my view to avoid a similar 
problem.33 Imagine there is one claim against death in Group A that is balanced by 
enough claims in Group B so that a single claim against severe impairment remains. 
This claim against severe impairment is then balanced by enough claims in Group A 
so that a single claim against moderate impairment remains. This claim in turn is then 
balanced, and so on. In the end a single claim against a trivial inconvenience, like a 
sore throat, remains. If we did not accept a global relevance condition, we would have 
to accept that a sore throat could become decisive in this scenario. But it seems 
implausible that it really should. By accepting a global relevance condition, my view 
 
32 Kamm, Morality, Mortality, 1:101-2, 146-47; Intricate Ethics, p. 34; and Bioethical Prescriptions, 
pp. 368-69. 
33 Van Gils and Tomlin, “Relevance Rides Again?,” pp. 242-44. 
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can appealingly explain why the sore throat should not be decisive. It would be 
disrespectful not to save a person from death (or severe impairment for that matter) 
because of the existence of a sore throat. Under my view, instead of letting balancing 
proceed until trivial inconvenience such cases would be decided by claims that are 
still relevant to the strongest claim that we fail to satisfy. 
Kamm’s Sore Throat case is an objection to a view that adopts only a local 
relevance condition. While my view incorporates and explains the intuition in the 
Sore Throat case, accepting that the sore throat makes a difference may not be a 
decisive objection for a proponent of purely local relevance. Some philosophers 
writing on aggregation have expressed doubt whether we should retain the intuition 
that it is permissible to save either of the two persons in Kamm’s case.34 Versions of 
Balance Relevant Claims that contain only a local relevance condition are, however, 
subject to a different objection that my view avoids. Joe Horton provides this excellent 
criticism against views of purely local relevance. He devises the following case with 
two stages.35 
 
34 See e.g. Campbell Brown, “Is close enough good enough?,” Economics & Philosophy 36 (2020): 
29-59, at pp. 41-42; van Gils and Tomlin, “Relevance Rides Again?,” pp. 231-42; and Korbinian 
Rüger, “Aggregation with Constraints,” Utilitas (forthcoming). 
35 For the case see Horton, “Always Aggregate,” pp. 168-71. I changed the precise example so 
that it fits the stipulations about relevance that I have used throughout the paper. One further 
comment: Horton argues that the problem limited aggregation faces is a problem of path 
dependence. The order in which claims are balanced against one another matters (Horton, 
“Always Aggregate,” pp. 167-68). The word “path dependence” is misleading, however. It 
indicates that the stages in Horton’s case are sequential. But the temporal element introduces 
additional difficulties in the case. For if we knew in advance that the people in the later stage 
will be in this position, then we can simply skip the first choice. And if we did not know and 
only later come to know of the people that are “added”, then this raises problems about the 
evidence-relativity of moral theories and about what we are required to do once we already 
made a commitment to helping some. To avoid these unnecessary complications, we should 
rather understand the different stages counterfactually. The objection then is that if there were 
additional people, then something implausible would follow. 
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At Stage One, we should save the person from the severe impairment. What 
about Stage Two? A form of Balance Relevant Claims with only a local relevance 
condition would resolve it as follows: The claim against severe impairment in Group 
A can be balanced by claims against moderate impairment in Group B. The remaining 
claim against moderate impairment in Group B can be balanced against one claim 
against moderate impairment in Group A. The remaining ten claims against 
moderate impairment can also be balanced and even outweighed by claims against 
mild impairment in Group B. Hence, we ought to save Group B. 
However, in this case intuitively we should still save Group A in Stage Two. 
The equal addition of claims should not make a difference in this case. While I argued 
that sometimes we can justify that the addition of equally strong claims on both sides 
makes a difference, it is hard to see why it should make a difference in this case. My 
argument was based on the idea that my adding a claim that is stronger than any 
other claim in the group, we change what justifications are available to this group for 
not saving them. This consideration is clearly not at stake in the present case. It would 
be desirable, therefore, if we could retain the judgment that in Stage Two we should 
save Group A as well. My view can do so in an intuitive fashion. The reason why we 
ought to save Group A in Stage Two as well is that the person with the severe 
impairment can complain and veto our failing to rescue her for the sake of people 
with mild impairments. 
Horton explains that the failure of a view that only contains a local relevance 
condition is that it can allow for irrelevant claims to be “activated” in a manner in 
Table 4.7: Horton against Local Relevance
Group A Group B
1 Severe
1,000 Mild
1 Severe
11 Moderate 11 Moderate
1,000 Mild
Local Relevance Stage One
Local Relevance Stage Two
Chapter 5. Aggregation, Balancing, and Respect for the Claims of Individuals 
186 
 
which they can help outweighing the strongest claim. If there are any claims against 
moderate impairment in Group A, then, under the view Horton criticizes, it is always 
possible to balance the claims against moderate impairment in Group A against the 
claims against mild impairment in Group B.36 Even if we added a greater number of 
claims against moderate impairment to Group A than to Group B, this could still 
mean that we should ultimately save Group B in Stage Two. The idea is that 
introducing claims against moderate impairment makes mild impairments relevant, 
so that they can contribute to our reasons for saving Group B. The claims against mild 
impairment could here outweigh the remaining claims against moderate impairment. 
But this is what my global relevance condition blocks. The person with a severe 
impairment has a veto against claims of mild impairment being considered. Mild 
impairments are treated as irrelevant utilities. My hybrid view therefore avoids the 
problem that Horton raises for views of pure local relevance. 
 
C. Principle of Agglomeration 
 
Horton, in his article, also raises another objection against limited 
aggregation. He describes the possibility that there are two separate moral decisions 
with one group we are required to save. But once we join the two decisions, it is 
possible that the group composed of those we ought to have saved no longer ought 
to be saved.37 Horton might appeal here to something like the Principle of 
Agglomeration according to which combining groups that ought to be saved cannot 
render them a group that ought not to be saved. 
The following case illustrates the problem.38 
 
36 Horton, “Always Aggregate,” pp. 171-73. 
37 Horton, “Always Aggregate,” p. 173. 
38 Another, weaker, illustration is my previous argument that adding equal claims on both 
sides can make it the case that a different group ought to be saved. In this previous case 
merging a choice where A ought to be chosen with a choice where we ought to be indifferent 
can make it the case that B ought to be chosen. Here, it is the case that merging two decisions 
in which parts of A would be chosen makes it the case that B will be chosen. 
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In both Sub-Cases we ought to save the sub-set of A, but in the combined case 
we ought to save the combination of the sub-sets of B. Notice, however, the following. 
We could also divide the case in the following sub-sets. 
 
In these Sub-Cases it is obvious that any limited aggregation view would have 
to select B in both cases. What does it tell us? First, any view on limited aggregation 
needs to decide the four sub-cases the way I suggested. They follow 
straightforwardly from the stipulations I have made about relevance. If we accept the 
Principle of Agglomeration, we ought to save Group A because Sub-Case One and 
Two tell us to save sub-groups of A. But if we accept the Principle of Agglomeration, 
Table 4.8: Principle of Agglomeration
Group A Group B
(1 Severe)
(10 Moderate) + (1 Moderate)
(10 Mild) + (980 Mild) (980 Mild) + 20 Mild
1 Severe
1,000 Mild
(11 Moderate)
(110 Mild) + 880 Mild
Combined Case
Sub-Case One
Sub-Case Two
Table 4.9: Principle of Agglomeration (Alternative)
Group A Group B
(1 Severe)
(10 Moderate) + 1 Moderate
(990 Mild) (990 Mild) + 10 Mild
Sub-Case Three
Sub-Case Four
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we also ought to save Group B because Sub-Case Three and Four tell us to save sub-
groups of B. Yet we cannot save both A and B. In other words, any view of limited 
aggregation has to violate the Principle of Agglomeration.39 
Agglomeration is intuitively appealing. What difference can mere composition 
really make? Should it really matter in which groups we are finding people 
assembled? Agglomeration shares one feature with the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives. Of course, if alternatives really are irrelevant then they should not count. 
The problem is that sometimes alternatives can be relevant even if they do not appear 
to be at first sight. Whether or not one option is on the table influences, for example, 
the kinds of justifications we can give to those we do not save. Similarly, composition 
can be relevant if it is not mere composition but something else that changes. 
A successful agglomeration argument should be one where mere scaling up 
results in a reversal of permissibility. In Chapter 3 (Contractualism, Complaints, and 
Risk) I have argued that ex post contractualism does this. Ex post contractualism 
would be willing to impose objective and probabilistically independent risks on two 
distinct groups of people. But the very same risk imposition which affects each 
individual in the very same manner would be impermissible if imposed on the group 
as a whole. Here nothing of significance changes when we change the composition of 
the group. 
This agglomeration argument differs crucially from Horton’s. It is 
symmetrical in the sense that everyone is equally affected in the sub-groups. Horton’s 
agglomeration cases do not have this feature. They crucially rely on the fact that the 
groups that are combined are not symmetrical. This makes it plausible that it is not 
mere composition that changes. Joining the groups together changes the moral 
situation by changing the relations of individuals towards one another. For example, 
the existence of persons with moderate impairments enables us to give the person 
with a severe impairment a justification we were previously unable to give. These 
special relations between different persons only arise in the particular configuration 
 
39 In his article, Horton claims that the agglomeration objection is one part of a dilemma for 
limited aggregation. What my argument here shows is that Horton is incorrect about this 
point. The concern about agglomeration is not a concern that any form of limited aggregation 
can avoid by embracing a different “horn”.  
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of one case. They do not necessarily hold between sub-sets of these persons. Since 
limited aggregation is predicated on the idea that the moral relations of individuals 
to one another are important, we should not be surprised that changes in the relations 
of individuals will change permissibility verdicts. We can give a satisfactory 
explanation why agglomeration is not a mere change in composition.40 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Limited aggregation is an attractive intermediate position between fully 
aggregative views and views that avoid all aggregation. But not all forms of 
aggregation are the same. I distinguished between two forms of limited aggregation, 
one with greater affinity to the outright rejection of all aggregation and another with 
greater affinity towards aggregative thinking. The motivation that leads us to reject 
full aggregation, the separateness of persons, is better developed by Balance Relevant 
Claims which show greater affinity to the outright denial of aggregation. 
Hybrid Balance Relevant Claims can also refine our ideas about which claims 
should be treated as relevant and which ones should not. It imposes two 
requirements. One is local insofar as each individual instance of balancing has to 
occur between relevant claims. Another one is global insofar as it ensures that we can 
also give a respect-based justification to those whom we fail to save. We will never 
not save someone for the sake of people with claims that are irrelevant from the 
standpoint of those who we fail to save. This hybrid view is therefore not a cheap 
compromise between two theories that we ought to reject. Rather, the two 
components nicely flow from the common motivation that our decisions about whom 
to save should respect also those individuals whose claims we cannot fulfil. 
If we adopt Hybrid Balance Relevant Claims we can respond to the recent 
criticism of limited aggregation. We can develop a view that avoids Tomlin’s 
 
40 In his article Horton claims that his dilemma shows why intransitivity is not as innocuous 
as proponents of limited aggregation have claimed (Horton, “Always Aggregate,” pp. 170-
71). What my response here shows is that Horton’s agglomeration problem is not any more 
troubling to limited aggregationists than previous challenges were. My reply here invokes the 
importance of moral relations and relational properties, the very same considerations that are 
invoked to argue why transitivity and the independence of irrelevant alternatives fail. 
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Anchoring Problem, as well as the problems that Horton has raised for views with 
purely local relevance. We only need to pay close attention to the guiding principle 
of respecting those whom we, sadly, cannot save. 
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Balancing Three (or More) Groups 
 
In the chapter I have only considered cases with two distinct groups. My view 
should ideally not be limited to such cases but also possibly be applied to choices 
between three or more groups. This is not trivial. Balancing is by its nature confined 
to one-on-one comparisons. This might seem to limit or make impossible its 
applications to decisions with more than two groups.41 
The easiest way to maintain this one-on-one confrontation is to engage in 
pairwise comparisons between the groups. We compare Group A to Group B, Group 
B to Group C, Group C to Group A. If one group wins both pairwise comparisons, 
then we ought to save this group. Pairwise comparisons cannot help us in all cases, 
however. Assume that the A-claims are against severe impairment, B-claims against 
moderate impairment, and C-claims against mild impairment. Without knowing the 
numbers, we can say that A ought to be saved rather than C. But we cannot say 
anything about the choices between A and B, and B and C. It is possible then that B 
ought to be saved rather than A, and C ought to be saved rather than B. If this is the 
case, we have a cycle and pairwise comparisons cannot tell us whom to save. 
Balance Relevant Claims can, however, take a similar solution to this problem 
as Aggregate Relevant Claims.42 The guiding principle of Balance Relevant Claims is 
that we should be able to respectfully justify not saving the person with the strongest 
claim. In our three-option example, we know that we cannot justify saving C to the 
persons with a severe impairment. Ignoring their plight in favor of mild impairments 
would not give due respect to the severity of their condition. This means that C is not 
an option for us. Saving group A or B are both in principle possible. Neither would 
render the decision disrespectful to the person most likely to have a grievance. We 
can then compare A and B in isolation. Depending on the numbers we would save 
either A or B. 
 
41 Wasserman and Strudler, “Can a Nonconsequentialist Count Lives?,” p. 93. 
42 For Voorhoeve’s solution see Voorhoeve, “How Should We Aggregate Competing 
Claims?,” pp. 76-78. Voorhoeve builds on the work of Frances Kamm. See Kamm, Intricate 
Ethics, pp. 297-98. 
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This method can also be applied to cases where the groups are heterogenous. 
Consider an example. 
 
In pairwise comparisons Group B is favored over A; Group C is favored over 
B; and Group A is favored over C. To break the cycle, we have to look at potential 
respectful justifications. Could saving Group A be justified to Group B? Yes, the 
person in Group A faces a more significant hardship than those in Group B. This can 
be a suitable justification. Could saving Group B be justified to Group C? Again yes, 
there are more people suffering from the moderate impairment in Group B. Could 
saving Group C be justified to Group A? No, because the only way we could prefer 
Group C is by counting the claims against the mild impairment. This is analogous to 
the previous case where the single person with a severe impairment cannot accept 
that we save the group with the mild impairment. After eliminating Group C, we can 
compare Groups A and B. 
This method will hold generally. In effect, it asks us to eliminate the claims 
that are not relevant to the strongest claim. This means that only those claims that are 
relevant to the strongest claim can count. Whichever option has the greatest weight 
of claims that are relevant to the strongest claim, will then be the chosen option. 
The justification is coherent and does not render Balance Relevant Claims 
unattractive. The exclusion of options from the cycle is motivated by the same 
principle as Balance Relevant Claims itself. It recognizes the primary importance of 
the person with the strongest claim. Since she has the strongest claim on our help, we 
need to justify our action primarily to her. Balance Relevant Claims is one way of 
doing so. Balance Relevant Claims seeks to ensure that our decision to save will 
always be respectful to everyone involved. The exclusion of options from supposed 
preference cycles achieves the same goal.  
  
Table 4.10: Balancing Three Groups
Group A Group B Group C
1 Severe
11 Moderate 1 Moderate
101 Mild
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Hybrid Balance Relevant Claims versus Sequential Matching 
 
 In their paper “Relevance Rides Again?” Aart van Gils and Patrick Tomlin 
consider a view similar to the one I have defended.43 They call their view Sequential-
Claims Matching. Sequential-Claims Matching is equivalent to what I call Balance 
Relevant Claims. Unlike my hybrid view, however, there is no additional global 
relevance condition. For this reason, Sequential-Claims Matching cannot account for 
the intuition that sometimes small harms, like a sore throat, should not be decisive in 
decisions about whom to save from severe conditions. At one point in the paper, van 
Gils and Tomlin consider a condition similar to my global relevance condition. The 
question they are concerned with is how should we continue to balance after a tie has 
occurred? The proposal under consideration is that claims can only we counted if 
they are relevant to the tied claims. For example, in Kamm’s Sore Throat case the sore 
throat would not be counted because it is not relevant to the claims that constitute the 
tie, i.e. claims to be saved from death. My global relevance condition can also explain 
why the sore throat should not be decisive but does this in a different manner. On my 
view, it is not important whether claims are relevant to the tie but rather whether the 
decisive claim is relevant to the strongest claim in the group which would not be 
saved. 
The following case which van Gils and Tomlin present against their own 
proposal illustrates why my global relevance condition is superior.44 
 
43 Van Gils and Tomlin, “Relevance Rides Again?”. 
44 Van Gils and Tomlin, “Relevance Rides Again?,” p. 240. Again, I have changed the precise 
example to fit it to the stipulations about relevance which I have used in the previous chapters. 
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 Following van Gils’s and Tomlin’s proposal, Case One would be a tie. The 
claims against death and severe impairment are evenly balanced. The claims against 
the mild impairment are irrelevant to the claims against severe impairment and 
therefore do not count. In Case Two, however, the claim against moderate 
impairment is relevant to the tie. This renders the claims against mild impairment 
relevant to the claim against moderate impairment. Together they outweigh the claim 
in Group B. We should now save Group A. This means that van Gils’s and Tomlin’s 
proposal violates the Principle of Addition. The addition of a claim against moderate 
impairment made Group B less choiceworthy. 
 The global relevance condition helps avoid this implication. In Case One, the 
same analysis as before holds for my view. The persons facing severe impairment can 
veto that claims against mild impairment are counted. The result is a tie. In Case Two, 
the persons facing severe impairment can again veto the claims against mild 
impairment. Now the person facing death can veto the claim against moderate 
impairment. The result is, again, a tie. 
 
  
Table 4.11: Hybrid Balance Relevance Claims versus Sequential Matching
Group A Group B
1 Death
10 Severe
11 Mild
1 Death
10 Severe
1 Moderate
11 Mild
Case One
Case Two
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The Order of Balancing 
 
 Van Gils and Tomlin identify an issue where Balance Relevant Claims seems 
incomplete. In which order should we balance claims? In the chapter, I started with 
the strongest claim and then continued to balance less strong claims. The justification 
for this was that the person with the strongest claim is the one to whom justification 
is owed most urgently. But priority for the person with the strongest claim could be 
expressed differently. We could also balance in the interest of the person with the 
strongest claim. Van Gils and Tomlin call this alternative “Strongest Decides”.45 
Strongest Decides, they contend, differs from the standard version of Balance 
Relevant Claims. They illustrate this with the following case.46 
 
 Assume we were to balance claims starting with the strongest claim and 
continuing sequentially but without my global relevance condition. In this case, the 
claims against mild impairment are decisive. Strongest Decides, on the other side, 
would balance the claims against moderate impairment with one another. The claims 
against mild impairment would then be deemed irrelevant to the claim against severe 
impairment. My Hybrid Balance Relevant Claims can account for the same result. 
The global relevance condition ensures that the claims against mild impairment 
cannot be ultimately decisive in not saving the person from severe impairment. 
 This indicates that Hybrid Balance Relevant Claims can, in some cases, 
combine starting with the strongest claim and balancing in the interest of the 
strongest claim. Strongest Decides can differ from standard forms of Balance 
Relevant Claims by rendering claims irrelevant. In the above example it does so by 
 
45 Van Gils and Tomlin, “Relevance Rides Again?,” pp. 250-52. 
46 Van Gils and Tomlin, “Relevance Rides Again?,” p. 250. Once more I adjusted the relevance 
stipulations for sake of consistency with the ones I have used. 
Table 4.12: The Order of Balancing
Group A Group B
1 Severe
11 Moderate 11 Moderate
11 Mild
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creating a “gap” in the line of claims to be considered. It balances claims of equal 
strength with one another and thereby leaves some claims in a group to be irrelevant 
to the overall strongest claim. This is also what my global relevance condition does. 
If claims that are irrelevant to the strongest claim would tip the balance, they become 
irrelevant. My view does not need to alter the order in which claims are balanced to 
account for this. 
 Strongest Decides can also differ from other forms of Balance Relevant 
Claims, including mine, in a different manner. Consider the following case.  
 
 In this case, my view says that we ought to save Group B. If we were to not 
count the claims of mild impairment, the person with severe impairment would get 
counterbalanced by the claims against moderate impairment itself. In a case like this 
it is possible for Strongest Decides to differ from my view. It would approach the case 
as follows. 
 
 By balancing the claims against moderate impairment in Group B with the 
claims against mild impairment in Group A, Strongest Decides renders the claims 
against mild impairment in Group B irrelevant. My global relevance condition would 
not have deemed the claims against mild impairment irrelevant. This is because 
doing so would also render Group A’s claims against mild impairment irrelevant. 
But the person with the severe impairment needs these claims to count against B’s 
claims against moderate impairment. This means that Strongest Decides differs from 
my approach here. It also highlights the problem with Strongest Decides, namely it 
Table 4.13: Hybrid Balance Relevance Claims versus Strongest Decides
Group A Group B
(1 Severe)
(10 Moderate) + (1 Moderate)
(10 Mild) + (100 Mild) (100 Mild) + 10 Mild
Table 4.14: Hybrid Balance Relevance Claims versus Strongest Decides (II)
Group A Group B
1 Severe
(11 Moderate)
(110 Mild) 110 Mild
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violates Equal Consideration for Equal Claims. Claims of mild impairment are 
considered and balanced if they are in Group A but deemed irrelevant if they are in 
Group B. 
 Van Gils and Tomlin discuss the violation of Equal Consideration for Equal 
Claims and suggest the following argument in defense of Strongest Decides.47 
Strongest Decides does not violate a narrower version of Equal Consideration for Equal 
Claims according to which it is impermissible that some claims of equal strength are 
disregarded at the outset while others are not. In my example it is not the case that 
some claims against mild impairment are disregarded at the outset. It is only because 
there are multiple ways of balancing claims against one another and the fact that the 
strongest claim chose this particular way of balancing. I remain unconvinced that this 
form of violating Equal Consideration for Equal Claims is meaningfully different. The 
core idea of Equal Consideration for Equal Claims is that claims of equal strength should 
have equal moral force. If we consider some claims and include them in our argument 
for why we save a particular group, we cannot then also say that claims of equal 
strength are irrelevant. If the claims against mild impairment of a member of B are 
irrelevant, then why is it fine to consider the claims against mild impairment of a 
member of A as relevant in deciding that we should save A? Any member of B facing 
a mild impairment can rightfully complain that we did not accord her with the same 
moral concern as the member of A. 
 Thus, I believe that we should accept at most that we balance in the interest 
of the strongest claim unless doing so violates Equal Consideration for Equal Claims. 
This means that we rule out this second case. We are left only with the first case. But, 
as I have argued, in this case my global relevance condition already ensures that a 
form of balancing that starts at the top is also in the interest of the person with the 
strongest claim. Strongest Decides is not an alternative to my view. 
 
47 Van Gils and Tomlin, “Relevance Rides Again?,” pp. 251-52. 
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Chapter 6. 
Constraints, You, and Your Victims 
 
“Individuals have rights, and there are things 
no person or group may do to them”. 
Nozick. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. p. ix 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 The quote with which Robert Nozick begins his Anarchy, State, and Utopia 
captures a position widely shared among deontologists. Nozick maintains that rights 
are not only one important normative consideration among others, but that they 
exclude some options available to us. Someone else’s right to life means that it is 
wrong for us to murder a person, full stop. Someone else’s right to privacy means 
that it is wrong for us to invade a person’s privacy, full stop. Nozick calls this position 
“rights as side constraints”.1 Following this view, it is impermissible to violate rights 
even if we thereby prevent more violations of the same right from happening. 
Assume I could save five people from being murdered by killing one person. Rights 
as side constraints would condemn the act, because our morally permissible options 
are constrained by the violation of the single person’s right. An action can be morally 
permissible only if it respects all side constraints.2 
 Not all deontologists would agree with Nozick’s understanding of rights. 
Indeed, many deontologists think that rights can be weighed against one another and 
overridden. Rights enjoy a certain normative priority over other moral 
considerations, but they do not have the power to categorically exclude courses of 
action. Deontologists often capture this status of rights by introducing a distinction 
between infringed and violated rights.3 In this chapter I do not want to enter the 
 
1 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, p. 29. 
2 Nozick leaves open the question whether there may be exceptions to side constraints in the 
case of “catastrophic moral horror”. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, p. 29fn. 
3 Joel Feinberg, Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1980), pp. 229-32; and Thomson, The Realm of Rights, pp. 82-104. 
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discussion among deontologists whether or not side constraints are co-extensive with 
rights, because in spite of the different positions on rights, deontologists share a 
common commitment. This commitment holds that there are at least some constraints 
on our actions that function in the way Nozick suggests. 
 The view that morally permissible actions have to respect all side constraints 
C is subject to a powerful criticism. Nozick appears to be the first to have articulated 
this criticism against his own view. Given that we care about the moral values that 
ground the side constraints C, isn’t it irrational to refuse to prevent as many violations 
as possible?4 How can one square caring about the non-violation of C while standing 
idly by when one could prevent many of these violations? Adherence to side 
constraints appears almost like a rights fetishism. Under a rival view, which Nozick 
calls “utilitarianism of rights” we ought to minimize rights violations. This view 
would still not be a form of utilitarianism as long as we determine which rights 
individuals have in a non-utilitarian manner. As such, utilitiarianism of rights 
escapes some of the standard criticisms standard utilitiarianism faces.5 
 There are (at least) two ways of responding to the irrationality objection. The 
first approach is an agent-based approach. It focuses on the agent making the decision 
and seeks to find something special about either her or the relationship she has with 
the victim. The second approach is a victim-based approach. This route to justifying 
constraints seeks to find a special feature in the victims and would-be victims. One 
way to bring out the contrast between agent- and victim-based justifications is the 
following. An agent-based justification focuses on the agent and what makes it 
impermissible for her to kill. A victim-based justification focuses on the victim and 
what makes it impermissible to kill him.6 
 
4 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, p. 30. The objection is sometimes also known as the 
“paradox of deontology”, a terminology due to Samuel Scheffler. See Scheffler, The Rejection 
of Consequentialism, pp. 80-114; and Samuel Scheffler, “Agent-Centered Restrictions, 
Rationality, and the Virtues,” Mind 94 (1985): 409-19. 
5 If, however, we determine rights instrumentally in virtue of the well-being that having these 
rights brings about, then utilitiarianism of rights turns into a version of rule utilitiarianism. It 
might then be described as a “negative rule utilitarianism” combining the focus on justifying 
general rules for actions together with a focus on minimizing evil instead of promoting good. 
6 Some defenses of deontological constraints defend constraints on the basis of a rejection of a 
maximizing conception of rationality. The irrationality objection dissipates, these authors 
argue, because rationality does not require us to promote all values. (See Paul Hurley, “Agent-
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While most accounts of side constraints are victim-based and many are based 
on the idea of inviolability, my aim in this chapter is to outline and defend an 
alternative, agent-based justification.7 We do not need to appeal to inviolability in 
order to justify deontological constraints. By focusing on the contribution of 
individual agents and their actions as opposed to the actions of different agents, this 
justification illustrates the importance of the separateness of agents that I highlighted 
in the introduction.8 Frances Kamm classifies agent-based justifications into three 
different groups. They can be agent-relative by giving different basic aims to different 
agents. They can be agent-focused by emphasizing a quality of agency. They can be 
 
Centered Restrictions: Clearing the Air of Paradox,” Ethics 108 (1997): 120-46; and Scanlon, 
What We Owe to Each Other, pp. 81-86.) Such a defense is incomplete, however, unless it gives 
us an account of why respect for rights should take the form of deontological constraints. Most 
would agree that we should save the greater rather than lesser number. Why not then violate 
one right to save many from rights violations? Answers to this question can again focus on 
the agent or on the victim. A genuinely third way is argued for by Christopher McMahon who 
argues that because there are other ways how to prevent the badness of rights violations we 
are not forced to minimize rights violations (Christopher McMahon, “The Paradox of 
Deontology,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 20 (1991): 350-77.) Constraints are not as solidly 
founded under this picture given that minimizing rights violations is still an available option 
to agents as McMahon admits.  
7 The standard account is Frances Kamm’s (F.M. Kamm, Morality, Mortality, vol. 2 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 259-89; Kamm, Intricate Ethics, pp. 17-31, 130-89, 227-84). 
Nozick’s justification resembles Kamm’s in many ways (Anarchy, State, and Utopia, pp. 30-50). 
Other prominent accounts that rely on inviolability are Warren Quinn’s (“Actions, Intentions, 
and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing,” Philosophical Review 98 (1989): 287-
312, at pp. 305-12) and Thomas Nagel’s (“Personal Rights and Public Space,” Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 24 (1995): 83-107, at pp. 89-99). Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen defends a revision of 
Kamm’s account that is also based on the idea of moral status (“Moral Status and the 
Impermissibility of Minimizing Violations,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 25 (1996): 333-51). 
Richard Brook gives a victim-based justification that does not rely on inviolability or moral 
status (“Agency and Morality,” Journal of Philosophy 88 (1991): 190-212, at pp. 201-9). For 
critical discussion see see Shelly Kagan, “Replies to my Critics,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 51 (1991): 919-28, at pp. 919-22; Lippert-Rasmussen, “Moral Status 
and the Impermissibility of Minimizing Violations”; David McNaughton and Piers Rawling, 
“On Defending Deontology,” Ratio 11 (1998): 37-54, at pp. 48-53; Michael Otsuka, “Are 
deontological constraints irrational?,” in The Cambridge Companion to Nozick’s Anarchy, State, 
and Utopia, ed. Ralf M. Bader and John Meadowcroft (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011), pp. 38-58; and Susanne Burri, “Personal Sovereignty and Our Moral Rights to 
Non-Interference,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 34 (2017): 621-34. 
8 I thereby respond to Frances Kamm who has rejected the idea that the separateness of agents 
can ground deontological constraints. See Kamm, “Moral Status and Personal Identity,” pp. 
290-91. 
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agent-concerned by focusing on what the violation of the constraint does to the agent.9 
My justification is not any of the three above but rather a relational agent-based 
justification. I focus on the relation between the agent and the victim.10 
After outlining my relational agent-based justification, I will, in Section III, 
introduce the problem of minimizing one’s own rights violations. Accounting for the 
wrongness of violating one right in order to prevent oneself from violating multiple 
rights poses the strongest challenge to agent-based justifications and I rise to this 
challenge in Sections III and IV. Before concluding, I will respond to two further 
criticisms of agent-based justifications, namely the charge that agent-based 
justifications are self-indulgent (Section V) and that they imply an unappealing 
symmetry between cases involving persons and non-persons (Section VI). 
 
II. A Relational Agent-Based Justification for Side Constraints 
 
 The irrationality objection compares two different states of affairs. To 
illustrate: A sadist has pushed a trolley towards five persons who will die if the trolley 
hits them. The only way for you to prevent this is by pushing an innocent bystander 
in front of the trolley, thereby killing her and stopping the trolley. In state of affairs 
A, you do nothing and five persons’ right to life is violated. In state of affairs B, you 
kill the bystander and one person’s right to life is violated. Surely, the violation of 
five rights is worse than the violation of one right, it is argued. However, there is, of 
course, the following relevant difference. In the second case, it is you who is violating 
the right, in the first case it is someone else. 
 
9 Kamm, Morality, Mortality, 2:238. A standard formulation of an agent-relative justification is 
given by Samuel Scheffler who ends up rejecting this argument (Scheffler, “Agent-Centered 
Restrictions, Rationality, and the Virtues”). For a defense see McNaughton and Rawlings, “On 
Defending Deontology”. Thomas Nagel provides a justification (The View From Nowhere, pp. 
175-85) which can be seen as an example of an agent-focused approach. Stephen Darwall’s 
justification can be interpreted as an example of the agent-concerned approach (“Agent-
Centered Restrictions from the Inside Out,” Philosophical Studies 50 (1986): 291-319). 
10 For a different example of the relational approach see Alec Walen, “Doing, Allowing, and 
Disabling: Some Principles Governing Deontological Restrictions,” Philosophical Studies 80 
(1995): 183-215, at pp. 185-90. Unlike my argument, Walen does not make clear how his 
justification avoids the standard criticisms which agent-based justifications face. 
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We have a special responsibility for our own actions, a responsibility that is 
greater than the responsibility we have for actions we let happen. To sharpen our 
understanding of this difference, consider the following pair of cases.11 Late at night 
you are driving through a scarcely populated area. You see at the side of the road a 
person who is bleeding and badly injured. There is no risk for her life, but she is in 
great pain. Given that you are morally motivated you decide to help her. Your phone 
does not have coverage, so you need to drive her to the nearest hospital. On the way 
your car breaks down. Luckily you see lights in a house nearby and decide to ask for 
help. An elderly lady opens the door but upon the sight of your bloody hands she 
locks herself into a room. The house does not have a telephone but only a car which 
you could use to help the injured stranger. The keys are unfortunately in the room 
where the old lady is locked in. In your desperation you look for solutions to get her 
to leave the room. The only solution you come up with is to use her grandchild which 
she left behind in the rush and twist her arm. Hearing her grandchild scream you are 
certain she will leave the room. Still, here you should not use the innocent child as a 
means to get the car keys. 
Contrast this with a case where you drive by the house and see the lady is 
about to twist the child’s arm. You have the chance to stop bringing the stranger to 
the hospital by stopping and intervening in the fight.12 But here, we think, you are 
not required to do so. The pain suffered by the stranger is by far greater than what 
the child will, unfortunately, experience. How do we explain this asymmetry? The 
easiest way is by appealing, as I already did, to the special responsibility we have for 
our own deeds. It would be you who hurts the child in the first case while it would 
be someone else in the second case. What is remarkable about these cases is that here 
facts about our own agency can overcome judgments about the wrongness of the 
different actions. This shows that facts about agency have a deeper role than merely 
being tie-breakers. 
 
11 The cases closely follow Nagel, The View From Nowhere, pp. 176-77. 
12 Assume it would take equally long to protect the child from the assault than it would to get 
the car started again in the earlier case. 
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There have been different attempts to explain why precisely we have this 
special responsibility. Thomas Nagel focuses on one aspect of our agency.13 One 
morally central part of our agency are intentional actions. What is special about our 
intentions is that our actions are guided by them. We adopt specific aims. In cases 
where we can do evil to prevent even more evil it would mean that we intend evil, 
we let ourselves be guided by evil aims. But, as Nagel puts it, “the essence of evil is 
that it should repel us”.14 This explains why evil should not be brought about 
intentionally by us. But what about evil that is allowed because of an evil intention? 
You might not stop to help the child not because you want to bring the stranger to 
the hospital, but because of your hatred of children. You let the harm happen out of 
an evil intention. It is even possible that your inaction (not helping) may be guided 
by evil aims. 
We can refine Nagel’s point with an argument made in defense of the doctrine 
of double effect. What counts is not whether or not agents have evil intentions. What 
counts is whether they have a justification for their action that does not require evil 
intentions.15 Evil should repel us at all times, but the repelling evil makes an act 
impermissible only when the repelling evil is unavoidable. We can illustrate this by 
considering our reasons for action. If the child were to object to our twisting her arm 
and voice her pain, this would only mean that we have succeeded. Only if the child 
is in pain we have achieved our aim. The child’s objection constitutes a reason for our 
action. This is not the case when we do not intervene and let harm happen. The harm 
that accrues to the child if the old lady twists the child’s arm does not have to be a 
reason for our inaction. We can wish that the child was not hurt. 
An alternative, and complementary, strategy departs from the idea that each 
of us has a special responsibility for one’s own life. We each have our own life to lead 
and it is incumbent upon us to lead a good life. The strategy is then to argue that the 
special responsibility for our lives should lead us to accept the special responsibility 
for our own actions. To see this, consider how we should treat our own actions if we 
 
13 Nagel, The View From Nowhere, pp. 180-85. 
14 Nagel, The View From Nowhere, p. 182. 
15 See William J. FitzPatrick, “Acts, intentions, and moral permissibility: in defence of the 
doctrine of double effect,” Analysis 63 (2003): 317-21. 
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did not have any special responsibility for them. We should take a purely 
instrumental view on our actions. What would matter is the overall outcome in the 
grand causal web, not what we contributed to it as opposed to others. It would not 
matter what the contribution of specific actions and specific persons are. The only 
thing that would matter is whether the opportunity to act (or fail to act) resulted in 
the optimal outcome. Such an instrumental attitude towards our actions cannot make 
sense of feelings of remorse or regret for what you in particular have done. The 
instrumental attitude can accept these sentiments only as irrational feelings that are 
a bad thing that happens. But this is not the content of these sentiments. Having done 
harm is not a bad thing that happened to a person. It is a flaw in that person’s life, a 
stain on one’s moral record. A person’s character, sense of self and integrity are 
bound up with what this person does. We identify with how we act. This 
identification and sense of integrity are part of our moral agency.16  
Just as we need to honor our own special responsibility for our own life, we 
need to respect the special responsibility of others for their lives. Doing harm means 
infringing in the sphere of control of someone else. It usurps the decision how a 
person’s life and body are to be used and thereby amounts to commandeering 
someone else’s life. This denies the other person her special responsibility for her life. 
Allowing harm, on the other hand, does not involve such commandeering of another 
person’s life. It does not involve a decision how this person’s life and body are to be 
used.17 Ronald Dworkin illustrates this idea with a swimming metaphor. The 
responsibility for our own life means that we are like swimmers who swim in 
different lanes. We are allowed to concentrate on swimming in our lanes and only 
sometimes are required to cross lanes in order to aid others. But what is more strictly 
forbidden is the crossing of lanes and the interference with others.18 This indicates 
 
16 See Williams, “A Critique of Utilitarianism,” pp. 93-118. 
17 Quinn, “Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing,” pp. 
308-10; Kamm, Intricate Ethics, pp. 17-21; and Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, ch. 13. This 
explanation may also explain why harming by merely foreseen but unintended side effects 
can be permissible. I discuss this issue shortly when discussing the limits of my construal of 
the distinction between killing and letting die. 
18 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, pp. 287-88. 
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that the special responsibility for our lives justifies the special responsibility for our 
actions. 
The special responsibility for our own actions and choices allows us to view 
the moral dilemma in the case of the sadist I mentioned at the beginning of this 
section from a first-personal perspective. Our special responsibility just means that 
there is something different about this perspective. Now from this perspective the 
action appears very different than from the impersonal perspective that compares 
states of affairs. From your first-personal perspective, you are confronted with your 
relation to the six individuals in the situation. What complaints can they make against 
your actions? The one who would be killed by you to save the five can complain that 
you would kill him. This is just like the girl in my earlier example who could complain 
that you would twist her arm and hurt her. Now the five others also have a complaint 
not to be killed. But this complaint is not directed to you, but to the original 
perpetrator causing the entire dilemma. To you, their complaint is still serious, but it 
is less serious than to the original perpetrator. If you would not discount the 
complaint to you, this would mean your relation to the victim was the same as the 
relation of the original perpetrator. This seems wrong. The parallel is here with the 
girl in the second case. Her complaint not to be hurt by having her arm twisted is 
directed to the old lady. To you she can only complain that you did not save her. In 
cases involving the killing of one you are thus facing one complaint against being 
killed versus five complaints against a failure to be saved. Given that we discounted 
the complaint of the five, it seems now plausible that you should act on the more 
serious complaint of the one. This is what we mean when we say that killing one is 
worse than letting five die. 
My construal of the distinction between killing and letting die can also explain 
the limits of this distinction. For example, it seems to many that it is permissible to 
save five people by diverting a trolley to a sidetrack where it would kill one bystander 
as an unintended side effect. In this case it would then be permissible to kill the one 
instead of letting the five die. Nagel’s understanding of the special responsibility for 
our actions can help explain this. It is a crucial component of Nagel’s view that 
intending evil is what makes acts impermissible. Insofar as the death of the bystander 
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is not intended, the case would not be covered by Nagel’s explanation. Similarly, 
Dworkin argues that using a person in order to save others constitutes usurpation of 
control. Insofar as the death of the bystander is not necessary for the saving of the 
five, we have not used the one in order to save the five. The trolley case would then 
not be covered by Dworkin’s explanation either. My argument in this article is 
compatible with both the possibility that diverting the trolley is permissible and with 
the possibility that it is impermissible.19 To avoid misunderstandings, any reference 
to the distinction between killing and letting die should therefore be understood as a 
difference between intentional killing or killing as a means or end and letting die.20 A 
second limit includes such killings that are not wrongful such as killing in self-
defense. Viewed from your first-personal perspective killing responsible aggressors 
in self-defense would not create any problem. If we take seriously the idea that 
responsible aggressors have made themselves liable to be killed, then a responsible 
aggressor would not have any grounds to complain to you. Therefore, we should 
understand further references to the distinction between letting die and killing as 
between letting die and pro tanto wrongful killing.21 
Deontological constraints can therefore be understood in terms of the 
relational construal of the distinction between killing and letting die. The reason why 
you are not permitted to violate the right of the one in the case of the sadist is because 
of the stronger complaint that the would-be victim has against you. Killing her would 
place you in a different relation to her than the relation in which you stand to the five 
that you let die. 
 
19 For the bystander case see Judith Jarvis Thomson, “The Trolley Problem,” Yale Law Journal 
94 (1985): 1395-1415, at pp. 1396-99. Thomson has later expressed some doubt on the 
permissibility of turning without ultimately endorsing either position. Judith Jarvis Thomson, 
“Turning the Trolley,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 36 (2008): 359-74. 
20 Whichever of the two depends on what one takes to be the salient explanation for why 
diverting the trolley in cases like the bystander case is (or seems) permissible. Intentional 
killing indicates a preference for the Doctrine of Double Effect, killing as a means indicates a 
preference for the Means Principle. 
21 One further comment: I adopt the phrase “killing is worse than letting die” and variations 
of it, given its familiarity. I think the phrase is misleading in some sense. The issue is not about 
whether killing or letting die is axiologically better, but rather whether one or the other is 
more justifiable. “It is harder to justify killing than to justify letting die” would be a more 
accurate statement. 
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III. The Puzzle of Minimizing One’s Own Rights Violations 
 
A. One’s Own Violations and the Guilty Agent 
 
 There is a powerful objection to the view and the reasoning that I just 
articulated. Kamm expressed this objection with her Guilty Agent case. You have set 
a bomb which will kill five people. Later you have a moral epiphany and realize that 
you ought not to have done this. The only way to prevent the bomb from killing the 
five is by shooting a sixth person and placing her body over the bomb.22 In this case 
my reasoning would seemingly lead to the conclusion that you ought to kill the one. 
After all, the complaints all six have towards you seem identical. Everyone can now 
complain to you that you would be killing her. More generally speaking, the case has 
the interesting twist that here you would prevent yourself from killing five people by 
killing one. It seems that you now have the option between (intentionally) killing five 
and (intentionally) killing one. But at the same time the deontological constraint 
against killing does not suddenly disappear because of some previous wrong you 
committed in the past. 
 This objection is indeed defeating for one version of an agent-based 
justification for constraints. We might conceive our special responsibility for our own 
actions as meaning that we should minimize our own violations of constraints. 
Kamm calls this justification agent-relative.23 Under this reconstruction of agent-based 
justifications we have not abandoned the idea of maximization altogether. We are 
still committed to the requirement of rationality to maximize our desired outcome. 
But the facts about our special responsibility of our own actions and our own agency 
make a difference nevertheless. They lead us to consider maximization relative to 
 
22 Kamm, Morality, Mortality, 2:242; and Intricate Ethics, pp. 26-27. Kamm credits Alan Zaitchik 
for coming up with cases of this kind. See Alan Zaitchik, “Trammell on Positive and Negative 
Duties,” The Personalist 58 (1977): 93-96. Cases of this kind are also discussed by Judith Jarvis 
Thomson and by Richard Brook. See Thomson, “The Trolley Problem,” pp. 1399-1401; 
Thomson, The Realm of Rights, pp. 139-140; and Brook, “Agency and Morality”, pp. 197-99. 
23 See McNaughton and Rawling, “On Defending Deontology”; Ulrike Heuer, “The Paradox 
of Deontology, Revisited,” in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. Volume 1, ed. Mark Timmons 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 237-67; and Christa M. Johnson, “The 
Intrapersonal Paradox of Deontology,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (2019): 279-301. 
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each agent. We act in accordance with such an agent-relative moral goal by abstaining 
from acting in the usual dilemma case. We minimize our own killings by not killing 
anyone but allowing the killing of the greater number. The Guilty Agent case shows 
that this solution does not work. There are cases in which we may be forced to violate 
a constraint in order to minimize our own violations. 24 
One response to the Guilty Agent would be to narrow down the scope of the 
minimizing requirement further. In addition to being agent-relative, the goal would 
also be temporally-relative. While the principle at stake here has the intuitively right 
answers, it is weak in justifying them. Why should we attach such great moral 
significance to the temporal specification? Perhaps the difference between now and a 
year later is seen as significant. You poison five people now and in a year time you 
frantically try to save them from the seemingly inevitable death. The only way to do 
so is by killing one person whose organs you can use to brew an effective antidote. 
Maybe we think that this time difference is significant. But what about now and 
tomorrow? Now and in one hour? Now and a moment from now? The latest 
difference does not carry any moral significance, yet the permissibility does not 
change depending on the time interval.25 
Christa Johnson, in a recent defense of constraints that is both agent-relative 
and time-relative, attempts to provide an answer to the question why differences in 
time are morally important. In order to justify time-relativity, Johnson invokes the 
“appeal to full relativity” according to which all reasons that speak in favor of agent-
relativity also speak in favor of time-relativity.26 Yet it is hard to see why this is the 
case. I argued that the best support for agent-relativity comes from the distinction 
between killing and letting die and the special responsibility we have for our actions. 
Thinking about one’s own responsibility as an agent would, if anything, seem to 
 
24 Heuer (“The Paradox of Deontology, Revisited”) bites the bullet and argues that 
deontological constraints do not in fact apply to this kind of case. Along with the vast majority 
of authors writing on this subject I will assume that deontological constraints should apply to 
the problem of minimizing one’s own violation. 
25 See Brook, “Agency and Morality,” pp. 198-201; Kamm, Intricate Ethics, p. 27; Otsuka, “Are 
deontological constraints irrational?,” pp. 44-46. 
26 Johnson, “The Intrapersonal Paradox of Deontology,” pp. 291-292; see also Nagel, The 
Possibility of Altruism, pp. 16-19, 99-100; and Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 137-148. 
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speak in favor of time-neutrality. After all, one is equally responsible for all parts of 
one’s life.27 Secondly, there seems to be an important difference between different 
persons and different points in time. The separateness of persons has moral 
significance in a way that the separateness of time points has not. This explains a clear 
asymmetry between agent-relativity where the separateness between one’s own life 
and the lives of others matters and time-relativity for which no comparable argument 
can be made.28 
 
B. Responding to the Guilty Agent 
 
 When I introduced the Guilty Agent case I said that it seems that you are facing 
the choice between killing five and killing one. Therefore, we cannot appeal to the 
distinction between doing and allowing in order to justify why you are facing a 
constraint against killing in this case as well. However, I need to correct myself. I do 
not think that this interpretation of the case is the correct one. Indeed, it is this 
mistaken interpretation which makes the Guilty Agent appear to be such a powerful 
objection to agent-based justifications. Once we see this interpretation is inaccurate, 
agent-based justifications will become a much more viable option than before. 
My argument proceeds in two steps. In the first step I argue that the choice 
the Guilty Agent is facing is one between doing and allowing. The argument is that 
the best description of the agent’s choices includes one of doing harm and the other 
of allowing harm. In the second step I examine the suggestion that the Guilty Agent’s 
allowing harm is relevantly different from standard cases of allowing harm. There 
are two possibly relevant disanalogies. First, the Guilty Agent is allowing the victim 
to be killed rather than merely allowing her to die. Second, the Guilty Agent is 
allowing the victim to be killed by herself rather than being killed simpliciter. 
However, I reject the suggestion that these forms of allowing harm are relevantly 
different from the standard case of allowing harm in the Guilty Agent case. 
 
27 See also Brook, “Agency and Morality,” p. 199. 
28 Brink, “Rational Egoism and the Separateness of Persons”. 
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My response may seem similar to invoking time-relativity which I rejected 
earlier. However, there are two important differences. First, unlike the agent- and 
time-relative view that I criticized, my justification does not rely on assigning agents 
different agent-relative goals. Instead, my justification highlighted that the objection 
to minimizing rights violations is grounded in the way the agent would relate to her 
victims if she were to kill the one to save the five from being killed. Second, I argue 
that the distinction between different actions is morally significant rather than the 
distinction between different points in time. Because different actions are carried out 
after one another it may seem that the difference in time is relevant. However, I argue 
that any significance of time is only derivate of the significance of distinguishing 
between separate actions. Thereby, I provide a more satisfactory answer to the 
question why differences in time can be morally important. 
 
C. First Step: Choice between Doing and Allowing 
 
To support my claim that in the situation of the Guilty Agent you are still 
facing a decision of doing versus allowing, consider my Inconclusive Agent. An agent 
has stabbed a person and wounded her seriously. The victim is suffering from severe 
blood loss, but not yet dead. It will take, say, half an hour until she dies from the 
blood loss. The agent is still present at the scene, she takes a deep breath and then 
starts to contemplate whether or not she should deliver first aid. She is inconclusive. 
On one side she is a sadist and enjoys seeing her victim suffering, on the other side 
she has some appreciation of the moral demand not to kill people. While she is 
contemplating, what is the agent doing? It seems that the agent is allowing the death 
of her victim by not delivering first aid. Her first action, the stabbing, is over and now 
she is engaged in another, different action. What makes this case peculiar is that the 
results of the first action are not yet known. It may be that the stabbing amounts to 
killing the victim (if she does not deliver first aid), it may be that it does not (if she 
delivers first aid). Therefore, we cannot fully describe what the first action was. It 
may be that the stabbing is best described as a killing or rather as merely attempting 
to kill. 
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My analysis of the Inconclusive Agent is strengthened by what Thomson calls 
the Reductive Theory of Action.29 According to the Reductive Theory of Action, every 
action is a set of bodily movements caused by intentions in the right way. The fact 
that an act can be given different descriptions only indicates that the same act can be 
described differently. The intention to kill caused the bodily movements which 
constituted the stabbing. When contemplating whether or not to continue, the agent 
is engaged in a different set of bodily movements or lack thereof. 
Even though my analysis follows naturally from the Reductive Theory of 
Action, a similar argument can be made assuming a rival view of action according to 
which differently described acts are numerically distinct acts.30 This view has two 
notable features. First, acts which the Reductive Theory of Action classifies as 
numerically identical stand in a relation of “amounting to”. The agent’s stabbing 
amounts to killing, or put otherwise, the agent kills by stabbing. Second, these actions 
can have different temporal extensions. In the Inconclusive Agent, the action of killing 
is continuing until the death of the victim. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the 
subsequent deliberation of the agent is part of the killing. The Inconclusive Agent’s 
stabbing rather than her contemplating will amount to the killing, and the stabbing 
is over. Even on this view, part of the killing, namely the stabbing, is in the past. When 
contemplating between delivering first aid or not, killing the victim is not one of the 
options she can choose from. She can only choose future actions. She can choose 
between waiting and helping, for example.31 These future actions may, in a similar 
spirit to the Reductive Theory of Action, then determine whether there will have been 
 
29 Thomson, The Realm of Rights, pp. 125-27. For a proponent see Donald Davidson, “Actions, 
Reasons, and Causes,” Journal of Philosophy 60 (1963): 685-700, at pp. 686-87; and Donald 
Davidson, “The Individuation of Events,” in Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel, ed. Nicholas 
Rescher (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1969), pp. 295-309. Other philosophers like G.E.M. Anscombe or 
Jonathan Bennett concur with the Reductive Theory of Action that co-occurring actions like 
the killing and stabbing are one and the same action, differently described. See G.E.M. 
Anscombe, Intention, 2nd edn. (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 11-12, 
37-47; and Jonathan Bennett, Events and their Names (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 
pp. 188-202. 
30 Alvin I. Goldman, A Theory of Human Action (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1970), 
chs. 1-3; Lawrence Davis, “Individuation of Action,” Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970): 520-30; 
and Judith Jarvis Thomson, “The Time of a Killing,” Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): 115-32. 
31 This is supported by Judith Thomson, a proponent of this theory of action. Thomson, “The 
Trolley Problem,” pp. 1399-1400; Thomson, The Realm of Rights, pp. 139-140. 
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a killing.32 But this does not make “killing” one of the options the Inconclusive Agent 
can choose when contemplating, since her waiting will not amount to a killing. 
The phenomenon that future actions can influence past actions is common for 
many actions whose typical outcomes we only see in the future. We can, of course, 
describe the action more basically as a stabbing.33 But the important description here 
is one that attaches special meaning to the action, like killing or letting die. To take a 
non-moral example, imagine a football player who shoots the ball aiming at goal. We 
do not know immediately whether the player scored a goal. This will depend on what 
other agents, in that case the goalkeeper, do. The standard case is this one where the 
description of our action depends on what other agents do. In the Inconclusive Agent 
case the interesting factor is that here the agent herself can change the description of 
the action after the action occurred. Should this make a difference for describing what 
the agent is doing in her second action? Should this turn an allowing into a doing? I 
cannot see why it should. For imagine that we learned that the Inconclusive Agent 
was not the agent who stabbed the victim. But in all other respects the Inconclusive 
Agent does the very same thing as before. Why should this turn her act into a doing 
as opposed to an allowing? She, like the perpetrator, sits next to the victim and goes 
through the very same thought processes while refraining from doing anything. It 
would be artificial to draw a line between the two agents and say that one is currently 
doing harm while the other is allowing it. 
Further, is this case relevantly different from the Guilty Agent case? It does not 
seem so. In the Guilty Agent case the first action, setting the bomb, is over. The Guilty 
Agent is, like the Inconclusive Agent, waiting for her action to yield results. Then, the 
Guilty Agent sees the opportunity to engage in a different action when she spots the 
sixth man who could mitigate the detonation. The Inconclusive Agent similarly sees 
 
32 Following this non-reductive theory of action, it can then be indeterminate whether an 
action is going on or not because this will depend on future events. Only if the Inconclusive 
Agent fails to intervene, it will be true that she was killing all along. This is one of the reasons 
why I reject the non-reductive theory and follow the reductive theory in my formulations. 
Another reason is that it makes it possible for acts to continue after the death of the agent. If 
the stabbing causes the victim to die after a prolonged coma, the killing would continue until 
the death of the victim. But it is possible for the perpetrator to die before the victim dies. If so, 
the current theory implausibly holds that the act of the agent continues after her death. 
33 Or focus on the more basic action of stabbing if we reject the Reductive Theory of Action. 
Chapter 6. Constraints, You, and Your Victims 
213 
 
the opportunity to engage in a different action when she spots the first aid kit which 
could save her victim’s life. If the Inconclusive Agent refrains from acting, she lets the 
person be killed. If the Guilty Agent refrains from acting, she similarly lets the five 
people be killed. However, should the Guilty Agent decide to shoot the one, she 
would be killing the one person. The decision therefore is not one of killing one or 
killing five, the decision is one of killing one or allowing five to die. 
 
D. Second Step: Killing versus Letting Be Killed 
 
One worry about my argument stems from the idea that not all forms of 
letting die are equal. The claim that killing is worse than letting die is familiar. But in 
the Guilty Agent and Inconclusive Agent cases you are facing a choice between killing 
and letting be killed. Perhaps this makes a difference. 
I submit that it does not.34 To see this, consider the following case. You stand 
in the middle of two tracks. Two trolleys are approaching, one on each track. On both 
tracks there are workmen whom you try to warn but who are unable to hear or see 
you. There is a lever that you can pull which would divert one of the two trolleys 
onto an empty sidetrack. You also know the following. The trolley on the left was set 
in motion by a villain, the trolley on the right broke loose naturally. Should you have 
any preference whom to save? In the case of the right-side trolley, the deaths would 
be an unfortunate accident. The workmen would not be killed in a rights-violating 
manner. In the case of the left-side trolley the workmen would be killed by the villain. 
If there is a difference between letting die and letting be killed, then we ought to save 
the workmen from the left-side trolley. Yet it would certainly not be wrong to save 
the workmen from the right-side trolley or to flip a fair coin to determine who should 
be saved. It would be permissible to be save either of the two groups or to give equal 
chances to both. 
 
 
34 For similar arguments and sentiments see Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, pp. 
109-110; Nagel, The View From Nowhere, p. 178; Thomson, The Realm of Rights, pp. 137-39, 142-
43; Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, p. 83. 
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E. Second Step: Killing versus Letting Be Killed by Oneself 
 
There is something peculiar, however, about both the Inconclusive and the 
Guilty Agent that is absent in my villain trolley case. In both cases we can add 
information having to do with the particular causal history of the agents facing the 
later choice. Not only do the two agents let their victims die, but they also let 
themselves become the killer of their victims. Now should this make a difference? We 
accepted that killing is worse than letting die. We also accepted that killing is worse 
than letting be killed. Should we think that letting oneself become the killer is worse 
than letting die (or be killed)? 
The best way to understand the proposal of “letting oneself become the killer” 
relates to the special normative situation in which we are once we have committed 
wrongs.35 Here it seems plausible that we have special obligations towards those we 
have wronged to make up for our wrong. Letting oneself become the killer carries 
some moral weight over and above letting die (or be killed). The reason here is similar 
to other special obligations. Consider the case of family bonds. Letting one’s partner 
die (or be killed) carries moral weight over and above letting die (or be killed). 
The context in which special obligations are most impactful are acts that 
would be discretionary if it was not for the presence of special obligations. For 
example, you are not required to drive a stranger to the hospital so that she receives 
care for her sprained ankle. You may do so, but if you do, your act would be 
supererogatory. The presence of a special obligation changes this picture. You are 
 
35 This is also suggested by Jason Hanna in an article on the difference between doing, 
allowing, and allowing one’s own doing. Hanna goes on to argue that a problem with this 
approach is that it cannot account for cases where current actions can prevent future actions 
given that in those cases the agent has not yet committed any wrong (Jason Hanna, “Doing, 
Allowing, and the Moral Relevance of the Past,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 12 (2015): 677-98, 
at pp. 680-89). In order for the problem to get off the ground Hanna needs cases in which it is 
certain that harm will be done. This cannot be said if the future action is one that is under the 
control of the agent. An agent could not claim that harm now was necessary to prevent future 
harm if the agent could have chosen not to harm at a later stage. The cases therefore involve 
harm that is caused in the absence of agency, for example during sleepwalking or due to 
mental incapacitation. I do not believe that a unified explanation for both of these cases is 
needed. Cases that involve killing without agency introduce further complications. These 
cases also do not raise the specific problem of the irrationality objection since it is doubtful 
whether such killings are rights violations. 
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required to drive your partner to the hospital for the sprained ankle treatment. In a 
similar vein, you would be required to drive a stranger to the hospital if you had 
wrongly sprained their ankle. (Assuming the stranger would be willing to let you 
drive her to the hospital.) Many other typical obligations towards one’s victims are 
part of this category. The obligation to apologize for our wrong is one example, as 
well as the obligation to compensate. There is little that speaks against these 
obligations here since no further person is entitled to your actions. 
Special obligations can also have an effect in a different context. Consider 
situations in which you can save only some but not everyone from harm. For 
example, many people are injured and need to be taken to the hospital. You are 
required to take as many as possible, but you are not able to take everyone. Special 
obligations can here tell you to prioritize those with whom you have special bonds. 
You are required to take your partner, just as you are required to take your own 
victim to the hospital. This does adversely affect those who are not saved. However, 
even in the absence of special obligations they would not have been wronged had 
other people been selected. 
Things are different, however, when other individuals have valid claims 
against you. Your special obligation to your partner would not license you to change 
the order of the waiting list for transplant kidneys that you administer. Others have 
a valid claim to you that you follow the procedure and allocate kidneys by reference 
to the waiting list. The question “why should it be fine for you to harm me because 
of your special ties” becomes salient. In the case of killing, it appears that it would be 
impermissible to kill an innocent bystander in order to save either oneself, or a close 
associate such as a partner or child, or even several of your children.36 The best reason 
for this is that special obligations cannot override the valid claims of third parties. 
This reason applies to special obligations towards one’s loved ones just as well as it 
applies to special obligations towards those one has previously wronged. If so, then 
the difference between letting be killed and letting be killed by oneself is morally 
 
36 E.g. Judith Jarvis Thomson, “Self-Defense,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 20 (1991): 283-310, at 
pp. 289-91; and Thomas Hurka, “Proportionality and the Morality of War,” Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 33 (2005): 34-66, at p. 60. 
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significant only in some contexts. Crucially, it is not significant in cases like the Guilty 
Agent when it comes to licensing harm. 
Why is it that special obligations are limited in this way and cannot override 
the claims of others? The reason is that special obligations derive their force from our 
general obligation not to harm individuals. Special obligations arise in particular 
contexts where roles or conventions specify the expectations of individuals. 
Frustrating or disappointing these expectations would breach the general injunction 
against harming.37 The argument that special obligations are local versions of our 
general obligation not to harm is most developed in the case of promising.38 In the 
case of promising, several philosophers have argued that our requirement to keep 
our promises is based on the general requirement not to raise expectations that one 
later frustrates. The fact that special obligations are subsidiary to our general 
obligations explains both why immoral relationships, conventions or agreements 
cannot give rise to obligations, and why special obligations cannot override the valid 
claims of third parties. 
Besides general considerations about special obligations, there are also 
reasons specific to the special obligation towards our own victims that indicate why 
this obligation should not license us to kill. The reason is that it is precisely the 
transgression of the constraint against killing that gave rise to the special obligation 
in the first place. There is something paradoxical about the idea that we can make up 
for our wrong by repeating what we just did. If someone asked us: “Why are you 
shooting this person?” our response “because I already shot some other people (and 
could use blood transfusions from my new victim to help my old victims)” seems 
odd. We would point out that the realization that the earlier act was wrong should 
give us a strong reason not to engage in the further act of shooting even more people. 
The obligation towards our victims is born out of a recognition and realization of the 
fact that we ought not harm. The obligation is subsidiary to the overall demand on 
us not to act in ways that impose serious harm. 
 
37 See Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, pp. 300-17. 
38 E.g. Thomson, The Realm of Rights, pp. 294-321; Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, ch. 7; 
and Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, pp. 303-11. 
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There is something incoherent about a morality which allows us to kill in 
order to save from killing. If it were permissible to save one person by killing 
someone else, then we would be allowed, for example, to point our gun towards the 
second person. But then by pointing our gun we have placed this person under as 
much danger as the first person was under. She would now have a claim that we 
ought to come to her rescue by killing someone else. This would mean our actions 
replicate the exact same situation we started with. Morally speaking we are in no way 
better off.39 
Now it may be objected that my argument works well only because I have 
considered easy cases so far in which we would be saving one person by killing 
another one. But in the cases involving deontological constraints the interesting 
feature is that we would be saving many people by killing someone else. What I want 
to suggest is that this feature is not relevant for our special obligation to make good 
for our wrong. Our obligation is directed to someone, it is not an impersonal value 
judgment but an obligation owed to someone. By killing the one you would honor 
your obligation towards each of the five separately. The special feature of your 
relation with your victims is one that holds only between your victim and you. This 
gives you a reason to treat the case as one of pairwise comparisons between each of 
your to-be victims and the one person you are about to kill. This pairwise comparison 
assess what you would be doing and the reasons you have for each option rather than 
comparing the harm the victims will incur. In this case this means a comparison 
between killing and allowing the death of one’s own victim. If this is correct, then the 
aforementioned reasons hold. The fact that you can replicate the same reason five 
times does not matter since your obligation is owed to the individuals and not to the 
group. Therefore, your action has to be based on the various individual’s complaints 
and not on complaints of groups. 
My reasoning can also explain why we are not allowed to harm a new victim 
in ways that fall short of killing. For example, it seems plausible to me to say that we 
 
39 Quinn gives a similar example where the agent would be killing two in order to save one. 
Quinn, “Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing,” pp. 
307-8. 
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should rather let our own victim die instead of mutilating someone else. I have 
argued earlier that the distinction between doing and allowing is strong enough to 
warrant a restriction on our actions when we could let more harm happen. This 
would be an example of such a case. I further denied that our special obligation 
towards our own victim makes a difference in cases of this kind. 
My reasoning concerning special obligations also explains an asymmetry 
between cases of constraints where persons are involved and parallel cases of 
material goods. It would be wrong to kill the one to prevent ourselves from becoming 
the killer of the five. But it seems permissible to destroy one piece of art if this is the 
only way to prevent ourselves from destroying five pieces of art. (Imagine that you 
have set a bomb that is going to destroy five Margritte paintings. The only way to 
defuse the bomb is to shield them with one equally great painting by Monet.40) In 
such a case we are confronted with impersonal value judgments and no longer with 
obligations owed to someone in particular. 
To sum up, I agree that there is a difference between letting die (or be killed) 
and letting oneself become the killer. The difference is context sensitive. It can explain 
why we should prioritize aiding our own victims where we can. It can also explain 
why even on an agent-based justification for constraints we can be allowed to 
minimize our own wrongdoings in cases where material goods and not persons are 
involved. But I deny that the difference is significant enough to allow the killing of 
one in order to save five of one’s own victims. Previously I justified the distinction 
between killing and letting die by appealing to the relation of the potential victims 
and the agent. The one person has a complaint not to be killed. The five have a 
complaint to be saved. They can add a complaint based on your special historic 
responsibility. They can complain that refraining from saving means refraining from 
saving them from your killing them. But I denied that this complaint would be strong 
enough. 
 
 
 
 
40 See also Kamm, Morality, Mortality, 2:241-42. 
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IV. Why Evaluate Actions One at a Time? 
 
 Thus far I have argued that the Guilty Agent is facing a problem of doing 
versus allowing in her second decision when deciding whether to place the sixth man 
over the bomb. If this is the case, then the agent-based rationale can be defended 
against the Guilty Agent case. There is one more caveat to the argument. In this 
statement I have tacitly assumed that we are justified in regarding the second action 
separately from the first one. But why should we regard them separately and not in 
conjunction with one another? It still remains true that with my second action, I can 
prevent myself from killing five people. I cannot undo my first action, but I can alter 
the results of my first action. So there is a sense in which whatever I will do, I will 
have killed either the one or the five. My argument has only shown that I will not 
have killed the five with my second action. Why should this matter? Why cannot the 
five complain to me that if I do not save them that I will have killed them? 
 We have a contrast here between two different questions that we can ask: (1) 
What should I do? (2) What should it be the case that I will have done? The two 
questions seem identical and they will in most cases yield the same answer. But in 
the cases I am considering they come apart since my second action can alter what can 
truthfully be said about my first action. Question (1) phrases the choice as between 
killing one or letting five people be killed by oneself. This is the question I have been 
answering so far. Question (2) phrases the choice as between having killed one person 
or having killed five persons. It asks us to evaluate our actions retrospectively. We 
should adopt a later point in time and evaluate what we will have done.41 
 
41 The choice here resembles a choice that both Hanna and Ingmar Persson have argued is a 
challenge for how proponents of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing should treat cases of 
allowing one’s own doing. (Ingmar Persson, From Morality to the End of Reason (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), pp. 102-5; Jason Hanna, “Enabling Harm, Doing Harm, and Undoing 
One’s Own Behavior,” Ethics 126 (2015): 68-90, at pp. 86-89; and Hanna, “Doing, Allowing, 
and the Moral Relevance of the Past,” pp. 683-85.) Either we take a view that only the present 
action matters (akin to Question 1), in which case we cannot tell allowing one’s own doing 
apart from standard cases of allowing. Alternatively, we focus on the reasons the agent has to 
ensure no one will be harmed (akin to Question 2), in which case we cannot account for 
intuitions about deontological constraints. The argument in my previous section, however, 
has shown that the first option can take into consideration the past. One’s past actions can 
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 I think the first question is the appropriate one. The most fundamental 
question of morality is “what should I do” or perhaps “what ought I to do”. Morality 
is a practical inquiry in our actions. It is a guide for action and asks how we should 
face and decide decision problems. It asks us to choose among the options currently 
available to us. And the options available to us are the different choices we can make. 
In the case of the Guilty Agent you choose how to act with our second action. Only 
derivatively it becomes true how you will have acted with our first action. You are 
not performing this first action, but only influencing its description and meaning. The 
relevant choice is between what you are doing with your new, second action. 
 While this view is seldom articulated, it has been recognized before. Judith 
Jarvis Thomson argues that in a case similar to the Guilty Agent case the perspective 
of the present action is relevant because the agent has to act in the present. It is the 
options that are available to the agent when deciding to act which count.42 T.M. 
Scanlon argues that it is a feature of moral principles that they can be employed as 
guides to deliberation. As such, the principles seek to answer the question “May one 
do X?”. Scanlon concedes that the question of permissibility can also be employed 
retrospectively or hypothetically. But the question of permissibility must also be 
possibly the object of a decision.43 This indicates a close link between permissibility 
and the perspective of making a decision. Among other things, it means that the 
question of permissibility applies only to options that are in the choice set of an 
agent.44 
 We can also see the appropriateness of the question “what should I do” by 
considering whether “ought” should be understood objectively. If ought should be 
understood objectively, then actual results of actions determine the permissibility of 
actions. An action which leads to harm through an unforeseeable and unpredictable 
process would be impermissible according to the objective ought. But this does not 
seem correct. Fluke consequences should not render otherwise innocuous actions 
 
determine which special obligations one has now. If we can show that the first question is the 
right one to ask, then the challenge disappears. 
42 Thomson, “The Trolley Problem,” pp. 1414-15. 
43 Scanlon, Moral Dimensions, pp. 9-10, 21-24. 
44 Scanlon, Moral Dimensions, pp. 58-59. 
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impermissible. This reason indicates that moral permissibility should be connected 
to a deliberative and action-guiding function.45 In other words, it brings the question 
“what should I do” back in the focus. 
 On the other hand, the question “what should it be the case that I will have 
done” is misguided in thinking about which action to perform. Someone who 
approaches the decision in the Guilty Agent case thinking about whether or not she 
will become the killer of only one or of five people, is clearly asking the wrong 
question. Her question shows excessive self-concern for her own perspective. This is 
one way how an agent can show excessive self-concern in the face of moral decisions. 
The agent reasons that if she does not save the five, she will become a mass killer. 
And this, presumably, is worse than becoming a killer of one. Reasoning in such a 
way in order to decide what to do is insensitive to the moral problem at hand. 
Morality is about what we should do and what reasons we have for choosing among 
our actions. It is not about keeping one’s hands clean. Asking ourselves of which 
things it will be true that we have committed them appears to me like keeping a 
scorecard of one’s own moral record or collecting points to get into the good place. It 
does not show the right attitude of engagement with the moral dilemma we are facing 
at the moment. While agents can rightly reflect on their moral records, this reflection 
should not become decisive when thinking about actions that significantly impact 
others by possibly violating their rights. 
 This is not to deny that our past actions can matter, but they matter in a subtler 
way. We can acknowledge the importance of history without evaluating past and 
present together. What we did in the past can change our reasons for our future 
actions. I have already indicated one way how this may come about. We acquire a 
special obligation towards the people we have put in danger. But we can ask about 
the effect of this special obligation purely by reference to the new decision we now 
have to make. I have argued that in cases involving deontological constraints this 
special obligation would not be strong enough to change what we all-things-
considered ought to do. But in other cases it will be. In deciding whether to help your 
 
45 Scanlon, Moral Dimensions, pp. 47-52 for a similar argument. 
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own victim or another victim, you are allowed to suspend impartiality between the 
two and attend to your own victim with priority. 
 I mentioned earlier that the second question asks for a kind of retrospective 
justification. It is important to distinguish the kind of retrospective justification that 
the question is asking for from more plausible candidates of retrospective 
justification. First, we might ask retrospectively what we should have done in the 
past. In this sense it is still a deliberative question. We reexamine the deliberation at 
the time of action, or perhaps we only now have time to deliberate whether our 
instinctive action was indeed right or wrong. Even though it is retrospective, we put 
ourselves in the position at the time of the decision. Second, future events may have 
an impact on the question whether or not we should feel regret or even be 
blameworthy for past wrongs. Bernard Williams gives the example of the painter 
Gauguin who abandons his family to go to paint in Tahiti. Gauguin’s later success 
renders this abandonment the beginning of great artistic success. Perhaps, if this 
artistic success is also of sufficient moral value, Gauguin should not feel regret for 
this choice.46 But neither of the two senses of retrospective justification is at play in 
the question “what should it be the case that I will have done”. The question is not 
phrased as a mere restatement of the deliberative question, and the question is not 
about the appropriateness of reactive attitudes. Since neither of the two plausible 
readings of retrospective justification can be attached to question (2), we should 
regard it as the wrong question to ask. 
This gives us now a good criterion for assessing the actions seriatim and in 
isolation. Note that this position responds to the worries that temporal restrictions on 
agent-relativity are not morally significant. I am convinced by the criticism that 
differences in time, at least small differences, do not carry moral significance. 
However, the criterion I have used is not a temporal one, but the criterion of being 
the same action. My stabbing in the Inconclusive Agent case will take several moments, 
 
46 B.A.O. Williams, “Moral Luck,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 50 (1976): 115-35, at pp. 
117-23. See also Elizabeth Harman, “’I’ll Be Glad I Did It’ Reasoning and the Significance of 
Future Desires,” Philosophical Perspectives 23 (2009): 177-99; R. Jay Wallace, The View From Here 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), chs. 1-4; and Bernhard Salow, “Partiality and 
Retrospective Justification,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 45 (2017): 8-26. 
Chapter 6. Constraints, You, and Your Victims 
223 
 
nevertheless it is the same action. The distinction between actions has sufficient moral 
significance to treat them separately as I have argued. 
 
V. Self-Indulgence 
 
 I have already mentioned how thinking about “what should it be the case that 
I will have done” is unduly self-concerned. The focus of the question is on what it 
will be the case that can be said about the agent. Having killed five is then worse than 
having killed one. It is worse because being the killer of five is worse than being the 
killer of one. To ask this question, detached from the victims with whom the agent is 
in contact now, is to abstract away from them. It is to ask what happens to oneself as 
opposed to what one does to others. The question is a reminder of an attitude where 
the agent keeps a scorecard of her moral record or collects points to get into the good 
place. 
 While keeping a scorecard of one’s moral record is unduly self-concerned, it 
is not the only source of excessive self-concern. To think that we should not harm a 
person because it would mean that we have to get our hands dirty would be another 
example. As Nagel asks: “[What] gives one man a right to put the purity of his soul 
or the cleanness of his hands above the lives or welfare of large numbers of other 
people?”47 This thought comes out most clearly in the kind of justification Kamm calls 
agent-concerned. But there is a concern that the objection generalizes to all agent-based 
justifications. 48 Because agent-based justifications focus on the agent as opposed to 
the victim, they raise a natural suspicion of being excessively self-concerned. The 
objection is that a justification why it is wrong to kill or violate rights ends up focusing 
exclusively on the killer and not on the person whose rights are at stake. Naturally, 
the question arises whether this objection applies to my construal of agent-based 
justifications as well. 
 
47 Nagel, Mortal Questions, p. 63. 
48 Scheffler, “Agent-Centered Restrictions, Rationality, and the Virtues,” pp. 415-17; and 
Kamm, Morality, Mortality, 2:249-52. 
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 My agent-based justification started out with the special responsibility for our 
own actions. In this sense, the justification is linked to the agent. This special 
responsibility, I have argued, allows us to view the moral problem from a first-
personal perspective. It asks you to assess the relation between your victim and you. 
The different relation that you have to the victim you are killing and to the victim 
that you are letting die explains the moral asymmetry between the two. The 
difference is not explained by the general fact that killing is (impersonally) worse 
than letting die. Nor is it explained by a reluctance of the agent to kill. We should 
draw a distinction between those agent-based justifications which rely on reasons 
related to the agent alone and those which rely on the relation between the agent and 
the victim. All three familiar categories of agent-based justifications (agent-relative, 
agent-focused, agent-concerned) are plausibly grouped together in the first group and 
contrast with my relational justification. 
 This relational understanding can help us respond to the charge of self-
indulgence. The justification brings the victim into the picture. The constraint against 
killing the one exists not because of a feature of you, the agent, but rather because of 
your relation to your victim. This indicates that the justification is not unduly self-
concerned but receptive to the fate of the victim. For example, my relational 
understanding would not rule out killing a person who wants to die. Justifications 
that emphasize that killing is impersonally bad or that agents should not get their 
hands dirty would seem to extend to these cases of voluntary euthanasia as well. 
These justifications are not receptive of the fate of the victim and can plausibly be 
charged with excessive self-concern. My justification, however, does not have this 
feature. Whether or not it is correct to charge non-relational agent-based justifications 
with self-indulgence is a question I cannot assess here. But what I have argued is that 
relational agent-based justifications like mine are not guilty of self-indulgence. 
 
VI. Constraints and Non-Persons 
 
 A further criticism against agent-based justifications is that they are 
overbroad. They apply to the killing of persons and non-persons alike. Justifying why 
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persons and non-persons should be treated differently would indicate, Kamm argues, 
that it is actually a feature of the victim that makes the transgression of the constraint 
impermissible.49 But there is also a motivation for not divorcing the case of persons 
and non-persons. In both cases, we can find examples where it seems that we should 
not do evil in order to bring good about (or prevent evil). There is some hesitation to 
pre-emptively bomb cultural heritage in war even if this bombing would demoralize 
the opponent who then will no longer destroy a slightly more valuable cultural 
heritage. Perhaps there is even a constraint against doing so. If this is so, a more 
unified explanation of these phenomena would be more satisfactory.50 
 My justification can integrate these two concerns better than victim-based 
justifications can. I argued that we have a special responsibility for our own actions. 
This special responsibility allows us to view moral issues from a first-personal 
perspective. In the case of persons this means that we have to take into account the 
moral relation between us and our potential victims. But the special responsibility 
also holds when there are no persons involved. Given the absence of relational 
reasons, the difference between doing and allowing is less stark in cases involving 
non-persons. This explains the asymmetry between persons and non-persons. There 
will be fewer deontological constraints against wrongdoing that does not involve 
wronging. But it does so by appealing to a common justification for constraints in 
personal and non-personal cases. 
 The same difference appears again in cases where we can minimize our own 
wrong by performing the same action. The previous conduct has given rise to a 
special responsibility for our past actions. In the case of persons this takes the form 
of a moral obligation that is owed to our victims. I have argued that this directedness 
can help us explain deontological constraints. In the case of non-persons, the special 
responsibility is not directed. Therefore, there are fewer constraints against 
minimizing our own wrongs in the case of non-persons.51 Again, we observe an 
 
49 Kamm, Morality, Mortality, 2:241-42 and Intricate Ethics, p. 28. 
50 See also Michael Otsuka, “Kamm on the Morality of Killing,” Ethics 108 (1997): 197-207, at 
p. 205. 
51 I say fewer because the following judgment is still possible: Doing A is worse than letting 
oneself do B, where A and B are damage done to a non-person and B is a slightly greater 
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asymmetry between persons and non-persons that is grounded in a common 
justification. 
 
VII. The Next Constraint You Come Up Against 
 
 In this chapter, I have outlined an agent-based justification for side constraints 
based on the distinction between doing and allowing. Unlike the familiar agent-
relative, agent-focused or agent-concerned justification, my justification is relational. 
It emphasizes the moral relation the agent has with her would-be victims. I have 
responded to the Guilty Agent and the problem of how to account for a constraint 
against minimizing one’s own violations. The Guilty Agent rests on a mistaken 
analysis of the choices the agent is facing. The case involves two separate actions and 
we have good reason to distinguish the moral evaluation of actions separately. If we 
do so, we can justify constraints in cases where minimizing one’s own violations is at 
stake, too. My justification can also respond to the criticism of self-indulgence and 
can treat cases of non-persons better than victim-based accounts. 
 Constraints tell us that individuals have rights and there are things no person 
may do to them. We are constrained, in each action, simply by the next constraint that 
we come up against. There is nothing special about the one victim as opposed to the 
other victims. You simply encounter her right in the given situation. Kamm imagines 
a potential victim saying that “[it] is impermissible to treat people in certain ways 
and so it is not permissible to treat me in this way; I am simply the first person with 
this status that you came up against.”52 I think this is a correct and very helpful way 
of understanding deontological constraints. Kamm justifies the constraining right by 
appealing to inviolability and high moral status. My justification shows that we do 
not need to make any such appeal if we want to justify that we are constrained by the 
next constraint we come up against. The one person has a right not to be killed. My 
argument that killing the one is harder to justify than letting five die establishes that 
 
damage than A. I do not know whether there are any such cases, but nothing what I have said 
rules them out. 
52 Kamm, Morality, Mortality, 2:248. 
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there is no exception to this right for the sake of saving the five. My further arguments 
that the distinctions between letting die and letting be killed, and between letting be 
killed and letting be killed by oneself, are not relevant in this case support this further. 
The arguments add that there cannot be any exception for the sake of minimizing 
violations of rights. It is the fact that we come up against the next constraining right 
that is the reason why we may not kill, but my argument does not need to rely on the 
idea of inviolability to make sense of this statement. 
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